Purpose of report

1. This report provides JARAP with information about the corporate risk register, highlighting high priority, newly registered and risks of note.

Recommendation

2. The panel is asked to discuss the contents of this report and note the current state of risk arrangements.

Summary

3. The force Strategic Organisational Risk Board (SORB) oversees and directs the strategic risks facing the force. This board last met on 20th June 2018 and was chaired by DCC Nixon and is due to meet again on 18th September. At this board the OPCC were represented.

4. The OPCC risks are overseen by the Head of Governance and Assurance and presented to the Senior Management Team within the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

5. Since the last meeting Laura Saunders, the Risk and Business Continuity Advisor, has left the organisation and her role is temporarily being supported by the Health and Safety Advisor, Matt Jones. Interviews for her replacement took place on 23rd August 2018 and recruitment of the successful candidate is underway.

6. A comprehensive review, commissioned by the DCC, of all strategic risks currently recorded on the risk register has been undertaken. Running in tandem to this the DCC has refreshed the format of SORB to ensure that account is taken of any new emerging risks emanating from the Force Management Statement, issues arising from ‘Op Fox’ and from across the wider organisation. The DCC is seeking to ensure that the force has accurately captured a true picture of ‘risk’ in the round and that those matters recorded
and managed on the risk register are a true and accurate reflection of all the strategic risks posed to the force.

7. As a result of this review, on the 18th September, SORB will be asked to consider recommendations for:

- 10 risks to be archived
- 9 risks to be removed as strategic risks but managed through Orchid by local management teams
- 2 risks to be merged (1 of these is one of the 10 risks recommended for archive.
- This equates to 42 strategic risks
- In addition there are 8 OPCC risks

If agreed this would leave 22 existing strategic risks however it is anticipated that further risks will be identified and added as a result of the recent Force Management Statement and issues arising out of other forums such as ‘Op Fox’. When JARAP next meets a further update will be provided on the outcome of SORB and any new risks which have been identified and added.

**Risk Grading Criteria**

8. The corporate risk register identifies the key strategic risks. In the main these risks represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

9. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 - 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a risk priority rating, which is expressed as a ‘RAG’ rating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Rating</th>
<th>‘RAG’ Rating</th>
<th>Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 - 16</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 8</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>3 Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3 Monthly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Risk status**

10. *Controlled* – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

*Controls Tasked* – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Orchid risk register the term ‘Awaiting Control’ is used to describe this status.

*Overdue Control* – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

*Managed* – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably controlled.
Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review. It may also be a new risk prior to first review or a risk transferred to a new ‘Responsible Officer’.

Risk Management System update

11. The force currently uses ‘Orchid’ software as its risk management tool however from the end of August 2018 the software will no longer be supported by the supplier. Whilst the system will continue to work no further development can be undertaken and the product has reached end of life so a replacement is required.

12. In anticipation of this the Principal Health and Safety Advisor has been working with the Risk Manager and IT department from Derbyshire Police to develop and procure a new risk management system. The chosen product, via procurement, is ‘Keto’ software. It is anticipated that the system will be ready for user acceptance testing in mid-September. ‘Orchid’ will continue to be used in the interim and the suppliers of ‘Keto’ will assist with back record conversion.

13. The ‘Keto’ software is more user friendly than ‘Orchid’ and has the following added benefits:-

- The ability to change risks from departmental level to strategic level and back again whilst still retaining a unique reference number (the prefix will change from strategic to departmental or vice versa so they can be easily tracked). This will ensure that the force will be able to elevate departmental risks to strategic level easily as well as downgrade risks that are well controlled.
- The inclusion of help text and mandatory fields to ensure the correct information is submitted by risk owners.
- A sign off function for the risk and business continuity advisor so that they can quality assure risks and provide advice if a newly created risk needs to be amended.
- An improved function for attaching supporting documents.
- The inclusion of an auto save function.
- The ability for the risk and business continuity advisor to amend risk review dates where necessary so that these can be correctly sequenced with meeting dates.
- A better impact rating system that allows the user to rate the risk’s impact in different areas, giving different ratings to financial, reputational impacts etc.
- A dashboard view showing the real time status of risks. This dashboard can be configured so that the recipient can be shown the risks that apply to them and we believe that in the future JARAP could be provided with a dashboard view of risks to further improve the information presented.

Training will be provided for key users however direct support and maintenance of the risk register will continue to be provided by the risk and business continuity advisor. It is anticipated that the software will provide us with a much more user friendly and focused system for managing risk. This software has already attracted interest from other regional forces as it is being designed by Leicestershire and Derbyshire Police from scratch where other forces as using ‘off the shelf’ systems.
Current Strategic risks

14. On the corporate risk register there are currently 42 police strategic risks and 8 OPCC strategic risks (subject to the outcomes of SORB on the 18th September).

The overall risk rating grid for the corporate risk register is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporate Risk Rating Grid</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are 3 high priority risks and 2 risks of note. All of these risks are outlined within Appendix A. Since the last JARAP meeting, there have been no new risks. No risks were archived at the last SORB meeting however it is anticipated that this may change following SORB on the 18th September.

The full corporate risk register is attached as Appendix B.

Implications

Financial

STR1844 – Failure to transition to the ESN. Costs incurred by the infrastructure upgrade, ongoing contract with Airwave in the event of a transition delay and purchase of new equipment.

STR1329 – Transforming services. This revolves around providing services with the reduced budget.

Equality impact assessment

STR430 – Disability related harassment. The police reputation for providing a fair and equitable service may be damaged.

Risks and impact

As per the tables above.

Link to Police and Crime Plan

As per report.

Appendices

Appendix A: Strategic Risks
Appendix B: Corporate Risk Register
Appendix C: Risk Matrix
Persons to contact

Rob Nixon – Deputy Chief Constable – (0116) 248 2002
Email: Rob.Nixon@leicestershire.pnn.police.uk

Angela Perry – Head of Governance and Assurance – (0116) 229 8982
Email: Angela.Perry@leics.pcc.pnn.gov.uk

Matt Jones – Health and Safety Advisor – (0116) 248 6983
Email: Matthew.Jones@leicestershire.pnn.police.uk
### Appendix A – Strategic Risks

#### High risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR2006</th>
<th>Management of Archive provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Responsible Officer | Jason Masters  
Assistant Chief Constable | Impact/Likelihood | High/High |
| Date Recorded | 03/10/17 | Current Rating | High (9) |
| Category | Operational/Performance | Previous Rating | High (9) |

**Information**

The current Archive provision lacks resilience through adequate governance, policy and procedure and staffing establishment. Items received from across the force, including crime case files, interview tapes and pocket notebooks are not always catalogued or stored in a methodical manner, case files are separated and difficult to re-locate owing to system legacy issues and review, retention and disposal processes are fragmented and not NRAC compliant. Retrieval of records for further investigation or review is difficult. There are also over 200,000 evidential interview cassette tapes that have not been digitised and are degrading, with some being unreadable. With this risk there is an opportunity to significantly improve the current service provision.

**Impact**

There is an operational impact of records/items found to be missing or un-locatable, which may be required for investigation purposes or case review. The current system provides little assurance that our obligations under MOPI are being met. This presents a significant reputational risk to the force.

**Additional Controls**

- Archive review project
- New Force data manager and 6 RRD staff
- Proposed regional MOPI RRD procedure
- Archive provision moving to shared property new build
- Centralised structure incorporated into the Evidential Property Team

**Update**

03/05/18 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager):

We are working on a policy and procedure for Retention Review and Disposal of archives. It is not straight forward as legacy archives do not provide the info we need to be able to apply standard MOPI criteria to review them. We need to take a decision on what to do with these legacy archives. We have sought national and then local guidance through East Midlands Police solicitors. Based on this advice a number of proposals will be put forward to chief officers for a decision on how to proceed.

24/07/18 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager)

A paper has been submitted to ACC Masters in respects to the ongoing project. Key points include:

A Regional Review, Retention and Disposal procedure relating to electronic records has been agreed. Lincolnshire Police are to act as the lead, carrying out the review process. A Leicestershire team will retain the responsibility of deleting appropriate records that have been subject to the review.

Physical recorded material stored within Leicestershire Police will need to adopt a similar procedure to ensure that digital and physical records are mapped together and disposed at the same time. This is being written by the EPAC Project Team. A challenge to this is the differing retention periods stipulated in different pieces of legislation. This is a national issue being looked at by the Home Office.

A task group led by ACC Master has been meeting to clarify the national and regional position on this in order to prepare an RRD procedure for Leicestershire Police. The procedure will be submitted to the Change Board.
although this is still at a consultation stage.

Going forward the projects current priorities are:

- Understand what physical archives are stored at Mansfield House
- Further clarify the legislative requirements around retention
- Clarify what “other” archives have been set up around the estate
- Re-commence MoPI RRD at Tigers Road
- Review and revise current evidential procedure to include NICHE
- Complete and submit to Change Board procedures around RRD.

Current status: controls tasked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR1679</th>
<th>Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsible Officer</strong></td>
<td>Lou Cordiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chief Inspector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date Recorded</strong></td>
<td>12/06/13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
<td>Operational/Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact/Likelihood</strong></td>
<td>High/High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td>Operational: crimes not being recorded. Reputational: loss of confidence in published figures and in the police as a whole.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Existing Controls**    | - Audit of 'STORM' incidents within CMD – compliance check  
                          | - Audit schedule – conducted by the Service Improvement Unit  
                          | - Task and finish groups – part of Get it Right 1st Time  
                          | - Communication plan – as part of Get it Right 1st Time  
                          | - Get it Right 1st Time – Gold Group  
                          | - HMIC inspection  
                          | - Introduction of the Investigative Management Unit |
| **Additional Controls**  | - Get it Right 1st Time delivery plan                   |

**Update**

06/05/18 – Darren Goddard (Deputy Crime Registrar):
We are still working through the 42 strand action plan and progress is being made. We have delivered training to approx. 540 officers and staff in relation to ethical crime recording training. We have produced an updated risk based audit schedule for the audit team. CMD have temporarily relocated 2 of their part time call takers into the for 12 months and we have recruited another member of staff on a temporary 12 month contract. These 3 staff will be undertaking real time audit review of STORM incidents to assist with our incident to crime conversion. The Force Audit team have just completed an audit which mirrored, as far as possible, the HMIC audit and whilst we are improving there is still a real possibility that HMIC could still grade the Force as inadequate.

24/07/18 – Darren Goddard (Deputy Crime Register)
Training has continued and significant work continues reporting directly to the DCC.
Get it Right 1st Time meeting to be re-established under D/CS Sandall. It is planned that the Crime Data Integrity meeting will feed into this.

HMICFRS are due to re inspect the force during September and October this year

Current status: controls tasked.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPCC1696</th>
<th>Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsible</strong></td>
<td>Angela Perry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact/Likelihood</strong></td>
<td>High/High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The PCC is making decisions which are informed by force data and information. If the data is not up to date or accurate this may affect the decisions made or where resources are allocated.

**Existing Controls**
- Data quality audits undertaken by HMIC
- Systems in place for providing good quality financial information
- Additional scrutiny applied by SAB
- Identify and communicate data requirements to the force
- Ongoing data audit and assurance programme
- Review the findings of recent data quality audits to understand current position
- Regular reports on data quality to appropriate forums
- Review performance and information requirements to meet PCC’s priorities
- Detailed action plan review at June SAB meeting
- PCC update to Police and Crime Panel in July 2017

**Additional Controls**
- HMIC effectiveness audit reviewed
- Force action plan requested by PCC at each SAB meeting
- HMIC data integrity audit underway
- Hot debrief and full report awaited
- Force to review internal audit methodology to ensure it reflects HMIC methodology

**Update**
28/03/18 – Nish Padhiar (Assurance Officer):
This risk has received an interim review, whilst a risk identification process is being planned when new emerging threats and opportunities will be benchmarked against all existing OPCC risks. **Current status: controls tasked.**

### Risks of note

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR380</th>
<th>Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Responsible Officer** | Alex Stacey-Midgley  
Senior HR Business Partner |
| **Date Recorded** | 06/01/10 |
| **Category** | People (staff and community) |
| **Information** | Following a review of the Force Job Evaluation Scheme (JES) - the JES does not meet with the EOC criteria. This particularly relates to: Linked grades, gender, equal pay, & age discrimination. |
| **Impact** | Should a claim be made against the Force and a finding made against us, the claims could be substantial; particularly over generic roles. As a result the Hay Scheme of job evaluation has been undertaken. The findings are now being assessed and shared with Union groups. There is a significant financial risk associated to the findings of the review being implemented |
| **Existing Controls** | Intrusive management of the JES  
Consideration of other JE schemes  
Force Equal Pay Review |
| **Additional Control** | Implementation of the Hay Scheme |
| **Update** | 03/08/18 – Alex Stacey-Midgley:  
Move risk up to 4 * 3 = 12 High  
Keep on risk register as the impact will be force-wide, including reputational risk, turbulence to the workforce in terms of work output and potential increase in leavers and legal costs; and resource intensive legal processes. There could be the potential for industrial action.  
The JE project has been ongoing for 3 years. There are 2 key aspects to the project which have been;  
1) to implement a new JE scheme which is Hay. All posts have been (and new ones or revised roles continue to be) evaluated using this scheme. Each job is |
given a score which gives the job a size relative to all other jobs.

2) to transpose those new JE scores into a pay model. The pay model is designed by the Force and has used the framework of the national PSC pay spinal points.

The project has moved to the phase of national consultation. There will be people who have no change to pay, those who have a pay increase and those who’s pay will reduce (they will have pay protection for 2 years). 30+ pay models have been considered.

It is likely that the Force will get an update from the national team in the next 2 months about their view and recommendation. The TU are unlikely to be able to recommend any pay model where members are affected adversely (pay reduction) and so the following scenarios are possible following further consultation and negotiation;

1) Unable to recommend the pay model - the TU may then ballot members about potential industrial action if the employer imposes the changes
2) Able to recommend the pay model and ballot members for them to consider acceptance or not – the Force may need to consider what action to take if the members do not accept which could include imposing the changes.

The added complexity is that the current JE scheme is not compliant with equalities legislation which has been publically reported on. This means the Force needs to change its scheme and the reality is that any scheme would need to be mapped into a pay model and there would still be likely the 3 groups impacted with no change to pay, pay increase and pay reduction. 

**Current status: Awaiting Control**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR1954</th>
<th>Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Officer</td>
<td>Mick Graham, Director of Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Recorded</td>
<td>19/01/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Information Systems/Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact/Likelihood</td>
<td>Very High/Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Information**

There is a project underway centrally for the introduction of a national ANPR system as opposed to the current system which is 43 different ones around the country. ANPR cameras nationally are placed around identified critical infrastructure ie gas/water/electricity/East Midlands Airport and other crowded places like major shopping centres. They can be used to proactively to monitor live feed and retrospectively viewing stored data for investigation purposes. The target date has been put back with the go live date now November 2018. Our ANPR server is aging. In the last few months the system has crashed and this has meant that we have lost the ability to have lives feeds from the cameras. These system failures were for a number of reasons, the flood being one and a broken part another. The Leicestershire ANPR server does need replacing but we are very reluctant to buy another that will costs us tens of thousands of pounds, that will probably only be used until the national system comes in.

**Impact**

Should our system fail, we will lose some live feed data for a period of time and if the problem persists/cannot be resolved then we might lose some data altogether.

**Existing Controls**

- National project team
- Force ANPR lead
- Regional ANPR group
- Ongoing repairs

**Update**

*15/08/18 - Ryan Ludlum:*

There has been significant improvement in the system, the management and work completed by IT. The risk is now Low, and can be removed from the strategic risk register and archived. The system will be monitored through FIB SPOC and IT to ensure that we don’t have a similar issue / concern.
Leicestershire Police have purchased a new management server in readiness for a new national ANPR system called NAS (Requirement of all 43 forces). Whilst the national system isn’t live as yet our management server is and is working well, the implementation of the system has been delayed by the home office. The purchasing of the upgrades and new server appear to have dramatically improved the overall performance of the system. Whilst some aspects of the current ANPR structure within the force are still using the old NADC / Northgate BOF we can’t replace this until the new system comes on line. That time frame is down to the Home office however there will be further improvement once the Northgate is replaced.

There has been a significant improvement in both the reliability of the system (Evidenced through the number of full system reboots that IT had previously had to complete). The fault / system crashes were highlighted as the risk to the force. We have also put safety measures in place to allow checks to be completed throughout the day to ensure the system is working correctly.

**Current status: Managed**

**Recommendation**

Archive Risk
## Appendix B

### Corporate Risk Register

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Recorded</th>
<th>Last review</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Previous rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STR2006</td>
<td>Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable</td>
<td>Management of archive provision.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>October 2017</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCC1696</td>
<td>Angela Perry Head of Governance &amp; Assurance</td>
<td>Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>28/03/18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1679</td>
<td>Lou Cordiner Chief Inspector</td>
<td>Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR380</td>
<td>Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner</td>
<td>Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission criteria</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Awaiting</td>
<td>03/08/18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1954</td>
<td>Mick Graham Director of Intelligence</td>
<td>Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>January 2017</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1935</td>
<td>Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable</td>
<td>Management of seized and found property provision.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1949</td>
<td>Mick Graham Director of Intelligence</td>
<td>Inability to upload non crime statistics from Niche onto PND.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
<td>26/08/18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1961</td>
<td>Michelle Chambers DBS Vetting Manager</td>
<td>Failure to upload information from Niche to the DBS PLX system.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>March 2017</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1922</td>
<td>Dan Granger Operations Lead Criminal Justice</td>
<td>Inability to adequately audit Niche.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>October 2015</td>
<td>26/08/18</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR473</td>
<td>Mandy Bogle-Reilly Security Vetting Manager</td>
<td>Compliance with the ACPO vetting policy for the policing community.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1991</td>
<td>Steve Morris Head of Information Security</td>
<td>Threat of cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>June 2017</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1953</td>
<td>Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner</td>
<td>Risk of significant change following implementation of Hay Review.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1926</td>
<td>Matt Ditcher Head of Serious Crime</td>
<td>Quality of video recorded evidence.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>January 2016</td>
<td>26/08/18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1939</td>
<td>Ian Freeman IT Communications Manager</td>
<td>Transition to the new Contact Management phone platform.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>September 2016</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR420</td>
<td>Peter Coogan Head of Health and Safety</td>
<td>Management system for energy use.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>26/08/18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1801</td>
<td>Alison Naylor HR Director</td>
<td>Ability to meet mandatory training requirements.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1329</td>
<td>Andy Elliott Head of Change</td>
<td>Transforming services – meeting the budget challenge for 2020.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1910</td>
<td>Dan Pedley Contact Management</td>
<td>Lack of resilience and foreseeable attrition in RTI-PNC compromises service.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td>17/08/18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Issue Description</td>
<td>Risk Level</td>
<td>Response Level</td>
<td>Action Taken</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCC1690</td>
<td>Angela Perry</td>
<td>Head of Governance &amp; Assurance</td>
<td>Failure to consult and engage sufficiently with the public.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1844</td>
<td>Ian Freeman</td>
<td>IT Communications Manager</td>
<td>Failure to transition to the ESN.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>August 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1917</td>
<td>Steve Morris</td>
<td>Information Manager</td>
<td>Failure to comply with the ‘Building the Picture’ HMIC recommendations.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1946</td>
<td>Steve Morris</td>
<td>Information Manager</td>
<td>Adoption of EU General Data Protection Regulations and Directive in May 2018.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>November 2016</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1916</td>
<td>Steve Morris</td>
<td>Information Manager</td>
<td>Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - records management.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR11</td>
<td>Alison Naylor</td>
<td>HR Director</td>
<td>Potential for industrial action affecting our service.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>October 2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCC1700</td>
<td>Angela Perry</td>
<td>Head of Governance &amp; Assurance</td>
<td>Failure to maintain relationships with key partners.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>STR508</td>
<td>Adam Streets</td>
<td>Head of Corporate Services</td>
<td>Failure to meet requirements of the Police and Crime Plan.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1706</td>
<td>Alison Naylor</td>
<td>HR Director</td>
<td>Loss/absence/churn of key personnel.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>August 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCC1698</td>
<td>Angela Perry</td>
<td>Head of Governance &amp; Assurance</td>
<td>Failure to provide governance to all East Midlands police collaboration projects.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCC1864</td>
<td>Angela Perry</td>
<td>Head of Governance &amp; Assurance</td>
<td>Impact of changes in legislation on the PCC.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>October 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCC1699</td>
<td>Angela Perry</td>
<td>Head of Governance &amp; Assurance</td>
<td>Failure to produce and maintain a commissioning framework.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCC1694</td>
<td>Angela Perry</td>
<td>Head of Governance &amp; Assurance</td>
<td>Lack of resource and capacity available to OPCC.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>STR2007</td>
<td>Andrew Wroe</td>
<td>Head of Estates</td>
<td>Continuity of power supply to the FHQ site.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>October 2017</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1940</td>
<td>Dan Pedley</td>
<td>Chief Inspector CMD</td>
<td>Failure to meet 101 call handling target.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>September 2016</td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1764</td>
<td>David Craig</td>
<td>Head of IT</td>
<td>Accreditation for the use of the PSN.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>January 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>STR564</td>
<td>Steve Potter</td>
<td>Superintendent LPD</td>
<td>Management of MFH enquiries.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>August 2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1571</td>
<td>Matt Ditcher</td>
<td>Head of Serious Crime</td>
<td>Genie/DASH not being used correctly resulting in incorrect risk assessments.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>September 2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR458</td>
<td>Matt Ditcher</td>
<td>Head of Serious Crime</td>
<td>Failure to protect vulnerable persons.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR253</td>
<td>David Craig</td>
<td>Head of IT</td>
<td>High risk of virus introduction and data loss.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>STR1519</td>
<td>Steve Morris</td>
<td>Information Manager</td>
<td>RMADS management for information security.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>June 2012</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

D12
| STR1915 | Steve Morris  
Information Manager | Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - asset owners. | Medium | Low | Controls Tasked | August 2015 | 08/02/18 | 2 | 2 |
| STR430  | Lynne Woodward  
Head of Equalities | Inquiry into disability related harassment. | Medium | Low | Managed | March 2010 | 17/08/18 | 2 | 2 |
| STR1975 | Carol Hever  
Head of HR | Gateway upgrade project. | Medium | Low | Controls Tasked | April 2017 | 17/08/18 | 2 | 2 |
| STR1623 | Mick Graham  
Director of Intelligence | Preparing for new communities, travelling and foreign national offending. | Medium | Low | Controlled | February 2013 | 17/08/18 | 2 | 2 |
| STR310  | David Sandall  
Head of Crime and Intelligence | Failure to recognise and respond to critical incidents and 'learn lessons'. | Low | Low | Controlled | November 2009 | 26/08/18 | 1 | 1 |
| STR1990 | David Craig  
Head of IT | Risk of uncertainty of impact of IT changes upon Leicestershire | Low | Low | Controls Tasked | June 2017 | 17/08/18 | 1 | 3 |
| OPCC1695 | Angela Perry  
Head of Governance & Assurance | Failure to deliver Police and Crime Plan during period of reducing funding. | Low | Low | Controls Tasked | July 2013 | 01/03/18 | 1 | 1 |
| STR1475 | Shane O’Neill  
Local Policing Lead | Limited ability to collate ASB incidents onto SENTINEL. | Low | Low | Controls Tasked | May 2012 | 17/08/18 | 1 | 1 |

**Risk of note**
## Appendix C

### Risk Scoring Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Performance/Service Delivery</th>
<th>Finance/Efficiency £</th>
<th>Confidence/Reputation</th>
<th>Health and Safety</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Strategic Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Very High | 4 | Major disruption to service delivery.  
Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders. | Force >1,000,000  
Business area >150,000 | Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns.  
Major reputational damage; adverse national media coverage > 7 days. | Death or a life changing injury. | Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected). | Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective. |
| High | 3 | Serious disruption to service delivery.  
Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders. | Force 251,000-1,000,000  
Business area 41,000-150,000 | Serious stakeholder/investigations/ prolonged specific section of community concerns.  
Serious reputational damage; adverse national media coverage < 7 days. | An injury requiring over 24 hours hospitalisation and/or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations. | High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected). | Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective. |
| Medium | 2 | Significant disruption to service delivery.  
Noticeable impact on performance indicators. | Force 51,000-250,000  
Business area 11,000-40,000 | Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns.  
Significant reputational damage; adverse local media coverage. | An injury requiring hospital/professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery. | Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected). | Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective. |
| Low | 1 | Minor disruption to service delivery.  
Minor impact on performance indicators. | Force <50,000  
Business area <10,000 | Complaints from individuals.  
Minor impact on a specific section of the community. | An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work. | Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected). | Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective. |

### Likelihood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Very High | >75% chance of occurrence  
Almost certain to occur |
| High | 51-75% chance of occurrence  
More likely to occur than not |
| Medium | 25-50% chance of occurrence  
Fairly likely to occur |
| Low | <25% chance of occurrence  
Unlikely to occur |

### Overall Risk Rating: Impact x Likelihood

- **9 - 16** = High
- **5 - 8** = Medium
- **1 - 4** = Low
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