		Paper Marked
POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR LEICESTERSHIRE JOINT AUDIT, RISK & ASSURANCE PANEL		**D**

Report of	**OFFICES OF CHIEF CONSTABLE AND POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER**
Subject	**RISK REGISTER**
Date	**WEDNESDAY 19 SEPTEMBER 2018 – 10:00AM**
Author	**MATTHEW JONES – HEALTH AND SAFETY ADVISOR**

Purpose of report

1. This report provides JARAP with information about the corporate risk register, highlighting high priority, newly registered and risks of note.

Recommendation

2. The panel is asked to discuss the contents of this report and note the current state of risk arrangements.

Summary

3. The force Strategic Organisational Risk Board (SORB) oversees and directs the strategic risks facing the force. This board last met on 20th June 2018 and was chaired by DCC Nixon and is due to meet again on 18th September. At this board the OPCC were represented.

4. The OPCC risks are overseen by the Head of Governance and Assurance and presented to the Senior Management Team within the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

5. Since the last meeting Laura Saunders, the Risk and Business Continuity Advisor, has left the organisation and her role is temporarily being supported by the Health and Safety Advisor, Matt Jones. Interviews for her replacement took place on 23rd August 2018 and recruitment of the successful candidate is underway.

6. A comprehensive review, commissioned by the DCC, of all strategic risks currently recorded on the risk register has been undertaken. Running in tandem to this the DCC has refreshed the format of SORB to ensure that account is taken of any new emerging risks emanating from the Force Management Statement, issues arising from 'Op Fox' and from across the wider organisation. The DCC is seeking to ensure that the force has accurately captured a true picture of 'risk' in the round and that those matters recorded

and managed on the risk register are a true and accurate reflection of all the strategic risks posed to the force.

7. As a result of this review, on the 18th September, SORB will be asked to consider recommendations for:

    - 10 risks to be archived
    - 9 risks to be removed as strategic risks but managed through Orchid by local management teams
    - 2 risks to be merged (1 of these is one of the 10 risks recommended for archive.
    - This equates to 42 strategic risks
    - In addition there are 8 OPCC risks

    If agreed this would leave 22 existing strategic risks however it is anticipated that further risks will be identified and added as a result of the recent Force Management Statement and issues arising out of other forums such as 'Op Fox'. When JARAP next meets a further update will be provided on the outcome of SORB and any new risks which have been identified and added.

Risk Grading Criteria

8. The corporate risk register identifies the key strategic risks. In the main these risks represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

9. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 - 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a risk priority rating, which is expressed as a 'RAG' rating.

Priority Rating	'RAG' Rating	Review
9 - 16	High	Monthly
5 - 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 - 4	Low	3 Monthly

Risk status

10. *Controlled* – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

    Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Orchid risk register the term 'Awaiting Control' is used to describe this status.

    Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

    Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably controlled.

Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review. It may also be a new risk prior to first review or a risk transferred to a new 'Responsible Officer'.

Risk Management System update

11. The force currently uses 'Orchid' software as its risk management tool however from the end of August 2018 the software will no longer be supported by the supplier. Whilst the system will continue to work no further development can be undertaken and the product has reached end of life so a replacement is required.

12. In anticipation of this the Principal Health and Safety Advisor has been working with the Risk Manager and IT department from Derbyshire Police to develop and procure a new risk management system. The chosen product, via procurement, is 'Keto' software. It is anticipated that the system will be ready for user acceptance testing in mid-September. 'Orchid' will continue to be used in the interim and the suppliers of 'Keto' will assist with back record conversion.

13. The 'Keto' software is more user friendly than 'Orchid' and has the following added benefits:-

   - The ability to change risks from departmental level to strategic level and back again whilst still retaining a unique reference number (the prefix will change from strategic to departmental or vice versa so they can be easily tracked). This will ensure that the force will be able to elevate departmental risks to strategic level easily as well as downgrade risks that are well controlled.
   - The inclusion of help text and mandatory fields to ensure the correct information is submitted by risk owners.
   - A sign off function for the risk and business continuity advisor so that they can quality assure risks and provide advice if a newly created risk needs to be amended.
   - An improved function for attaching supporting documents.
   - The inclusion of an auto save function.
   - The ability for the risk and business continuity advisor to amend risk review dates where necessary so that these can be correctly sequenced with meeting dates.
   - A better impact rating system that allows the user to rate the risk's impact in different areas, giving different ratings to financial, reputational impacts etc.
   - A dashboard view showing the real time status of risks. This dashboard can be configured so that the recipient can be shown the risks that apply to them and we believe that in the future JARAP could be provided with a dashboard view of risks to further improve the information presented.

   Training will be provided for key users however direct support and maintenance of the risk register will continue to be provided by the risk and business continuity advisor. It is anticipated that the software will provide us with a much more user friendly and focused system for managing risk. This software has already attracted interest from other regional forces as it is being designed by Leicestershire and Derbyshire Police from scratch where other forces as using 'off the shelf' systems.

Current Strategic risks

14. On the corporate risk register there are currently 42 police strategic risks and 8 OPCC strategic risks (subject to the outcomes of SORB on the 18th September).

The overall risk rating grid for the corporate risk register is shown below.

Corporate Risk Rating Grid		Likelihood			
		Very High	High	Medium	Low
Impact	Very High	0	1	3	2
	High	0	2	7	7
	Medium	1	2	5	8
	Low	0	1	0	3

There are 3 high priority risks and 2 risks of note. All of these risks are outlined within Appendix A. Since the last JARAP meeting, there have been no new risks. No risks were archived at the last SORB meeting however it is anticipated that this may change following SORB on the 18th September.

The full corporate risk register is attached as Appendix B.

Implications

Financial	**STR1844 – Failure to transition to the ESN.** Costs incurred by the infrastructure upgrade, ongoing contract with Airwave in the event of a transition delay and purchase of new equipment.
	STR1329 – Transforming services. This revolves around providing services with the reduced budget.
Equality impact assessment	**STR430 – Disability related harassment.** The police reputation for providing a fair and equitable service may be damaged.
Risks and impact	As per the tables above.
Link to Police and Crime Plan	As per report.

Appendices

Appendix A: Strategic Risks
Appendix B: Corporate Risk Register
Appendix C: Risk Matrix

Persons to contact

Rob Nixon – Deputy Chief Constable – (0116) 248 2002
Email: Rob.Nixon@leicestershire.pnn.police.uk

Angela Perry – Head of Governance and Assurance – (0116) 229 8982
Email: Angela.Perry@leics.pcc.pnn.gov.uk

Matt Jones – Health and Safety Advisor – (0116) 248 6983
Email: Matthew.Jones@leicestershire.pnn.police.uk

Appendix A – Strategic Risks

High risks

STR2006	Management of Archive provision		
Responsible Officer	Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	03/10/17	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The current Archive provision lacks resilience through adequate governance, policy and procedure and staffing establishment. Items received from across the force, including crime case files, interview tapes and pocket notebooks are not always catalogued or stored in a methodical manner, case files are separated and difficult to re-locate owing to system legacy issues and review, retention and disposal processes are fragmented and not NRAC compliant. Retrieval of records for further investigation or review is difficult. There are also over 200,000 evidential interview cassette tapes that have not been digitised and are degrading, with some being unreadable. With this risk there is an opportunity to significantly improve the current service provision.		
Impact	There is an operational impact of records/items found to be missing or un-locatable, which may be required for investigation purposes or case review. The current system provides little assurance that our obligations under MOPI are being met. This presents a significant reputational risk to the force.		
Additional Controls	• Archive review project • New Force data manager and 6 RRD staff • Proposed regional MOPI RRD procedure • Archive provision moving to shared property new build • Centralised structure incorporated into the Evidential Property Team		
Update	**03/05/18 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager):-** We are working on a policy and procedure for Retention Review and Disposal of archives. It is not straight forward as legacy archives do not provide the info we need to be able to apply standard MOPI criteria to review them. We need to take a decision on what to do with these legacy archives. We have sought national and then local guidance through East Midlands Police solicitors. Based on this advice a number of proposals will be put forward to chief officers for a decision on how to proceed. **24/07/18 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager)** A paper has been submitted to ACC Masters in respects to the ongoing project. Key points include: A Regional Review, Retention and Disposal procedure relating to electronic records has been agreed. Lincolnshire Police are to act as the lead, carrying out the review process. A Leicestershire team will retain the responsibility of deleting appropriate records that have been subject to the review. Physical recorded material stored within Leicestershire Police will need to adopt a similar procedure to ensure that digital and physical records are mapped together and disposed at the same time. This is being written by the EPAC Project Team. A challenge to this is the differing retention periods stipulated in different pieces of legislation. This is a national issue being looked at by the Home Office. A task group led by ACC Master has been meeting to clarify the national and regional position on this in order to prepare an RRD procedure for Leicestershire Police. The procedure will be submitted to the Change Board		

although this is still at a consultation stage. Going forward the projects current priorities are: • Understand what physical archives are stored at Mansfield House • Further clarify the legislative requirements around retention • Clarify what "other" archives have been set up around the estate • Re-commence MoPI RRD at Tigers Road • Review and revise current evidential procedure to include NICHE • Complete and submit to Change Board procedures around RRD. **Current status: Controls tasked.**	

STR1679	Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime		
Responsible Officer	Lou Cordiner Chief Inspector	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	12/06/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The Service Improvement Unit carried out a number of audits under the heading "Missed Opportunities" which identified issues with the accuracy of our crime recording, both on initial contact and in relation to classification of crime. In addition, in April 2015 the Home Office Crime Recording reduced the timescale for when crimes must be recorded from 72 hours to 24 hours.		
Impact	Operational: crimes not being recorded. Reputational: loss of confidence in published figures and in the police as a whole.		
Existing Controls	• Audit of 'STORM' incidents within CMD – compliance check • Audit schedule – conducted by the Service Improvement Unit • Task and finish groups – part of Get it Right 1st Time • Communication plan – as part of Get it Right 1st Time • Get it Right 1st Time – Gold Group • HMIC inspection • Introduction of the Investigative Management Unit		
Additional Controls	• Get it Right 1st Time delivery plan		
Update	**06/05/18 – Darren Goddard (Deputy Crime Registrar):-** We are still working through the 42 strand action plan and progress is being made. We have delivered training to approx. 540 officers and staff in relation to ethical crime recording training. We have produced an updated risk based audit schedule for the audit team. CMD have temporarily relocated 2 of their part time call takers into the for 12 months and we have recruited another member of staff on a temporary 12 month contract. These 3 staff will be undertaking real time audit review of STORM incidents to assist with our incident to crime conversion. The Force Audit team have just completed an audit which mirrored, as far as possible, the HMIC audit and whilst we are improving there is still a real possibility that HMIC could still grade the Force as inadequate. **24/07/18 – Darren Goddard (Deputy Crime Register)** Training has continued and significant work continues reporting directly to the DCC. Get it Right 1st Time meeting to be re-established under D/CS Sandall. It is planned that the Crime Data Integrity meeting will feed into this. HMICFRS are due to re inspect the force during September and October this year **Current status: controls tasked.**		

OPCC1696	Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources		
Responsible	Angela Perry	Impact/Likelihood	High/High

Officer	Head of Governance & Assurance		
Date Recorded	19/07/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Governance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The PCC is making decisions which are informed by force data and information.		
Impact	If the data is not up to date or accurate this may affect the decisions made or where resources are allocated.		
Existing Controls	- Data quality audits undertaken by HMIC - Systems in place for providing good quality financial information - Additional scrutiny applied by SAB - Identify and communicate data requirements to the force - Ongoing data audit and assurance programme - Review the findings of recent data quality audits to understand current position - Regular reports on data quality to appropriate forums - Review performance and information requirements to meet PCC's priorities - Detailed action plan review at June SAB meeting - PCC update to Police and Crime Panel in July 2017		
Additional Controls	- HMIC effectiveness audit reviewed - Force action plan requested by PCC at each SAB meeting - HMIC data integrity audit underway - Hot debrief and full report awaited - Force to review internal audit methodology to ensure it reflects HMIC methodology		
Update	**28/03/18 – Nish Padhiar (Assurance Officer):-** This risk has received an interim review, whilst a risk identification process is being planned when new emerging threats and opportunities will be benchmarked against all existing OPCC risks. **Current status: controls tasked.**		

Risks of note

STR380	Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission criteria		
Responsible Officer	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	06/01/10	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	People (staff and community)	Previous Rating	Low (2)
Information	Following a review of the Force Job Evaluation Scheme (JES) - the JES does not meet with the EOC criteria. This particularly relates to: Linked grades, gender, equal pay, & age discrimination.		
Impact	Should a claim be made against the Force and a finding made against us, the claims could be substantial; particularly over generic roles. As a result the Hay Scheme of job evaluation has been undertaken. The findings are now being assessed and shared with Union groups. There is a significant financial risk associated to the findings of the review being implemented		
Existing Controls	- Intrusive management of the JES - Consideration of other JE schemes - Force Equal Pay Review		
Additional Control	Implementation of the Hay Scheme		
Update	**03/08/18 – Alex Stacey-Midgley:** Move risk up to 4 * 3 = 12 High Keep on risk register as the impact will be force-wide, including reputational risk, turbulence to the workforce in terms of work output and potential increase in leavers and legal costs; and resource intensive legal processes. There could be the potential for industrial action. The JE project has been ongoing for 3 years. There are 2 key aspects to the project which have been; 1) to implement a new JE scheme which is Hay. All posts have been (and new ones or revised roles continue to be) evaluated using this scheme. Each job is		

given a score which gives the job a size relative to all other jobs.

2) to transpose those new JE scores into a pay model. The pay model is designed by the Force and has used the framework of the national PSC pay spinal points.

The project has moved to the phase of national consultation. There will be people who have no change to pay, those who have a pay increase and those who's pay will reduce (they will have pay protection for 2 years). 30+ pay models have been considered.

It is likely that the Force will get an update from the national team in the next 2 months about their view and recommendation. The TU are unlikely to be able to recommend any pay model where members are affected adversely (pay reduction) and so the following scenarios are possible following further consultation and negotiation;

1) Unable to recommend the pay model - the TU may then ballot members about potential industrial action if the employer imposes the changes
2) Able to recommend the pay model and ballot members for them to consider acceptance or not – the Force may need to consider what action to take if the members do not accept which could include imposing the changes.

The added complexity is that the current JE scheme is not compliant with equalities legislation which has been publically reported on. This means the Force needs to change its scheme and the reality is that any scheme would need to be mapped into a pay model and there would still be likely the 3 groups impacted with no change to pay, pay increase and pay reduction.
Current status: Awaiting Control

STR1954	Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed		
Responsible Officer	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/Low
Date Recorded	19/01/17	Current Rating	Low (4)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	Medium (8)
Information	There is a project underway centrally for the introduction of a national ANPR system as opposed to the current system which is 43 different ones around the country. ANPR cameras nationally are placed around identified critical infrastructure ie gas/water/electricity/East Midlands Airport and other crowded places like major shopping centres. They can be used to proactively to monitor live feed and retrospectively viewing stored data for investigation purposes. The target date has been put back with the go live date now November 2018. Our ANPR server is aging. In the last few months the system has crashed and this has meant that we have lost the ability to have lives feeds from the cameras. These system failures were for a number of reasons, the flood being one and a broken part another. The Leicestershire ANPR server does need replacing but we are very reluctant to buy another that will costs us tens of thousands of pounds, that will probably only be used until the national system comes in.		
Impact	Should our system fail, we will lose some live feed data for a period of time and if the problem persists/cannot be resolved then we might lose some data altogether.		
Existing Controls	• National project team • Force ANPR lead • Regional ANPR group • Ongoing repairs		
Update	**15/08/18 - Ryan Ludlum:** There has been significant improvement in the system, the management and work completed by IT. The risk is now Low, and can be removed from the strategic risk register and archived. The system will be monitored through FIB SPOC and IT to ensure that we don't have a similar issue / concern.		

	Leicestershire Police have purchased a new management server in readiness for a new national ANPR system called NAS (Requirement of all 43 forces). Whilst the national system isn't live as yet our management server is and is working well, the implementation of the system has been delayed by the home office. The purchasing of the upgrades and new server appear to have dramatically improved the overall performance of the system. Whilst some aspects of the current ANPR structure within the force are still using the old NADC / Northgate BOF we can't replace this until the new system comes on line. That time frame is down to the Home office however there will be further improvement once the Northgate is replaced. There has been a significant improvement in both the reliability of the system (Evidenced through the number of full system reboots that IT had previously had to complete). The fault / system crashes were highlighted as the risk to the force. We have also put safety measures in place to allow checks to be completed throughout the day to ensure the system is working correctly. **Current status: Managed**
Recommendation	**Archive Risk**

	Appendix B	Corporate Risk Register						17th August 2018	
Reference	Owner	Title	Impact	Likelihood	Status	Recorded	Last review	Priority	Previous rating
STR2006	Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable	Management of archive provision.	High	High	Control Tasked	October 2017	17/08/18	9	9
OPCC1696	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources.	High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2013	28/03/18	9	9
STR1679	Lou Cordiner Chief Inspector	Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime.	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2013	17/08/18	9	9
STR380	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission criteria	Very High	High	Awaiting Control		03/08/18	12	2
STR1954	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed.	Very High	Low	Managed	January 2017	17/08/18	4	8
STR1935	Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable	Management of seized and found property provision.	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2016	17/08/18	8	8
STR1949	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Inability to upload non crime statistics from Niche onto PND.	Very High	Medium	Managed	December 2016	26/08/18	8	8
STR1961	Michelle Chambers DBS Vetting Manager	Failure to upload information from Niche to the DBS PLX system.	Very High	Medium	Managed	March 2017	17/08/18	8	8
STR1922	Dan Granger Operations Lead Criminal Justice	Inability to adequately audit Niche.	Medium	Very High	Controls Tasked	October 2015	26/08/18	8	8
STR473	Mandy Bogle-Reilly Security Vetting Manager	Compliance with the ACPO vetting policy for the policing community.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	March 2010	17/08/18	6	6
STR1991	Steve Morris Head of Information Security	Threat of cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police.	High	Medium	Managed	June 2017	17/08/18	6	6
STR1953	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Risk of significant change following implementation of Hay Review.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2016	17/08/18	6	6
STR1926	Matt Ditcher Head of Serious Crime	Quality of video recorded evidence.	High	Medium	Controlled	January 2016	26/08/18	6	6
STR1939	Ian Freeman IT Communications Manager	Transition to the new Contact Management phone platform.	High	Medium	Controlled	September 2016	17/08/18	6	6
STR420	Peter Coogan Head of Health and Safety	Management system for energy use.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2010	26/08/18	6	6
STR1801	Alison Naylor HR Director	Ability to meet mandatory training requirements.	High	Medium	Controlled	June 2014	17/08/18	6	6
STR1329	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Transforming services – meeting the budget challenge for 2020.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2012	17/08/18	6	6
STR1910	Dan Pedley Contact Management	Lack of resilience and foreseeable attrition in RTI-PNC compromises service.	High	Low	Controlled	August 2015	17/08/18	3	3

OPCC1690	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to consult and engage sufficiently with the public.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/03/18	6	6
STR1844	Ian Freeman IT Communications Manager	Failure to transition to the ESN.	Very High	Low	Managed	August 2014	17/08/18	4	4
STR1917	Steve Morris Information Manager	Failure to comply with the 'Building the Picture' HMIC recommendations.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	08/02/18	4	4
STR1946	Steve Morris Information Manager	Adoption of EU General Data Protection Regulations and Directive in May 2018.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	November 2016	08/02/18	4	4
STR1916	Steve Morris Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - records management.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	08/02/18	4	4
STR11	Alison Naylor HR Director	Potential for industrial action affecting our service.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	October 2007	17/08/18	4	4
OPCC1700	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to maintain relationships with key partners.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	14/03/18	4	4
STR508	Adam Streets Head of Corporate Services	Failure to meet requirements of the Police and Crime Plan.	Medium	Low	Controlled	April 2010	17/08/18	2	4
STR1706	Alison Naylor HR Director	Loss/absence/churn of key personnel.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	August 2013	17/08/18	4	4
OPCC1698	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to provide governance to all East Midlands police collaboration projects.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	14/03/18	4	4
OPCC1864	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Impact of changes in legislation on the PCC.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2014	14/03/18	4	4
OPCC1699	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to produce and maintain a commissioning framework.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	28/03/18	4	4
OPCC1694	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Lack of resource and capacity available to OPCC.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/03/18	3	3
STR2007	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Continuity of power supply to the FHQ site.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	October 2017	17/08/18	3	3
STR1940	Dan Pedley Chief Inspector CMD	Failure to meet 101 call handling target.	Low	High	Controlled	September 2016	17/08/18	3	3
STR1764	David Craig Head of IT	Accreditation for the use of the PSN.	High	Low	Controlled	January 2014	17/08/18	3	3
STR564	Steve Potter Superintendent LPD	Management of MFH enquiries.	High	Low	Controlled	August 2010	26/08/18	3	3
STR1571	Matt Ditcher Head of Serious Crime	Genie/DASH not being used correctly resulting in incorrect risk assessments.	High	Low	Managed	September 2012	26/08/18	3	3
STR458	Matt Ditcher Head of Serious Crime	Failure to protect vulnerable persons.	High	Low	Controlled	March 2010	26/08/18	3	3
STR253	David Craig Head of IT	High risk of virus introduction and data loss.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2009	17/08/18	3	3
STR1519	Steve Morris Information Manager	RMADS management for information security.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	June 2012	08/02/18	2	2

STR1915	Steve Morris Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - asset owners.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	August 2015	08/02/18	2	2
STR430	Lynne Woodward Head of Equalities	Inquiry into disability related harassment.	Medium	Low	Managed	March 2010	17/08/18	2	2
STR1975	Carol Hever Head of HR	Gateway upgrade project.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	April 2017	17/08/18	2	2
STR1623	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Preparing for new communities, travelling and foreign national offending.	Medium	Low	Controlled	February 2013	17/08/18	2	2
STR310	David Sandall Head of Crime and Intelligence	Failure to recognise and respond to critical incidents and 'learn lessons'.	Low	Low	Controlled	November 2009	26/08/18	1	1
STR1990	David Craig Head of IT	Risk of uncertainty of impact of IT changes upon Leicestershire	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	June 2017	17/08/18	1	3
OPCC1695	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to deliver Police and Crime Plan during period of reducing funding.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/03/18	1	1
STR1475	Shane O'Neill Local Policing Lead	Limited ability to collate ASB incidents onto SENTINEL.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	May 2012	17/08/18	1	1

Risk of note

Risk Scoring Matrix

Impact							
	Score	Performance/ Service Delivery	Finance/ Efficiency £	Confidence/Reputation	Health and Safety	Environment	Strategic Direction
Very High	4	Major disruption to service delivery. Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force >1,000,000 Business area >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns. Major reputational damage; adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
High	3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force 251,000-1,000,000 Business area 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/ prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage; adverse national media coverage < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24 hours hospitalisation and/or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Medium	2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force 51,000-250,000 Business area 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns. Significant reputational damage; adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital/professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Low	1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force <50,000 Business area <10,000	Complaints from individuals. Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.

Likelihood			
	Score		
Very High	4	>75% chance of occurrence	Almost certain to occur
High	3	51-75% chance of occurrence	More likely to occur than not
Medium	2	25-50% chance of occurrence	Fairly likely to occur
Low	1	<25% chance of occurrence	Unlikely to occur

**Overall Risk Rating:
Impact x Likelihood**

9 - 16 = High	
5 - 8 = Medium	
1 - 4 = Low	

This page is intentionally blank.