

POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR LEICESTERSHIRE JOINT AUDIT, RISK & ASSURANCE PANEL

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Report of	OFFICES OF CHIEF CONSTABLE AND POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER
Subject	RISK REGISTER
Date	WEDNESDAY 21 st FEBRUARY 2018 – 10.00 A.M.
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Purpose of report

1. This report provides JARAP with information about the corporate risk register, highlighting high priority, newly registered and risks of note.

Recommendation

2. The panel is asked to discuss the contents of this report and note the current state of risk arrangements.

Summary

3. The force Strategic Organisational Risk Board (SORB) oversees and directs the strategic risks facing the force. This board last met on 6th November 2017 and was chaired by DCC Bannister. At this board the OPCC and JARAP were represented.
4. The OPCC risks are overseen by the Head of Governance and Assurance and presented to the Senior Management Team within the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

Risk

5. The corporate risk register identifies the key strategic risks. In the main these risks represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.
6. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 - 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a risk priority rating, which is expressed as a 'RAG' rating.

Priority Rating	'RAG' Rating	Review
9 - 16	High	Monthly

5 - 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 - 4	Low	3 Monthly

Risk status

7. *Controlled* – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Orchid risk register the term ‘Awaiting Control’ is used to describe this status.

Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably controlled.

Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review. It may also be a new risk prior to first review or a risk transferred to a new ‘Responsible Officer’.

Strategic risks

8. On the corporate risk register there are 45 police strategic risks and 8 OPCC strategic risks.

The overall risk rating grid for the corporate risk register is shown below.

Corporate Risk Rating Grid		Likelihood			
		Very High	High	Medium	Low
Impact	Very High	0	1	4	0
	High	1	3	10	9
	Medium	1	0	12	6
	Low	0	1	0	5

There are 5 high priority risks and 4 risks of note. All of these risks are outlined within Appendix A. Since the last JARAP meeting, there have been no new or archived risks.

The full corporate risk register is attached as Appendix B.

Implications

Financial

STR1844 – Failure to transition to the ESN.

Costs incurred by the infrastructure upgrade, ongoing contract with Airwave in the event of a transition delay and purchase of new equipment.

STR1329 – Transforming services.

This revolves around providing services with the reduced budget.

Equality impact assessment **STR430 – Disability related harassment.**
The police reputation for providing a fair and equitable service may be damaged.

Risks and impact As per the tables above.

Link to Police and Crime Plan As per report.

Appendices

Appendix A: Strategic Risks
Appendix B: Corporate Risk Register
Appendix C: Risk Matrix

Persons to contact

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Appendix A – Strategic Risks

High risks

STR1844	Failure to transition to the ESN		
Responsible Officer	Helen Chamberlain Chief Superintendent Tri Force Collaboration (TFC)	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	15/08/14	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	High (12)
Information	Airwave is a private network, based on the TETRA standard that uses masts to provide national coverage. Centrally the government are driving the procurement process as every		

	emergency service will move to mobile communications. There is a national project team that is engaging with individual forces to gauge concerns and provide updates.
Impact	This risk is concerned with the operational impact of not transitioning. There is uncertainty about how well the mobile network will respond to increased traffic and whether the emergency services will have priority. In addition, we do not know what functionality issues there may be and how our practices may have to be altered.
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purchase of repair credits for existing Sepura Airwave radios. • Monitoring of Airwave performance • COT oversight • Maintaining close contact with national police project team • Regional Airwave user group • Regional coordination and strategic oversight • Tri Force Programme • ICCS infrastructure upgrade
Update	<p>26/01/18 – Sally Brooks (TFC ESN Project Manager):- The transition plan is due to be released in Spring 2018, however, it is expected in Autumn 2018. A new Regional Devices/Apps Work Stream Lead has been identified and will be in post by Feb 2018. A regional communications strategy/plan has been approved with an emergency services stakeholder event scheduled for March 2018.</p> <p>Current status: managed.</p>

STR473		Organisational risk of not complying with the ACPO policy	
Responsible Officer	Mandy Bogle-Reilly Vetting Manager	Impact/Likelihood	Very High/High
Date Recorded	22/03/10	Current Rating	High (12)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (12)
Information	The ACPO National Vetting Policy is partially implemented; anybody joining the organisation after January 2012 are vetted to the ACPO national guidance. Anyone who joined the organisation before this date are not vetted to the national standards. The risk posed extends to resources deployed to regional units.		
Impact	There is an ongoing risk associated to operational security, corruption and reputation.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Centralisation of vetting within PSD • Review of the force vetting function • Priority EMOpSS vetting • Renewal procedure for CTC introduced • Compliance with policy for all new employees • Operational security • New starters vetted per ACPO policy • Business Case Implementation 2015 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure all staff are vetted in line with policy • All staff to be subject of aftercare / review 		
Update	<p>31/01/18 – Mandy Bogle-Reilly:- Since the beginning of the month, 3 full time Vetting Researchers have been working on the project. Decision made to withdraw the admin function offered to Special Branch beyond the 2nd Feb 2018, due to the impact this was having on BAU and the Project. If the numbers of vetting remain consistent the project is on target for completion in Nov 2019.</p> <p>Current status: controls tasked.</p>		
STR2006		Management of Archive provision	
Responsible Officer	Jason Masters Chief Superintendent	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	03/10/17	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The current Archive provision lacks resilience through adequate governance, policy and procedure and staffing establishment. Items received from across the force, including crime case files, interview tapes and pocket notebooks are not always catalogued or stored in a methodical manner, case files are separated and difficult to re-locate owing to system legacy issues and review, retention and disposal processes are fragmented and not NRAC compliant. Retrieval of records for further investigation or review is difficult. There are also over 200,000 evidential interview cassette tapes that have not been digitised and are degrading, with some being unreadable. With this risk there is an opportunity to significantly		

	improve the current service provision.
Impact	There is an operational impact of records/items found to be missing or un-locatable, which may be required for investigation purposes or case review. The current system provides little assurance that our obligations under MOPI are being met. This presents a significant reputational risk to the force.
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Archive review project • New Force data manager and 6 RRD staff • Proposed regional MOPI RRD procedure • Archive provision moving to shared property new build • Centralised structure incorporated into the Evidential Property Team
Update	<p>31/01/18 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager):- There are currently groups of staff working in Archives sitting within different directorates and work is being done to bring them together, consolidated within the broader property team. The policy and procedure is currently being scoped – this will include how the MOPI compliance team and the archives staff align their practises to ensure compliance to both the force procedure and MOPI requirements. Current status: controls tasked.</p>

STR1679		Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime	
Responsible Officer	Johnny Starbuck D/Superintendent	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	12/06/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The Service Improvement Unit carried out a number of audits under the heading "Missed Opportunities" which identified issues with the accuracy of our crime recording, both on initial contact and in relation to classification of crime. In addition, in April 2015 the Home Office Crime Recording reduced the timescale for when crimes must be recorded from 72 hours to 24 hours.		
Impact	Operational: crimes not being recorded. Reputational: loss of confidence in published figures and in the police as a whole.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Audit of 'STORM' incidents within CMD – compliance check • Audit schedule – conducted by the Service Improvement Unit • Monthly Crime Integrity Meeting • Crime Integrity Sub Group Meetings • Communication plan • Get it Right 1st Time – Gold Group • HMIC inspection • Introduction of the Investigative Management Unit 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime Integrity delivery plan 		
Update	<p>31/01/18 – Jonny Starbuck:- Work continues with the 42 strand plan – national best practise scanning was carried out to inform this plan. Staff that are working on identifying and rectifying issues has increased from 3 to 10 people. We have the ongoing audit regime in place to monitor improvement and the anecdotal feedback from staff that fewer crimes are being missed around vulnerability. Residual risks remain around incident to crime conversion in CMC, with most commons missed crimes being low level assault, public order and minor criminal damage. Current status: controls tasked.</p>		
OPCC1696		Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources	
Responsible Officer	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Impact/Likelihood	High/High
Date Recorded	19/07/13	Current Rating	High (9)
Category	Governance	Previous Rating	High (9)
Information	The PCC is making decisions which are informed by force data and information.		
Impact	If the data is not up to date or accurate this may affect the decisions made or where resources are allocated.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Data quality audits undertaken by HMIC • Systems in place for providing good quality financial information • Additional scrutiny applied by SAB 		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify and communicate data requirements to the force Ongoing data audit and assurance programme Review the findings of recent data quality audits to understand current position Regular reports on data quality to appropriate forums Review performance and information requirements to meet PCC's priorities Detailed action plan review at June SAB meeting PCC update to Police and Crime Panel in July 2017
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> HMIC effectiveness audit reviewed Force action plan requested by PCC at each SAB meeting HMIC data integrity audit underway Hot debrief and full report awaited Force to review internal audit methodology to ensure it reflects HMIC methodology
Update	<p>31/01/18 – Nish Padhiar (Assurance Officer):- The existing controls remain in place with work continuing with the additional controls. The Force action plan is presented at each SAB and until the end of March 2018 Current status: controls tasked.</p>

Risks of note

STR380		Current job evaluation scheme unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission	
Responsible Officer	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Impact/Likelihood	Medium/Low
Date Recorded	06/01/10	Current Rating	Low (2)
Category	People (Staff & Community)	Previous Rating	High (12)
Information	Following a review of the Force Job Evaluation Scheme (JES) - the JES does not meet with the EOC criteria. This particularly relates to: Linked grades, gender, equal pay, & age discrimination. Should a claim be made against the Force and a finding made against us, the claims could be substantial; particularly over generic roles. As a result the Hay Scheme of job evaluation has been undertaken. The findings are now being assessed and shared with Union groups.		
Impact	There is a significant financial risk associated to the findings of the review being implemented.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existing Control Name Intrusive management of the JES Consideration of other JE Schemes Force Equal Pay Review 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implementation of the Hay Scheme 		
Update	<p>31/01/18 – Alex Stacey-Midgley:- This risk is associated to the non-compliance of the current job evaluation scheme with Equality Legislation. This has been the case for some time and whilst low there is the risk that a claim could be made against the force until the new scheme is fully implemented. The uncertainty and potential threat associated to implementation of this new scheme is captured within a separate risk therefore the focus on this risk can remain on the existing scheme and the specific threat associated to it. Current status: managed.</p>		

STR2009		Reduced performance as a result of Force changes	
Responsible Officer	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Impact/Likelihood	High/Low
Date Recorded	24/10/17	Current Rating	Low (3)
Category	Operational/Performance	Previous Rating	Medium (6)
Information	Changes are being made to the Force operating model to bridge the gap between increased demand and reduced resource. There is a risk that these changes may not be successful if there is increased demand in areas that the model has not been designed to respond to.		
Impact	If the Force is unable to meet demand in certain areas this may impact upon operational capability, performance and reputation.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Performance measures Force Change Team 		

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Change Board • COT oversight
Update	<p>03/01/18 – Andy Elliott:- Darwin has now been implemented, which consisted of significant change. Performance continues to be monitored via the gold group and PDG and there have been no concerns around performance as a result of changes. We are now entering a steady state and the risk is currently low. Current status: controlled.</p>

STR1948		Resilience of LAN connectivity	
	David Craig Head of IT	Impact/Likelihood	High/Low
Date Recorded	13/12/16	Current Rating	Low (3)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	Medium (6)
Information	Following the flood in Admin 2, there is just one Local Area Network (LAN) node providing network services to headquarters. Whilst we have physical controls (Air Con, Uninterrupted Power Supply, fire protection and physical access) in place to protect the service, we have reduced resilience until a further node can be restored in Admin 2.		
Impact	Having just one LAN node creates vulnerability for headquarters networking. If this fails or the physical controls do not behave as expected the ability to maintain critical functions will be compromised.		
Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BC plans • Network maintenance contract • Change control process • DR plans • Engagement with Estates around restoration of Admin 2 • Physical controls (UPS, AC, fire and physical) • Preservation of Comms server room 		
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinstate resilient node at Force headquarters 		
Update	<p>01/01/18 – David Craig:- All controls are complete and normal service has been restored. I have reduced the likelihood of occurrence as a result and recommend that this is now closed. Current status: controls tasked.</p>		

STR1947		Resilience of WAN connectivity	
Responsible Officer	David Craig Head of IT	Impact/Likelihood	High/Low
Date Recorded	12/09/16	Current Rating	Low (3)
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	Medium (6)
Information	Following the flood in Admin 2, there is just one Wide Area Network (WAN) link providing connectivity for headquarters and the wider force. Work is being completed to reinstate the service with Virgin Media to reroute the existing fibre and terminate it in HQ Comms. This will be an interim measure until it can be restored in Admin 2.		
Impact	Having just one WAN link creates vulnerability issues for the force as there is no resilience. If the remaining WAN link fails the force will be unable to access critical systems based at Force HQ.		

Existing Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engagement with Virgin Media • Engagement with contractors to make them aware • DR plans • BC plans • Change control process • Network maintenance contract • Service level agreement with suppliers • WAN link temporarily restored to HQ CR1 & 4 data centre
Additional Controls	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reinstate resilient node at Force headquarters
Update	<p>23/01/18 – David Craig:- All controls are now in place; full service has been restored and tested. Current status: controls tasked.</p>

Appendix B		Corporate Risk Register				31 st January 2018			
Reference	Owner	Title	Impact	Likelihood	Status	Recorded	Last review	Priority	Previous rating
STR1844	Helen Chamberlain Tri Force Collaboration	Failure to transition to the ESN.	Very High	High	Managed	August 2014	26/01/18	12	12
STR473	Mandy Bogle-Reilly Security Vetting Manager	Organisational risk of not complying with the ACPO national vetting policy.	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	March 2010	31/01/18	12	12
STR2006	Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable	Management of archive provision.	High	High	Control Tasked	October 2017	31/01/18	9	9
OPCC1696	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Poor data quality leads to inefficient decision making in the OPCC and use of resources.	High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2013	31/01/18	9	9
STR1679	Johnny Starbuck D/Superintendent	Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime.	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2013	31/01/18	9	9
STR1954	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Failure of ANPR server resulting in loss of live feed.	Very High	Medium	Managed	January 2017	31/01/18	8	8
STR1935	Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable	Management of seized and found property provision.	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2016	31/01/18	8	8
STR1949	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Inability to upload non crime statistics from Niche onto PND.	Very High	Medium	Managed	December 2016	20/11/17	8	8
STR1961	Michelle Chambers DBS Vetting Manager	Failure to upload information from Niche to the DBS PLX system.	Very High	Medium	Managed	March 2017	06/11/17	8	8
STR1922	Chris Cockerill Operations Lead Criminal Justice	Inability to adequately audit Niche.	Medium	Very High	Controls Tasked	October 2015	07/12/17	8	8
OPCC1694	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Lack of resource and capacity available to OPCC.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	31/01/18	6	6
STR1991	David Craig Head of IT	Threat of cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police.	High	Medium	Managed	June 2017	28/11/17	6	6
STR1953	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Risk of significant change following implementation of Hay Review.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2016	19/01/18	6	6
STR1926	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Quality of video recorded evidence.	High	Medium	Controlled	January 2016	31/10/17	6	6
STR1939	Andrew Rodwell Communications Manager	Transition to the new Contact Management phone platform.	High	Medium	Controlled	September 2016	20/11/17	6	6
STR420	Peter Coogan Head of Health and Safety	Management system for energy use.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2010	03/11/17	6	6
STR1801	Alison Naylor HR Director	Ability to meet mandatory training requirements.	High	Medium	Controlled	June 2014	19/01/18	6	6
STR1329	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Transforming services – meeting the budget challenge for 2020.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2012	03/01/18	6	6

STR1910	Jason Ross Contact Management	Lack of resilience and foreseeable attrition in RTI-PNC compromises service.	High	Medium	Controlled	August 2015	10/01/18	6	6
OPCC1690	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to consult and engage sufficiently with the public.	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	31/01/18	6	6
STR1917	Steve Morris Information Manager	Failure to comply with the 'Building the Picture' HMIC recommendations.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	31/01/18	4	4
STR1946	Steve Morris Information Manager	Adoption of EU General Data Protection Regulations and Directive in May 2018.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	November 2016	08/01/18	4	4
STR2008	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Impact of Darwin implementation.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2017	03/01/18	4	4
STR1916	Steve Morris Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - records management.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	August 2015	31/01/18	4	4
STR11	Alison Naylor HR Director	Potential for industrial action affecting our service.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	October 2007	19/01/18	4	4
OPCC1700	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to maintain relationships with key partners.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	31/01/18	4	4
STR508	Adam Streets Head of Corporate Services	Failure to meet requirements of the Police and Crime Plan.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	April 2010	20/11/17	4	4
STR1706	Alison Naylor HR Director	Loss/absence/churn of key personnel.	Medium	Medium	Controlled	August 2013	19/01/18	4	4
STR533	Jason Masters Assistant Chief Constable	The fair and effective use of stop and search to promote confidence.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2010	31/01/18	4	4
OPCC1698	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to provide governance to all East Midlands police collaboration projects.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	31/01/18	4	4
OPCC1864	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Impact of changes in legislation on the PCC.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2014	31/01/18	4	4
OPCC1699	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to produce and maintain a commissioning framework.	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2013	31/01/18	4	4
STR2007	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Continuity of power supply to the FHQ site.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	October 2017	11/01/18	3	3
STR1940	Jason Ross Chief Inspector CMD	Failure to meet 101 call handling target.	Low	High	Controlled	September 2016	30/01/18	3	3
STR1764	David Craig Head of IT	Accreditation for the use of the PSN.	High	Low	Controlled	January 2014	20/11/17	3	3
STR564	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Management of MFH enquiries.	High	Low	Controlled	August 2010	31/10/17	3	3
STR1571	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Genie/DASH not being used correctly resulting in incorrect risk assessments.	High	Low	Managed	September 2012	31/10/17	3	3
STR458	Simon Cure Head of Serious Crime	Failure to protect vulnerable persons.	High	Low	Controlled	March 2010	31/10/17	3	3
STR253	David Craig Head of IT	High risk of virus introduction and data loss.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2009	03/11/17	3	3

STR2009	Andy Elliott Head of Change	Reduced performance as a result of Force changes.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	October 2017	03/01/18	3	6
STR1948	David Craig Head of IT	Resilience of LAN connectivity.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	December 2016	01/01/18	3	6
STR1947	David Craig Head of IT	Resilience of WAN connectivity.	High	Low	Controls Tasked	September 2016	23/01/18	3	6
STR380	Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner	Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) criteria.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	January 2010	31/01/18	2	12
STR1519	Steve Morris Information Manager	RMADS management for information security.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	June 2012	31/01/18	2	2
STR1915	Steve Morris Information Manager	Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - asset owners.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	August 2015	31/01/18	2	2
STR430	Lynne Woodward Head of Equalities	Inquiry into disability related harassment.	Medium	Low	Managed	March 2010	02/11/17	2	2
STR1975	Carol Hever Head of HR	Gateway upgrade project.	Medium	Low	Controls Tasked	April 2017	02/11/17	2	2
STR1623	Mick Graham Director of Intelligence	Preparing for new communities, travelling and foreign national offending.	Medium	Low	Controlled	February 2013	20/11/17	2	2
STR310	David Sandall Head of Crime and Intelligence	Failure to recognise and respond to critical incidents and 'learn lessons'.	Low	Low	Controlled	November 2009	08/01/18	1	1
STR1990	David Craig Head of IT	Risk of uncertainty of impact of IT changes upon Leicestershire	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	June 2017	18/01/18	1	3
OPCC1695	Angela Perry Head of Governance & Assurance	Failure to deliver Police and Crime Plan during period of reducing funding.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	July 2013	01/11/17	1	1
STR1945	Steve Morris Information Manager	Freedom of information requests – demand v capacity.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	November 2016	08/01/18	1	1
STR1475	Shane O'Neill Local Policing Lead	Limited ability to collate ASB incidents onto SENTINEL.	Low	Low	Controls Tasked	May 2012	31/01/18	1	1

Risk of note

Risk Scoring Matrix

Impact							
	Score	Performance/ Service Delivery	Finance/ Efficiency £	Confidence/Reputation	Health and Safety	Environment	Strategic Direction
Very High	4	Major disruption to service delivery. Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force >1,000,000 Business area >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns. Major reputational damage; adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
High	3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force 251,000-1,000,000 Business area 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage; adverse national media coverage < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24 hours hospitalisation and/or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Medium	2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force 51,000-250,000 Business area 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns. Significant reputational damage; adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital/professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
Low	1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force <50,000 Business area <10,000	Complaints from individuals. Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.

Likelihood			
		Score	
Very High	4	>75% chance of occurrence	Almost certain to occur
High	3	51-75% chance of occurrence	More likely to occur than not
Medium	2	25-50% chance of occurrence	Fairly likely to occur
Low	1	<25% chance of occurrence	Unlikely to occur

Overall Risk Rating: Impact x Likelihood	
9 - 16 = High	
5 - 8 = Medium	
1 - 4 = Low	

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