

POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR LEICESTERSHIRE JOINT AUDIT, RISK & ASSURANCE PANEL

Paper
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Report of	OFFICES OF CHIEF CONSTABLE AND POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER
Subject	RISK REGISTER
Date	FRIDAY 17 th MARCH 2017 – 9.00 A.M.
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Purpose of report

1. This report provides JARAP with information about the corporate risk register, highlighting high priority, newly registered and risks of note.

Recommendation

2. The panel is asked to discuss the contents of this report and note the current state of risk arrangements.

Summary

3. The force Strategic Organisational Risk Board (SORB) oversees and directs the strategic risks facing the force. This board last met on 9th February 2017 and was chaired by DCC Bannister. At this board the OPCC were represented. The JARAP were unrepresented.
4. The OPCC risks are overseen by the Chief Finance Officer and presented to the Senior Management Team within the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

Risk

5. The corporate risk register identifies the key strategic risks. In the main these risks represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.
6. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 - 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a risk priority rating, which is expressed as a 'RAG' rating.

Priority Rating	'RAG' Rating	Review
9 - 16	High	Monthly
5 - 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 - 4	Low	3 Monthly

Risk status

7. *Controlled* – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Orchid risk register the term 'Awaiting Control' is used to describe this status.

Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably controlled.

Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review. It may also be a new risk prior to first review or a risk transferred to a new 'Responsible Officer'.

Strategic risks

8. On the corporate risk register there are 42 police strategic risks and 9 OPCC strategic risks.

The overall risk rating grid for the corporate risk register is shown below.

Corporate Risk Rating Grid		Likelihood			
		Very High	High	Medium	Low
Impact	Very High	0	1	2	0
	High	0	3	9	8
	Medium	3	1	17	4
	Low	0	1	0	2

There are 4 high priority risks, 8 new risks and 2 risks of note. Since the last JARAP meeting, 3 risks have been archived. All of these risks are outlined within Appendix A.

The full corporate risk register is attached as Appendix B.

Implications

Financial

STR1844 – Failure to transition to the ESN.
Costs incurred by the infrastructure upgrade and purchase of new equipment.

STR1329 – Transforming services.
This revolves around providing services with the reduced budget.

Equality impact assessment

STR430 – Disability related harassment.
The police reputation for providing a fair and equitable service may be damaged.

Risks and impact

As per the tables above.

Link to Police and Crime Plan

As per report.

Appendices

Appendix A: Strategic Risks
Appendix B: Corporate Risk Register
Appendix C: Risk Matrix

Persons to contact

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Appendix A – Strategic Risks

High risks

STR1844		Failure to transition to the ESN	
Responsible Officer	Chief Superintendent Helen Chamberlain Tri Force Collaboration	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	15/08/14	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	High (12)
Information	The Tri force collaboration is managing the transition to ESN as a programme. Leicestershire Police's contract with Airwave is due to expire on 06/01/17. Airwave is a private network, based on the TETRA standard that uses masts to provide national coverage. Centrally the government are driving the procurement process as every emergency service will move to mobile communications. There is a national project team that is engaging with individual forces to gauge concerns and provide updates.		
Impact	This risk is concerned with the operational impact of not transitioning. There is uncertainty about how well the mobile network will respond to increased traffic and whether the emergency services will have priority. In addition, we do not know what functionality issues there may be and how our practices may have to be altered.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purchase of repair credits for existing Sepura Airwave radios. • Monitoring of Airwave performance • COT oversight • Maintaining close contact with national police project team • Regional Airwave user group • Regional coordination and strategic oversight • Tri Force Programme • ICCS infrastructure upgrade 		
Update	28/02/17 – Helen Chamberlain:- We have a very active risk and issues log for the Tri Force Collaboration project acting as mitigation as it covers off a lot of the areas around transition. We continue to manage the project effectively and have recruited to key roles. We are also linked in directly with the national programme; there is now slippage to no earlier than June 2018. Current status: managed.		

STR1679		Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime	
Responsible Officer	Caroline Barker Crime Registrar	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	12/06/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The Service Improvement Unit carried out a number of audits under the heading "Missed Opportunities" which identified issues with the accuracy of our crime recording, both on initial contact and in relation to classification of crime. In addition, in April 2015 the Home Office Crime Recording reduced the timescale for when crimes must be recorded from 72 hours to 24 hours.		
Impact	Operational: crimes not being recorded. Reputational: loss of confidence in published figures and in the police as a whole.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audit of 'STORM' incidents within CMD – compliance check • Audit schedule – conducted by the Service Improvement Unit • Task and finish groups – part of Get it Right 1st Time • Communication plan – as part of Get it Right 1st Time • Get it Right 1st Time – Gold Group • HMIC inspection • Introduction of the Investigative Management Unit 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Get it Right 1st Time delivery plan 		
Update	13/02/17 – Caroline Barker:- There is no significant change to the risk at present, the controls remain in place. The Get It Right First Time meetings continue with work ongoing with the delivery plan. Current status: controls tasked.		

STR1935		Management of seized and found property provision	
Responsible Officer	Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	30/06/16	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	A series of internal audits and related staff issues have highlighted that the organisational provision and processes relating to property are in need of comprehensive review. Some of the themes highlighted include; no single point of leadership, lack of clear processes and a high volume of property retained with no systematic process for disposal. With this risk there is an opportunity to improve the current service provision.		
Impact	There is an operational impact of items being missing, which may be required for investigation purposes. There is a reputational risk associated to the poor management of the force property provision where items are lost, whether through theft or being unaccounted for.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Internal audit completed Force Property Working Group Safe audit Appointment of Project Manager and team Force Property Manager Policies and procedures 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Property review project 		
Update	<p>01/03/17 – Jez Leavesley (Property Project Consultant):- Work continues with the identified workstreams. Individual sub policies are now nearly all completed, with work commenced on the overarching strategy. Key risks around ageing freezers and security of temporary stores are being addressed. As requested at the last Change Board, a feasibility study is going to be conducted around the housing of a new main property store at police headquarters. Current status: controls tasked.</p>		

OPCC1694		Lack of resource and capacity available to the PCC	
Responsible Officer	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	19/07/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Infrastructure	Previous Rating	Low (3)
Information	Lack of appropriate resource and capacity available to OPCC.		
Impact	Ability to deliver PCC priorities.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review and consider options for new PCC Deputy and Advisor arrangements PDR process to monitor and enhance staff performance and development OPCC structure reviewed and new structure finalised Undertake interim and permanent review of structure to ensure appropriate Continuous development permanent resource Skills analysis requirements for the OPCC completed as part of new structure Existing staff matched into roles within the new structures Experienced and interim staff provide capacity All "non operational" employees of the Office of the Chief Constable available to PCC at all times under legislation PDRs in place for all staff Undertake OPCC team development sessions to focus and develop the workforce Business Plan in place and under review 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Deputy PCC review of office structure Force and interim staff to provide additional capacity Recruit to roles in office Undertake appropriate consultation with staff Develop Training and PDRs for all office staff 		
Update	<p>02/03/17 – Helen King:- This risk has been fully updated to reflect requirements for additional capacity and consultation on staff structure. Current status: controls tasked.</p>		

Risk of note

OPCC1934	Newly elected PCC for LLR could result in widespread change		
Responsible Officer	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Impact/Likelihood	Low/Low
Date Recorded	16/06/16	Current Rating	Low (1)
Category	Politics/Legal	Previous Rating	Medium (6)
Information	Newly elected PCC for LLR could result in widespread change.		
Impact	This could lead to the following possible impacts:- The way policing and Commissioning services are delivered. Relationships with partners (including Police). Public perception of the PCC. Media coverage of significant change. Challenges around the use of resources (including financial) to deliver the new PCC's political or strategic priorities.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Role of Strategic Assurance Board (SAB) • Police & Crime Panel's role in developing a Police & Crime Plan • Induction pack prepared for new PCC • PCC Information pack for candidates • Prospective PCC candidate events with Force/OPCC • Key Briefings and Meetings for new PCC • Website repository for key information/articles • Enhanced Public Engagement via a developing strategy • Timeline for development of new PCC's Police & Crime Plan established • Key meetings, induction and briefings continue until the PCC is fully informed • SMT & COT Visioning Workshops established • PCC consultation & survey plan 		
Update	02/03/17 – Helen King:- The PCC election has taken place and the PCC taken up Office. The risk was associated to the uncertainty ahead of the election outcome and therefore the risk will not exist again until new PCC due. Current status: controlled.		

New risks

STR1948	Resilience of LAN connectivity		
Responsible Officer	David Craig Head of IT	Impact/Likelihood	High/Medium
Date Recorded	13/12/16	Current Rating	Medium (6)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	Following the flood in Admin 2, there is just one Local Area Network (LAN) node providing network services to headquarters. Whilst we have physical controls (Air Con, Uninterrupted Power Supply, fire protection and physical access) in place to protect the service, we have reduced resilience until a further node can be restored in Admin 2.		
Impact	Having just one LAN node creates vulnerability for headquarters networking. If this fails or the physical controls do not behave as expected the ability to maintain critical functions will be compromised.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BC plans • Network maintenance contract • Change control process • DR plans • Engagement with Estates around restoration of Admin 2 • Physical controls (UPS, AC, fire and physical) • Preservation of Comms server room 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinstate resilient node at Force headquarters 		
Update	05/01/17 – David Craig:- Estates are working to restore the HQ Admin 2 building to provide permanent accommodation for a resilient network node. Current status: controls tasked.		

STR1947	Resilience of WAN connectivity		
Responsible Officer	David Craig Head of IT	Impact/Likelihood	High/Medium
Date Recorded	12/09/16	Current Rating	Medium (6)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	Following the flood in Admin 2, there is just one Wide Area Network (WAN) link providing connectivity for headquarters and the wider force. Work is being completed to reinstate the service with Virgin Media to reroute the existing fibre and terminate it in HQ Comms. This will be an interim measure until it can be restored in Admin 2.		
Impact	Having just one WAN link creates vulnerability issues for the force as there is no resilience. If the remaining WAN link fails the force will be unable to access critical systems based at Force HQ.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Engagement with Virgin Media Engagement with contractors to make them aware DR plans BC plans Change control process Network maintenance contract Service level agreement with suppliers WAN link temporarily restored to HQ CR1 & 4 data centre 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reinstate resilient node at Force headquarters 		
Update	05/01/17 – David Craig:- The link has been temporarily restored to HQ Computer Room 1 and 4, providing resilience to the connectivity between headquarters and the wider force. The risk assessment remains unchanged as the loss of Computer Room 1 and 4 would still result in the loss of WAN services to headquarters. Current status: controls tasked.		

STR1954	Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed		
Responsible Officer	Dave Purvis Director of Intelligence	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/Medium
Date Recorded	19/01/17	Current Rating	Medium (8)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	There is a project underway centrally for the introduction of a national ANPR system as opposed to the current system which is 43 different ones around the country. ANPR cameras nationally are placed around identified critical infrastructure i.e. utilities/East Midlands Airport and other crowded places such as major shopping centres. They can be used to proactively monitor live feed and retrospectively view stored data for investigation purposes. The target date for the national system has been put back to November 2018. Our ANPR server is aging. In the last few months the system has crashed and this has meant that we have lost the ability to have live feeds from the cameras.		
Impact	Should our system fail, we will lose some live feed data for a period of time and if the problem persists/cannot be resolved then we might lose some data altogether, which has operational implications.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National project team Force ANPR lead Regional ANPR group Ongoing repairs 		
Update	19/01/17 – Rich Hiom (Force ANPR Lead):- We continue to engage with the national team and on a regional basis to fully understand the developments with the national programme and any potential slippage with timescales. Derbyshire Police are exploring an interim upgrade to their sever and we are engaging with them to understand the financial implications of this to include within our considerations. Current status: managed.		

STR1946		Adoption of EU General Data Protection Regulations and Directive in May 2018	
Responsible Officer	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Impact/Likelihood	Medium/Low
Date Recorded	28/11/16	Current Rating	Low (2)
Category	Governance	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	New European legislative framework to be adopted by UK in May 2018 - EU General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR) and separate Law Enforcement Directive (LED). All partners will be required to follow the GDPR, whilst Leicestershire Police will be required to follow both the GDPR and LED. Gap analysis is required to assess the impact of these changes.		
Impact	The risk is associated to the failure of adopting and complying with the new requirements. At present there is uncertainty around the requirements and extent of work required to implement and ensure compliance.		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Local gap analysis National gap analysis Increased resilience to Information Management 		
Update	29/12/16 – Paul Hooseman:- The Output Based Budgeting Panel have agreed to fund project resource to assist the Information Manager to conduct local gap analysis and identify suitable implementation plans in readiness for these changes. Current status: controls tasked.		

STR1953		Risk of significant change following implementation of Hay Review	
Responsible Officer	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Impact/Likelihood	High/Medium
Date Recorded	13/12/16	Current Rating	Medium (6)
Category	People (Staff and Community)	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	Leicestershire Police are currently involved in a Hay Review Project. The second phase of this project is aligning the hay scores for each job to pay scales. There is a fear that if there is significant change to people's pay and a number of risks could emerge. These include; an increase in the salary bill resulting in future redundancies to accommodate the cost, decrease in an individual's salary could result in them wanting to take action e.g. to leave and claim constructive dismissal, being unable to agree the new salary bands with the trade union and them seeking to raise a formal dispute with the employer (e.g. strike activity), individuals reporting sick en masse rather than leaving.		
Impact	There is a risk that these changes will impact upon staff performance. In addition, the perception from the public about the changes and the impact on our ability to deliver services.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project plan in place Project budget in place Formal consultation with unions Trained evaluators Quality assurance from project team Communications messages Comms plan 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hay project team 		
Update	13/12/16 – Alex Stacey-Midgley:- In essence phase 2 of the project is how we align the hay scores for each job to pay scales. There is a fear that if there is significant change to people's pay and the salaries budget we could have a range of risks on our hands ranging from an increased salary bill to a negative response by staff. We will consider the impact for groups of people before decisions are made about pay, which could include consulting with the whole workforce. Current status: controls tasked.		

STR1952		Cyber Attack via Telephone Denial of Service (TDOS) on 999 system	
Responsible Officer	Alistair Roe Head of Contact Management	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/Medium
Date Recorded	30/12/16	Current Rating	Medium (8)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	On 29/12/16 Leicestershire Police was subject of a Telephone Denial of Service (TDOS) cyber attack on 999 lines; 120 calls were received over 8 hours, with 56 calls within 10 minutes. This caused an overspill of 999 calls to Northants but had the potential to saturate the 999 system		
Impact	This type of attack can prevent genuine calls being put through and has an impact on our ability to maintain a critical function of receiving and responding to incidents.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting held with IT Comms • National PNC broadcast • Briefing/messages • Short term contingency • Investigation commenced 		
Update	30/01/17 – Jason Ross Chief Inspector CMD:- An investigation was commenced by Special Branch in consultation with BT to obtain further details about the originating number. The calls were identified to be coming from one mobile telephone (a Polish number) rather than a spoofing possibility. There have been no further incidents. Current status: managed.		

STR1949		Inability to upload non crime statistics from Niche onto PND	
Responsible Officer	Dave Purvis Director of Intelligence	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/Medium
Date Recorded	13/12/16	Current Rating	Medium (8)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	In 2015 Leicestershire Police transferred to Niche as the crime, intelligence and child abuse recording platform, which is now used by all 5 regional forces. Each police force is expected to upload daily their crime, intelligence, custody, child abuse and domestic violence records to the Police National Database (PND) to comply with nationally agreed standards. Leicestershire Police has not uploaded any non-crime child abuse or domestic violence data to PND since the transfer to Niche. The PND is an extensive repository and search facility for all police forces and other law enforcement agencies developed following the Bichard Enquiry.		
Impact	This is an operational and reputational risk should a risk decision in another force area be made that would have been altered with access to Leicestershire non crime data.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Regional Niche Team • Lincolnshire engagement with Home Office • National PND User Group • Regional PND User Group 		
Update	13/12/16 – Dave Purvis:- The Regional Niche team have commissioned a business risk and mitigation review paper for circulation tasked by the Niche Programme Lead. Lincolnshire, who are leading for all 5 forces, are still working with the Home Office to ensure a stable and accurate extract is completed for all 5 regional forces but the scale of data means that this is very time consuming. Current status: managed.		

STR1945		Freedom of Information requests – demand v capacity	
Responsible Officer	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Impact/Likelihood	Low/High
Date Recorded	28/11/16	Current Rating	Low (3)
Category	Stakeholders/Reputation	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	There has been a significant increase in valid Freedom of Information Act 2000 requests (65% in last three years, and 30% in last 12 months), Alongside the increased number is increased complexities to the requests, against a background of static resource capacity, has seen a drop in performance/compliance.		
Impact	This may result in increased reputational risk, increased number of complaints, and increased risk of formal ICO scrutiny and intervention.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in resilience 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase in staff Process review 		
Update	29/12/16 – Paul Hooseman:- OBB presentation successful with proposal to increase resilience by employment of one dedicated FOI Officer. To be actioned once Finance and HR considerations are confirmed. Current status: controls tasked.		

Archived risks

STR1890		Making best use of DNT to reduce demand upon other teams	
Responsible Officer	Kerry Smith Head of Local Policing	Impact/Likelihood	High/Medium
Date Recorded	29/04/15	Current Rating	Medium (6)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	Medium (6)
Information	As part of the force restructure the Edison model has now been implemented. The response teams and neighbourhood teams have been replaced by priority response teams and dedicated neighbourhood teams, respectively. The staffing levels have also changed as a consequence. The dedicated neighbourhood teams are staffed by a fewer number of officers than the previous neighbourhood teams, however, the remit of their role has altered substantially.		
Impact	The risk is associated to ensuring the best use of these resources and additional capacity in order to drive down demand upon other interdependent teams across the organisation.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tactical plans Tasking via TABS system Superintendent meetings with NPA commanders Monitoring levels of abstraction NPA Performance Framework Neighbourhood activity analysis Use of KINECT consultation and engagement recording system 		
Update	03/11/16 – Kerry Smith:- The additional controls of the quarterly performance framework, which would have informed the quarterly development plan did not get established due to the transition to Niche. Work is being undertaken with the analysts to understand what information is required and how this can be best extracted from Niche. Since the changes made to the operating model due to Op Edison the ways in which the DNT have been used to reduce demand on other parts of the force has been evident and measurable though the proactive work they have undertaken such as Op Tiger and most recently Op Tiger Lightning. Current status: controlled.		

STR1818		Government Security Classification (GSC) implementation	
Responsible Officer	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Impact/Likelihood	Low/Low
Date Recorded	24/06/14	Current Rating	Low (1)
Category	Governance	Previous Rating	New Risk
Information	The Government Security Classification (GSC) is to replace the Government Protective Marking Scheme (GPMS) after April 2016. A national conversion programme has been discounted, however, agreement has been reached that there is a requirement for local and regional implementation to raise organisational awareness.		
Impact	Threat to information loss or incorrect disclosure if the GSC is not fully implemented and complied with.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Corporate Project Officer appointed • National ACPO Lead appointed • Force Lead designated • Policy / Procedure agreed at regional level • Sharing of Secret information practices to be reviewed • System accreditation to be strengthened • Change Programme devised • Regional SIRO Lead appointed as SRO • Information Sharing Agreements (ISAs) to be reviewed • System updates • National implementation plans considered 		
Update	<p>03/11/16 – Paul Hooseman:- GSC went live on 01/11/16, with training and communications implemented. A policy was produced and advice provided via the intranet. A GSC page for reference and guidance has been developed and published as part of the Information Management website. Current status: controlled.</p>		

STR1927		Lack of agility in applying local change to shared services	
Responsible Officer	David Craig Head of IT	Impact/Likelihood	Low/Medium
Date Recorded	15/01/16	Current Rating	Low (2)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	Low (2)
Information	Shared systems may limit the agility to make change to meet local requirements. For example there was difficulty in scheduling some changes to Leicestershire beat boundaries in Niche because of the extent of change as Northamptonshire and Nottinghamshire go live.		
Impact	Ability to make timely changes to our systems to ensure that the information contained is as accurate and up to date as possible. This could have a detrimental impact on systems which directly support operational activity.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Process alignment • Reduce interdependencies • Geo Spatial capability • Minimise Back Record Conversion • Slot for boundary changes identified • TFC Collaboration for IT • Regional change control process 		
Update	<p>09/12/16 – David Craig:- This risk was created following a specific incidence of making changes to Niche in the earlier stages of it going live. Since that time new processes have been identified as a result of collaboration. Current status: controlled.</p>		

Appendix B		Corporate Risk Register				2 nd March 2017			
Reference	Owner	Title	Impact	Likelihood	Status	Recorded	Last review	Priority	Previous rating
STR1844	Helen Chamberlain Tri Force Collaboration	Failure to transition to the ESN.	Very High	High	Managed	August 2014	28/02/17	12	12
STR1679	Caroline Barker Crime Registrar	Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime.	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2013	13/02/17	9	9
STR1935	Jason Masters Head of Corporate Services	Management of seized and found property provision.	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2016	01/03/17	9	9
OPCC1694	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Lack of resource and capacity available to OPCC.	High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2013	02/03/17	9	3
STR1954	Dave Purvis Director of Intelligence	Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed.	Very High	Medium	Managed	January 2017	19/01/17	8	New
STR1949	Dave Purvis Director of Intelligence	Inability to upload non crime statistics from Niche onto PND.	Very High	Medium	Managed	December 2016	12/01/17	8	New
STR473	Ross Dimmock Anti-Corruption Unit	Organisational risk of not complying with the ACPO national vetting policy.	Medium	Very High	Controls Tasked	March 2010	01/03/17	8	8
STR1922	Chris Cockerill Operations Lead Criminal Justice	Inability to adequately audit Niche.	Medium	Very High	Controls Tasked	October 2015	22/02/17	8	8
STR1940	Jason Ross Chief Inspector CMD	Failure to meet 101 call handling target.	Medium	Very High	Controlled	September 2016	22/02/17	8	8
STR1948	David Craig Head of IT	Resilience of LAN connectivity.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2016	05/01/17	6	New
STR1947	David Craig Head of IT	Resilience of WAN connectivity.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	September 2016	05/01/17	6	New
STR1953	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Risk of significant change following implementation of Hay Review.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2016	19/01/17	6	New
STR1936	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Impact of Tri-force Collaboration on local Change Programme.	High	Medium	Managed	June 2016	22/02/17	6	6
STR1926	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Quality of video recorded evidence.	High	Medium	Controlled	January 2016	02/03/17	6	6
STR1939	Andrew Rodwell Communications Manager	Transition to the new Contact Management phone platform.	High	Medium	Controlled	September 2016	19/01/17	6	6
STR420	Peter Coogan Head of Health and Safety	Management system for energy use.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2010	29/01/17	6	6
STR1801	Alison Naylor HR Director	Ability to meet mandatory training requirements.	Medium	High	Controlled	June 2014	22/02/17	6	6
STR1329	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Transforming services – meeting the budget challenge for 2020.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2012	22/02/17	6	6

STR1917	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the 'Building the Picture' HMIC recommendations.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	29/12/16	4	4
STR1910	Jason Ross Contact Management	Lack of resilience and foreseeable attrition in RTI-PNC compromises service.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	August 2015	18/01/17	4	4
STR1519	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	RMADS management for information security.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2012	29/12/16	4	4
STR1915	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - asset owners.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	29/12/16	4	4
STR1916	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - records management.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	29/12/16	4	4
STR11	Alison Naylor HR Director	Potential for industrial action affecting our service.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	October 2007	22/02/17	4	4
OPCC1700	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Failure to maintain relationships with key partners.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	02/03/17	4	4
OPCC1690	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Failure to consult and engage sufficiently with the public.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	02/03/17	4	4
STR1521	Ross Dimmock Anti-Corruption Lead	Criminal behaviour/impropriety by staff.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2012	01/03/17	4	4
STR508	Jason Masters Head of Corporate Services	Failure to meet requirements of the Police and Crime Plan.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	April 2010	04/01/17	4	4
STR1875	Julie Saunders Senior HR Business Partner	Increased number of subject to vetting contracts issued.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	December 2014	19/01/17	4	4
STR1706	Alison Naylor HR Director	Loss/absence/churn of key personnel.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	August 2013	22/02/17	4	4
STR533	Jason Masters Head of Corporate Services	The fair and effective use of stop and search to promote confidence.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2010	04/01/17	4	4
OPCC1698	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Failure to provide governance to all East Midlands police collaboration projects.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	02/03/17	4	4
OPCC1695	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Failure to deliver Police and Crime Plan during period of reducing funding.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	02/03/17	4	4
OPCC1864	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Impact of changes in legislation on the PCC.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2014	02/03/17	4	4
OPCC1699	Helen King Head of Commissioning	Failure to produce and maintain a commissioning framework.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	02/03/17	4	4
OPCC1694	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Lack of resource and capacity available to OPCC.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2013	02/03/17	3	3
STR1952	Alistair Roe Head of Contact Management	Cyber attack via telephone denial of service on system.	Very High	Medium	Managed	December 2016	25/01/17	3	New
STR1945	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Freedom of information requests – demand v capacity.	Low	High	Controls Tasked	November 2016	29/12/16	3	New
STR1764	David Craig Head of IT	Accreditation for the use of the PSN.	High	Low	Controlled	January 2014	22/02/17	3	3

STR564	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Management of MFH enquiries.	High	Low	Controlled	August 2010	02/03/17	3	3
STR1571	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Genie/DASH not being used correctly resulting in incorrect risk assessments.	High	Low	Managed	September 2012	02/03/17	3	3
STR458	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Failure to protect vulnerable persons.	High	Low	Controlled	March 2010	02/03/17	3	3
STR310	David Sandall Head of Crime and Intelligence	Failure to recognise and respond to critical incidents and 'learn lessons'.	High	Low	Controlled	November 2009	10/01/17	3	3
STR520	Jason Masters Head of Corporate Services	Governance of collaborative arrangements.	High	Low	Controlled	May 2010	04/01/17	3	3
STR253	David Craig Head of IT	High risk of virus introduction and data loss.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2009	19/01/17	3	3
STR1946	Paul Hooseman Information Manager	Adoption of EU General Data Protection Regulations and Directive in May 2018.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	November 2016	29/12/16	2	New
STR430	Lynne Woodward Head of Equalities	Inquiry into disability related harassment.	Medium	Low	Managed	March 2010	02/03/17	2	2
STR380	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) criteria.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	January 2010	18/01/17	2	2
STR1623	Dave Purvis Director of Intelligence	Preparing for new communities, travelling and foreign national offending.	Medium	Low	Controlled	February 2013	12/01/17	2	2
OPCC1934	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Newly elected PCC for LLR could result in widespread change.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2016	02/03/17	1	6
OPCC1696	Helen King Chief Finance Officer	Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making and use of resources.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2013	02/03/17	1	1
STR1475	Kerry Smith Local Policing Lead	Limited ability to collate ASB incidents onto SENTINEL.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	May 2012	01/03/17	1	1

New risk	New risk owner	Risk of note
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Risk Scoring Matrix

Impact							
	Score	Performance/ Service Delivery	Finance/ Efficiency £	Confidence/Reputation	Health and Safety	Environment	Strategic Direction
Very High	4	Major disruption to service delivery. Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force >1,000,000 Business area >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns. Major reputational damage; adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
High	3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force 251,000-1,000,000 Business area 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage; adverse national media coverage < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24 hours hospitalisation and/or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Medium	2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force 51,000-250,000 Business area 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns. Significant reputational damage; adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital/professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Low	1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force <50,000 Business area <10,000	Complaints from individuals. Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.

Likelihood			
Score			
Very High	4	>75% chance of occurrence	Almost certain to occur
High	3	51-75% chance of occurrence	More likely to occur than not
Medium	2	25-50% chance of occurrence	Fairly likely to occur
Low	1	<25% chance of occurrence	Unlikely to occur

Overall Risk Rating: Impact x Likelihood	
9 - 16 = High	
5 - 8 = Medium	
1 - 4 = Low	

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