Purpose of report

1. To provide JARAP with an update on the force strategic risk register, highlighting high priority, newly registered risks, risks of note and archived risks.

Recommendation

2. The panel is recommended to review:
   • the contents of this report and the updates provided in respect of both high priority risks and risks of note
   • Those risks that SORB supports for archiving.

Summary

3. **High Risks** – There are currently 23 strategic risks on the force risk register with six of these being rated as ‘High’ priority.

4. **New Risks** – No new risks were added to the register at February SORB

5. **Risks of Note / Archived** – Proposal for Risk STR2006 to be lowered to Medium/Amber from High/Red. See risk update at Appendix A for details. Kim to meet with risk owner to discuss proposal and calculate risk score ahead of May SORB.

6. OPCC risks are presented on a separate risk register and this is overseen by the Senior Management Team within the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner.

Risk Grading Criteria

8. The strategic risk register identifies the key strategic risks to the force. In the main, these risks represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

9. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 - 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a risk priority rating, which is expressed as a Red/Amber/Green or ‘RAG’ rating.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Rating</th>
<th>‘RAG’ Rating</th>
<th>Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 - 16</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 8</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>3 Monthly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 4</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>3 Monthly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Risk Status

10. The ‘status’ of a risk gives an indication of the extent to which the risk is being managed/controlled. The categories are detailed below:

   Controlled – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

   Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Keto risk management system the term ‘Pending Control’ is used to describe this status.

   Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

   Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably ‘controlled’.

   Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review. It may also be a new risk to be reviewed for the first time or a risk transferred to a new ‘Responsible Officer’.

Risk Management System update

11. The development of the ‘Keto’ Risk Management system was completed at the start of April 2019. A priority for Kim has been to add users to the system and sort through the transferred strategic risks from Orchid; assigning risks as either live or archived. This should be completed by the end of the month.

12. The next step will be to meet with Risk Owners/SMTs within the Force and Mr Henry from the OPCC, with a view to getting all risks, both strategic and departmental, onto the system. As a result, this one system will securely house the force strategic risk register and departmental risk registers, as well as the OPCC risk register. Once the system is ready it can be showcased at both SORB and JARAP.
Overview of Current Strategic risks

13. There are currently 23 strategic risks on the force risk register with six of these risks being rated as ‘High’ priority as outlined within Appendix A.

14. The overall risk rating grid for the risk register is shown below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Force Risk Rating Grid</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The full summary risk register is attached as Appendix B.

Appendices

Appendix A: High priority risks and risks of note
Appendix B: Summary force risk register
Appendix C: Risk scoring matrix
Appendix D: Risks supported for removal from the strategic risk register

Persons to contact

Rob Nixon – Deputy Chief Constable – (0116) 248 2002
Email: Rob.Nixon@leicestershire.pnn.police.uk

Martin Henry – Finance Director – (0116) 229 8705
Email: Martin.Henry8143@leicestershire.pnn.police.uk

Email: kimberly.jebson-hambly7981@leicestershire.pnn.police.uk
### Appendix A – High Priority Risks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR-FMS-3</th>
<th>Evolving digital sophistication impacting on our technology requirements and the skills &amp; abilities needed to undertake investigations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsible Officer</strong></td>
<td>Chris Baker/David Craig DCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date Recorded</strong></td>
<td>01/11/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Criminal use of technology to enable crimes and the evolving digital sophistication of devices impacts on the skills and abilities needed to investigate crime and the length of time required to complete investigations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Impact** | • Potential skills gap  
• Potential technology or infrastructure gaps  
• Difficulties in investigating crime  
• Longer time to complete investigations  
• Increased digitally enabled crime |
| **Existing Controls** | • Blueprint 2025  
• Digital Technology Board  
• Quarterly updates from FMS/threat owners  
• Dedicated Digital Hub  
• National change programmes in support of enhancing force capability to deal with new and emerging technology enabled crime to include DII (Digital Intelligence and Investigation), Child Abuse Image Database, Biometrics, Mercury, digital forensics and specialist capability. |
| **Additional Controls** | • None |
| **Date Recorded** | 01/11/18 – Matt Jones  
New risk created with assistance from Dee Singh and Suzanne Nichols. Suzanne requests regular updates from the FMS threat owners and will update SORB through this report.  

**08/03/19 – Suzanne Nicholls**  
The Digital Hub continue to develop their skill set and continually seek technical solutions and improved capabilities such as:  

**Combatting sophisticated encryption**  
• Delivery of a solution to defeat sophisticated encryption within Apple and Samsung devices (phones protected by pin locks).  
• The use of J-Tag examinations (now in effect) as well as Chip-off and ISP examinations (training pending) to examine those phones from which data cannot be extracted using our standard forensic tools.  

**Telematics**  
The mainstreaming of complex car entertainment systems meant that there was a wealth of data (on board telematics) available that we, as a force, were not taking advantage of in our investigations. By accessing S106 funding we were able to introduce a new capability to the force which has already had a massive impact on relevant investigations, providing key lines of enquiry in a timely manner which would not have been available otherwise. Being early adopters has also enabled us to be a key player nationally to influence the development of telematics work.  

**Identifying applicable skills already within force and seeking volunteers with the necessary skill set**  
The Cybercrime Team investigate offences which often require an advanced level of knowledge about the architecture of networks and the interpretation of the data we seize from them. This knowledge is not traditionally found with high tech crime units and is more commonly placed |
within corporate IT departments. To meet this challenge we are seeking to identify applicable skills already possessed by within our officer workforce and proactively seeking volunteers with the necessary skill sets to support either in a regular basis around researching novel and efficient methods or in an ad hoc basis in support of pursue investigations.

**Improvement to timeliness of investigations**

- Pegasus is a suite of programmes that provide the Force with Covert Operations (COPS) and Covert Human Intelligence Sources (CHIS) capability in the confidential network. New versions of these programmes are available that will improve their functionality and capability; they will also ensure that the systems remain supported. The systems are provided and supported by ABM Altia. The Force license for these systems covers right to use and support but not professional services for upgrades. This change would significantly improve access and efficiency and reduce officer time. IT department are working towards full proposals and costs involved with this.
- Virtualisation and automation project is in early stages and will allow for ever quicker turnaround times.

**Current Status: Controls Tasked**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR-FMS-4</th>
<th>The maintenance of workforce wellbeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Officer</td>
<td>DCC Rob Nixon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Recorded</td>
<td>01/11/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>The maintenance of workforce well-being.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Impact**

- Fatigue and stress in staff
- Increased absence
- Reduced productivity
- Increased presenteeism
- Further decline in well-being
- Loss of staff through resignation
- Civil litigation and criminal enforcement
- Capacity/capability not managed as demand increases
- Inability to provided policing services due to lack of productivity/resource

**Existing Controls**

- Blueprint 2025
- Overseen by Workforce Wellbeing Board
- Chief Officer lead
- Wellbeing agenda and working group
- EMSOU engagement
- HR Wellbeing support
- Training in TRiM, Mental Health First Aid, Health and Safety for managers
- Chaplains
- CiC and Occupational Health
- Wellbeing SPOCS
- Staff surveys
- Management of health and safety including stress surveys and assessments

**Additional Controls**

- Role based stress surveys

**Update**

01/11/18 – Matt Jones

New risk created with assistance from Dee Singh and Suzanne Nichols. Suzanne requests regular updates from the FMS threat owners and will update SORB through this report.
08/03/19 – Suzanne Nicholls
Support Teams/SPOCS

Within the last 12 months the force has increased the number of internal teams and people who can support and offer bespoke guidance:

- 100+ Wellbeing Champions spread all over the Force areas
- 15 Trained welfare SPOCS
- 15 Dyslexia SPOCS
- 50 TRiM Practitioners (including advanced practitioners)
- 154 Mental Health First Aiders

These compliment the support provided by the Trade Unions, Police Federation, Superintendents Association and other volunteer services like the chaplaincy.

Events/Awards/Roadshows

There has been a number of leadership roadshows taking place where people have been encouraged to come and share what is causing issues for their wellbeing. Those matters are now being built into the wellbeing workstream.

The introduction of the Wellbeing Awards at a Force level demonstrates the interest in what people are doing regarding wellbeing and also demonstrates the commitment by the Force to recognise and thank those promoting this area.

Continuing Initiatives

- Your Wellbeing Intranet website which has been developed in 4 areas: Physical Health, Mental Health, Emotional Health & Resilience and also financial health. This promotes bespoke toolkits and also features special wellbeing events such as Brew Monday on 21/1/19. The intranet website includes BLUE LIGHT newsletters which focus on latest developments, opportunities and training around health matters for emergency services staff.
- Campaigns include LPF Trust Wellbeing sessions where 144 people were seen and had quick checks on their blood pressure, cholesterol, pulse, temperature, BMI, blood sugar levels & oxygen saturation levels – these will continue throughout 2019
- Development of the GAIN (General Analysis Intervention and Needs) model and practical use of this to review where our people are starting to struggle to cope.

Staff Safety

The Health & Safety Team have increased the number of building surveys at police locations and satellite ‘beat offices’ and enhanced reports that are provided to health and safety committees. They also have an improved ‘Risk Assessor’ course that has enabled improvements in the quality of role based risk assessments.

Current Status: Controls Tasked

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR-FMS-1</th>
<th>Increased Demand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Officer</td>
<td>Jason Masters ACC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Recorded</td>
<td>01/11/18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Crime and non-crime demand increases year on year affecting capacity/capability in first response, investigation, neighbourhood policing and specialist teams. This is not sustainable with current resources,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| | Impact/Likelihood | Very High/High |
| | Current Rating | High (12) |
| | Previous Rating | N/A |
processes and technology. The demand increase is from changes in the nature of crime, its complexity and a general rise in volume. A Force Management Statement was undertaken in 2017. 29 out of the 57 identified threats were due to demand changes, including increased violent crime.

### Impact
- Investigations take longer
- Reduction in what can be investigated
- Skills set don’t keep up with changes
- Poor perception from public/lack of public confidence
- Reduced ability to deliver services
- Increased demand on specialist teams

### Existing Controls
- Blueprint 2025
- Overseen by Demand Board and Strategic PDG
- Quarterly updates from FMS/threat owners
- Improvements in how crime is reported/technology investment, Pronto
- Prioritisation/assessment of work (EMSOU-FS, POLIT, THRIVE)
- Improved software on demand gaps and crime type (Process Evolution)
- Improved work with partners to reduce/remove non-police demand
- VIP support to increase volunteers and recruit specialist skills
- New supportive departments (e.g. Crime Bureau) and dedicated teams (e.g. Volume Fraud Team, Serious Harm Reduction Unit)
- Supervising/monitoring of triage Sergeants in CMD
- Specialist roles/training to reduce duplication
- Shift pattern reviews
- Training/upskilling (e.g. More Detectives, Solubility Factors)
- Operations on high risk/volume crime area
- Increased use of powers (e.g. stop Search)
- Targeted strategies on Force Priorities (knife crime reduction, school education, safety advice to public, Heritage Watch etc)
- Increased resources (PRT, Missing Persons Team)
- Improved management of health and safety
- Community Impact Assessments

### Additional Controls
- Ongoing Blueprint 2025 work
- Refocus and prioritise commissioning of forensic analysis (FMS20)
- Reducing the number of investigations on the queues of POLIT investigators FMS24)
- Continued alignment of processes and resources in CSE (FMS36)
- Demand Board paper to manage RSO increase through policy change or increased resourcing (FMS45)
- Design Authority
- Developing service offer work

### Update
- **01/11/18 – Matt Jones**
  New risk created with assistance from Dee Singh and Suzanne Nichols. Suzanne requests regular updates from the FMS threat owners and will update SORB through this report.

- **08/03/19 – Suzanne Nicholls**
  - Target Operating Model (TOM) review
  - The Internal Mental Health structure is to be reformed in order to meet increased demand. Plans include recruiting a dedicated post which supports tactical and operational delivery and through the TOM, to realign multiagency resources so as it deal with Mental Health at the first point of contact.
  - Precept now agreed for more staff
  - Continued roll out of ‘Single Online Home’ which provides members of the public with the ability to self-serve and report crime online as well as accessing a wide range of information
  - Continued recruitment programme within CMD
- Revised ‘Bed Watch’ procedure has been agreed and implementation is pending the antenna fitted at LRI which is due to take place in March 2019
- Expansion of Crime Bureau planned
- Proposal to expand the POLIT team
- Plans to expand CSE team in anticipation of becoming a Child Exploitation Team as opposed to a CSE team
- Monitoring of Brexit related demand – Force-wide ‘Threat Assessment’ carried about by Supt Cordiner in January and regular Gold level planning meetings continue. Gold group confident that we as a Force have done all we can to prepare based upon the minimal intel and guidance we have on the Brexit situation. PCC has attended most meetings.

**Current status: Controls Tasked**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR380</th>
<th>Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Responsible Officer</strong></td>
<td>Alex Stacey-Midgley Senior HR Business Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Date Recorded</strong></td>
<td>06/01/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
<td>People (staff and community)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Leicestershire Police are currently involved in a Hay Review Project. The second phase of this project is aligning the hay scores for each job to pay scales. There is a fear that if there is significant change to people’s pay and the salaries budget a number of risks could be emerge. These include; an increase in the salary bill resulting in future redundancies to accommodate the cost, decrease in an individual’s salary could result in them wanting to take action e.g. to leave and claim constructive dismissal, being unable to agree the new salary bands with the TU and them seeking to raise a formal dispute with the employer (e.g. potential strike action), individuals reporting sick en masse rather than leaving and claiming constructive dismissal. JES does not meet with the EOC criteria. This particularly relates to: Linked grades, gender, equal pay, &amp; age discrimination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Impact</strong></td>
<td>Should a claim be made against the Force and a finding made against us, the claims could be substantial; particularly over generic roles. There is a significant financial risk associated to the findings of the review being implemented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is a risk that these changes will impact upon staff performance, with people taking increased sickness absence or providing a lesser quality of service. In addition, the perception from the public about the changes and the impact on our ability to deliver services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Existing Controls** | • Project plan in place  
• Project budget in place  
• Formal consultation with unions  
• Trained evaluators  
• Quality assurance from project team  
• Communications messages  
• Comms plan  
• Intrusive management of the JES  
• Consideration of other JE schemes  
• Force Equal Pay Review |
| **Additional Control** | • Implementation of the Hay Scheme  
• Hay project team |
| **Update** | 03/08/18 – Alex Stacey-Midgley:  
Move risk up to \(4 \times 3 = 12\) High  
Keep on risk register as the impact will be force-wide, including reputational risk, turbulence to the workforce in terms of work output and potential |
increase in leavers and legal costs; and resource intensive legal processes. There could be the potential for industrial action.

The JE project has been ongoing for 3 years. There are 2 key aspects to the project which have been;

1) to implement a new JE scheme which is Hay. All posts have been (and new ones or revised roles continue to be) evaluated using this scheme. Each job is given a score which gives the job a size relative to all other jobs.

2) to transpose those new JE scores into a pay model. The pay model is designed by the Force and has used the framework of the national PSC pay spinal points.

The project has moved to the phase of national consultation. There will be people who have no change to pay, those who have a pay increase and those who’s pay will reduce (they will have pay protection for 2 years). 30+ pay models have been considered.

It is likely that the Force will get an update from the national team in the next 2 months about their view and recommendation. The TU are unlikely to be able to recommend any pay model where members are affected adversely (pay reduction) and so the following scenarios are possible following further consultation and negotiation;

1) Unable to recommend the pay model - the TU may then ballot members about potential industrial action if the employer imposes the changes

2) Able to recommend the pay model and ballot members for them to consider acceptance or not – the Force may need to consider what action to take if the members do not accept which could include imposing the changes.

The added complexity is that the current JE scheme is not compliant with equalities legislation which has been publically reported on. This means the Force needs to change its scheme and the reality is that any scheme would need to be mapped into a pay model and there would still be likely the 3 groups impacted with no change to pay, pay increase and pay reduction.

09/10/18: Matt Jones
The archived risk STR1953 discussed the same risk and has been merged with this one.

16/10/18 – Alex Stacey-Midgley:
There has been no change. The first consultation meeting with the Trade Union is on 24/10/18 but will only be to discuss the agenda for future meetings.

15/01/19 – Alex Stacey-Midgley:
Weekly consultation is ongoing with the local trade unions. There should be a meeting in February with representatives from the national Trade Union PSC side to consider the impact of the proposed new pay model alongside the new JE scheme. Following this the TU will consider if they can recommend the new model to their members and/or if they will undertake a ballot process.

29/03/19 – Alex Stacey-Midgley:
The risk remains high because of the potential impact and reaction from employees and the potential subsequent impact to service provision.

Due to the complexity of the ongoing consultation there is no finalised date agreed in respect of when the Trade Union may ballot their members about
the final offer. This in itself causes some anxiety for staff and a comprehensive range of wellbeing support is currently in development to help employees with this.

Current status: Controls Tasked

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR2006</th>
<th>Management of Archive provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Officer</td>
<td>Jason Masters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date Recorded</td>
<td>03/10/17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Operational/Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>The current Archive provision lacks resilience through adequate governance, policy and procedure and staffing establishment. Items received from across the force, including crime case files, interview tapes and pocket notebooks are not always catalogued or stored in a methodical manner, case files are separated and difficult to re-locate owing to system legacy issues and review, retention and disposal processes are fragmented and not NRAC compliant. Retrieval of records for further investigation or review is difficult. There are also over 200,000 evidential interview cassette tapes that have not been digitised and are degrading, with some being unreadable. With this risk there is an opportunity to significantly improve the current service provision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact</td>
<td>There is an operational impact of records/items found to be missing or un-locatable, which may be required for investigation purposes or case review. The current system provides little assurance that our obligations under MOPI are being met. This presents a significant reputational risk to the force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Additional Controls | • Archive review project  
• New Force data manager and 6 RRD staff  
• Proposed regional MOPI RRD procedure  
• Archive provision moving to shared property new build  
• Centralised structure incorporated into the Evidential Property Team |

**Update**

03/05/18 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager):-
We are working on a policy and procedure for Retention Review and Disposal of archives. We need to take a decision on what to do with these legacy archives. A number of proposals will be put forward to chief officers for a decision on how to proceed.

24/07/18 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager)
A paper has been submitted to ACC Masters. Key points include:

A Regional Review, Retention and Disposal procedure relating to electronic records has been agreed. Lincolnshire Police are to act as the lead, carrying out the review process. A Leicestershire team will retain the responsibility of deleting appropriate records that have been subject to the review.

Physical recorded material stored within Leicestershire Police will need to adopt a similar procedure to ensure that digital and physical records are mapped together and disposed at the same time. This is being written by the EPAC Project Team. A challenge to this is the differing retention periods stipulated in different pieces of legislation. This is a national issue being looked at by the Home Office.

Going forward the projects current priorities are:
• Understand what physical archives are stored at Mansfield House
• Further clarify the legislative requirements around retention
• Clarify what “other” archives have been set up around the estate
• Re-commence MoPI RRD at Tigers Road
• Review and revise current evidential procedure to include NICHE
• Complete and submit to Change Board procedures around RRD.

09/10/18 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager)
An archives RRD procedure has been completed and submitted to DCC Nixon (END Sept 2018). Further work is being completed at the request of DCC Nixon on risk assessing and prioritising disposal of records prior to a final decision. The responsibility for this overall risk sits jointly between the Information Management MoPI team and the Archives team. Operation Halo2 archives aims to prepare operational archives for transfer to the EPAC centre in June 2019.

This involves reviewing, cataloguing, scan and bin, dating and grading all undetected crime files at Mansfield house archive store and files where offences are to be prosecuted or have been prosecuted at Tigers Road. It also involves reviewing potentially 100,000 back record converted crimes from CIS that have been MoPI graded by the regional RRD team, locating the relevant files & media material, retrieving the specific files and preparing them for disposal subject to IICSA/UCPI approval. This operation requires staff. 2 full time MoPI staff are to be provided. A business case for 3 full time temporary staff for 12 months has been submitted to the October Change board and approved.

16/01/19 – Jez Leavesley (Project Manager)
The proposed force RRD procedure has had a number of amendments made and is now back with DCC Nixon and will be discussed by him at February SORB prior to sign off and introduction. Operation Halo 2 has commenced and is on-going however progress has been slow due to lack of staff. Light duties staff are used for this operation which means that they are usually short term, so there are continuity issues. Recruitment of 3 temporary agency staff for 12 months has been approved and recruitment is underway. The force archive project sits within the Evidential Property & Archive Programme. The archive project itself will be audited by Mazars in March 2019.

26/03/19 - Jez Leavesley (Implementation Manger)
The RRD procedure has now been ratified by DCC Nixon. Elements of the new procedure such as bluebook reviews have commenced under Operation Halo 2. The project team have submitted the RRD procedure (now it has been ratified) to the national ICSA/UCPI enquiries to confirm compliance with their requirements prior to full implementation of the procedure. We await a reply.
The Archives project was audited by Mazars w/c 18th March. We await the audit results.

Subject to audit results I would recommend that risk is reduced to AMBER. We now have a procedure and are MOPI compliant. We have started to identify material for disposal but we need approval from the national enquiries to commence this next stage.

Current status: Controls Tasked
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STR1679</th>
<th>Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Responsible Officer** | Lou Cordiner  
Chief Inspector | **Impact/Likelihood** | High/High |
| **Date Recorded** | 12/06/13 | **Current Rating** | High (9) |
| **Category** | Operational/Performance | **Previous Rating** | High (9) |

**Information**
The Service Improvement Unit carried out a number of audits under the heading “Missed Opportunities” which identified issues with the accuracy of our crime recording, both on initial contact and in relation to classification of crime. In addition, in April 2015 the Home Office Crime Recording reduced the timescale for when crimes must be recorded from 72 hours to 24 hours.

**Impact**
Operational: crimes not being recorded. Reputational: loss of confidence in published figures and in the police as a whole.

**Existing Controls**
- Audit of ‘STORM’ incidents within CMD – compliance check
- Audit schedule – conducted by the Service Improvement Unit
- Task and finish groups – part of Get it Right 1st Time
- Communication plan – as part of Get it Right 1st Time
- Get it Right 1st Time – Gold Group
- HMIC inspection
- Introduction of the Investigative Management Unit

**Additional Controls**
- Get it Right 1st Time delivery plan

**Update**

24/07/18 – Darren Goddard:
Training has continued and significant work continues reporting directly to the DCC. Get it Right 1st Time meeting to be re-established under D/CS Sandall. It is planned that the Crime Data Integrity meeting will feed into this.

11/10/18 – Darren Goddard/Caroline Barker
We have now delivered training to 765 staff.

HMICFRS visited the Force in September for the audit part of the CDI 2 tier inspection and returned 8th, 9th and 10th of October to complete the fieldwork. We are awaiting the outcome of the hot debrief on 13/11/18 with the report being published early 2019.

20/11/18 – Caroline Barker
On the 8th November HMICFRS provided the force with a CDI debrief ahead of a draft report being submitted to the Force by 22nd November for factual accuracy checks prior to publication of the final report in January 2019.

Early feedback suggests that HMICFRS have found that the force has made improvements to its crime recording arrangements since their inspection in 2017 and they acknowledge the work undertaken to improve our CDI compliance. They have outlined a number of areas where the force still needs to make improvements and these will be further refined and provided to the force in the final report in the new year.

16/01/19 – Caroline Barker
HMICFRS published their Leicestershire CDI Inspection report on 15th January 2019. Whilst the force was again graded as inadequate they recognised the statistically significant improvement in the accuracy of crime recording, overall compliance is 84.1%. They identified good leadership and that the force has improved crime-recording standards in many areas and timeliness of recording is excellent. The force has 3
outstanding recommendations from 2017 which are included in the force delivery plan and work will continue to address these.

C/Supt Streets has suggested this risk may need to be replaced/retitled to focus solely on CDI Inspection work. Risk & BC Advisor to meet with Caroline & Darren to progress this.

28/03/19 – Caroline Barker
The outstanding recommendation in the HMICFRS CDI inspection report in relation to the rollout of CDI training for all staff involved in the recording of crime, is now complete, with over 1000 staff receiving an input. Training will continue on a rolling programme with student officers/ISAs/specialist teams.

Work continues to build on the improvements to the forces crime recording arrangements recognised by HMIC; this includes a continuing training programme, utilising a number of methods, including face to face training inputs, cascade training and CDI videos. The force CDI audit strategy is being reviewed and a revised strategy produced for the new financial year starting on 1st April. Audit results are shared and monitored through the CDI group, the Get it Right 1st Time Governance group and Crime & Ops group.

**Current status: Controls Tasked**
### Appendix B – Force Strategic Risk Register

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Impact</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Recorded</th>
<th>Last review</th>
<th>Priority</th>
<th>Previous rating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>STR-FMS-3</td>
<td>Chris Baker</td>
<td>Detective Chief Inspector</td>
<td>Criminal use of technology</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>November 2018</td>
<td>08/03/19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR-FMS-4</td>
<td>Julia Debenham</td>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>The maintenance of workforce wellbeing</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>November 2018</td>
<td>08/03/19</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR380</td>
<td>Alex Stacey-Midgley</td>
<td>Senior HR Business Partner</td>
<td>Current JES unlikely to meet Equal Opportunities Commission criteria</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td>29/03/19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR-FMS-1</td>
<td>Jason Masters</td>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Increased demand</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>November 2018</td>
<td>08/03/19</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR2006</td>
<td>Jason Masters</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable</td>
<td>Management of archive provision.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>October 2017</td>
<td>26/03/19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1679</td>
<td>Lou Cordiner</td>
<td>Chief Inspector</td>
<td>Missed opportunities: failure to accurately record crime.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>28/03/19</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1935</td>
<td>Jason Masters</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable</td>
<td>Management of seized and found property provision.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>June 2016</td>
<td>16/01/19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1949</td>
<td>Mick Graham</td>
<td>Director of Intelligence</td>
<td>Inability to upload non crime statistics from Niche onto PND.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>December 2016</td>
<td>24/01/19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR-FMS-2</td>
<td>Rob Nixon</td>
<td>DCC</td>
<td>Workforce numbers</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>November 2018</td>
<td>08/03/19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR-FMS-5</td>
<td>Shane O’Neill</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>November 2018</td>
<td>23/01/19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR2017</td>
<td>Nat Wignall</td>
<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Implementing the HMIC targeting the risk recommendations for firearms checks</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>April 2018</td>
<td>16/01/19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR473</td>
<td>Mandy Bogle-Reilly</td>
<td>Security Vetting Manager</td>
<td>Compliance with the ACPO vetting policy for the policing community.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>15/01/19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1991</td>
<td>Steve Morris</td>
<td>Head of Information Security</td>
<td>Threat of cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>June 2017</td>
<td>04/02/19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1801</td>
<td>Alison Naylor</td>
<td>HR Director</td>
<td>Ability to meet mandatory training requirements.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>June 2014</td>
<td>15/01/19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1329</td>
<td>Andy Elliott</td>
<td>Head of Change</td>
<td>Transforming services – meeting the budget challenge for 2020.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>February 2012</td>
<td>15/01/19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1844</td>
<td>Ian Freeman</td>
<td>IT Communications Manager</td>
<td>Failure to transition to the ESN.</td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>17/01/19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1946</td>
<td>Steve Morris</td>
<td>Information Manager</td>
<td>Adoption of EU General Data Protection Regulations and Directive in May 2018.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>November 2016</td>
<td>04/02/19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Risk Level</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>Status</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR11</td>
<td>Alison Naylor</td>
<td>HR Director</td>
<td>Potential for industrial action affecting our service.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>15/01/19</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1910</td>
<td>Dan Pedley</td>
<td>Contact Management</td>
<td>Lack of resilience and foreseeable attrition in RTI-PNC compromises service.</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td>15/01/19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1915</td>
<td>Steve Morris</td>
<td>Information Manager</td>
<td>Failure to comply with the ICO recommendations - asset owners.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controls Tasked</td>
<td>August 2015</td>
<td>04/02/19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR430</td>
<td>Lynne Woodward</td>
<td>Head of Equalities</td>
<td>Inquiry into disability related harassment.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>15/01/19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1623</td>
<td>Mick Graham</td>
<td>Director of Intelligence</td>
<td>Preparing for new communities, travelling and foreign national offending.</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Controlled</td>
<td>February 2013</td>
<td>28/01/19</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STR1475</td>
<td>Shane O’Neill</td>
<td>Local Policing Lead</td>
<td>Limited ability to collate ASB incidents onto SENTINEL.</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Managed</td>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>24/01/19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Highlighting Legend:**

- Risks Archived from SORB
- Status Change
# Appendix C – Risk Scoring Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Performance/Service Delivery</th>
<th>Finance/Efficiency £</th>
<th>Confidence/Reputation</th>
<th>Health and Safety</th>
<th>Environment</th>
<th>Strategic Direction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Major disruption to service delivery.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns. Major reputational damage; adverse national media coverage &gt; 7 days.</td>
<td>Death or a life changing injury.</td>
<td>Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).</td>
<td>Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Serious disruption to service delivery.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Serious stakeholder/investigations/prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage; adverse national media coverage &lt; 7 days.</td>
<td>An injury requiring over 24 hours hospitalisation and/or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.</td>
<td>High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).</td>
<td>Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Significant disruption to service delivery.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns. Significant reputational damage; adverse local media coverage.</td>
<td>An injury requiring hospital/professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.</td>
<td>Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).</td>
<td>Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Minor disruption to service delivery.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Complaints from individuals. Minor impact on a specific section of the community.</td>
<td>An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.</td>
<td>Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).</td>
<td>Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Likelihood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Likelihood</th>
<th>Overall Risk Rating: Impact x Likelihood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>&gt;75% chance of occurrence</td>
<td>Almost certain to occur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>51-75% chance of occurrence</td>
<td>More likely to occur than not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>25-50% chance of occurrence</td>
<td>Fairly likely to occur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>&lt;25% chance of occurrence</td>
<td>Unlikely to occur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D - Risks Removed from Risk Register

No risks removed from the register this quarter
This page is intentionally blank.