

**POLICE & CRIME  
COMMISSIONER FOR  
LEICESTERSHIRE  
JOINT AUDIT, RISK &  
ASSURANCE PANEL**

Paper

Marked

**D**

Report of	OFFICE OF CHIEF CONSTABLE
Subject	FORCE RISK REGISTER
Date	TUESDAY 1 <sup>st</sup> AUGUST 2023
Author	MATTHEW JONES – DEPUTY HEAD OF SAFETY, SUSTAINABILITY AND RISK

### **Purpose of report**

1. To provide JARAP with an update on the force strategic risk register, highlighting high priority risks, newly registered risks, changes of risk score and archived risks.

### **Recommendation**

2. The panel is recommended to review the contents of this report and the updates provided within. These updates will be reviewed at the Organisational Risk Board (ORB), due to meet on 18<sup>th</sup> July 2023 (JARAP risk report written on 11<sup>th</sup> July 2023).

### **Summary**

3. There are currently 28 strategic risks on the risk register.

### **High Risks**

4. 14 risks are currently rated as 'High' priority. All 28 risks are summarised in Appendix A, as well as those that have been archived at ORB.

### **Archived risks**

5. 2 risks have been recommended for archive, since JARAP last met in April 2023. These will be discussed at the next ORB. This is detailed in Appendix B.

### **Changes in risk score**

6. 4 risks have been recommended for a change in risk score since the last JARAP. These will be discussed at the next ORB. These are detailed in Appendix C.

### **New risks**

7. There will be 5 new risks put forward at the next ORB, as per Appendix D since JARAP last met.

### **Risk Grading Criteria**

8. The strategic risk register identifies the key strategic risks to the force. These risks typically represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

OFFICIAL

9. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 – 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a Risk Score, which is expressed as a Red/Amber/Green or ‘RAG’ rating. All strategic risks are reviewed at least quarterly.

Risk Score	‘RAG’ Rating	Review
9 – 16	High	3 Monthly
5 – 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 – 4	Low	3 Monthly

**Risk Status**

10. The ‘status’ of a risk gives an indication of the extent to which the risk is being managed/controlled. The categories are detailed below:

Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Keto risk management system, the term ‘Pending Control’ is used to describe this status.

Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably ‘controlled’.

Controlled – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review or a new risk to be reviewed for the first time or a risk transferred to a new ‘Responsible Officer’.

**Risk Matrix Grid Chart:**

	Low	Medium	High	Very High
Very High	0	0	2	3
High	0	0	3	6
Medium	0	1	4	3
Low	0	0	1	5

**Appendices**

Appendix A: Summary of force risk register

Appendix B: Archived risks

Appendix C: Changes in risk score

Appendix D: New risks

Appendix E: High priority risks not included in above appendices

Appendix F: Risk scoring matrix

**Persons to contact**

Kerry Smith – Assistant Chief Constable – (0116) 222 2222 ext 3307002

Email: [kerry.smith@leics.police.uk](mailto:kerry.smith@leics.police.uk)

Paul Dawkins – Assistant Chief Officer (Finances and Resources) – (0116) 248 2244

Email: [paul.dawkins@leics.police.uk](mailto:paul.dawkins@leics.police.uk)

Peter Coogan – Principal Health and Safety Advisor – 07966 932338

Email: [peter.coogan@leics.police.uk](mailto:peter.coogan@leics.police.uk)

OFFICIAL

Appendix A: Risks Overview

Highlighting Legend:

Risks Archived / proposed archived since last JARAP (Apr 23)
Proposed change to risk score
Proposed new risk since last meeting

Appendix A		Force Risk Register				01 <sup>st</sup> AUGUST 2023			
Reference	Owner	Title	Impact	Likelihood	Status	First Recorded	Last review	Current/ proposed Risk Score	Previous Score
STR0278	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	The Financial Challenge – 2022/2023 - 2025/26	Very High	Very High	Controls Tasked	September 2021	June 2023	16	16
STR0081	David Craig Head of I.T	Capacity within I.T.	Very High	Very High	Controls Tasked	May 2019	June 2023	16	16
STR0243	Ch/Supt Starbuck Head of LPD	Plymouth – firearms review	Very High	Very High	Controls tasked	May 2023	June 2023	16	New Risk
STR0307	David Craig Head of I.T	Risk to network storage	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	February 2022	June 2023	8	12
STR0127	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Inability to meet regional Occupational Health demand	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	January 2020	June 2023	12	12
STR0187	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Churn of staff and ongoing establishment pressure	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	April 2020	June 2023	12	12
STR0380	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Current JES non-equalities compliant and the implementation of new JES scheme carries risk	High	Very High	Controls Tasked	January 2010	June 2023	6	12
STR0339	Steve Morris Head of Info Management	Risk of cyber attack	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2022	June 2023	12	12

OFFICIAL

STR0386	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Estates Department not being able to support essential building services	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	December 2008	June 2023	12	12
STR0411	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	Loss of all IT functionality due to overheating at Euston Street	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	October 2022	June 2023	12	12
STR0350	C/Insp Parkes Head of Transport Unit	Risk associated with a transition to an alternatively fuelled fleet	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	September 2022	June 2023	12	12
STR0447	Leah Johnson Head of Prosecutions	Witness Care Unit staffing	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2023	June 2023	9	New Risk
STR0383	Ch/Supt O'Neill Head of CalD	Lack of PIP 2 detectives	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2020	June 2023	6	9
STR1679	Adam Streets ACC	Complying with Home Office Counting Rules & Ensuring High Levels of Crime Data Integrity	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2013	June 2023	6	9
STR0257	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Risk of not providing appropriate health surveillance	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2021	June 2023	8	8
STR0292	David Sandall DCC	Violence, abuse and intimidation against women and girls	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	October 2021	June 2023	8	8
STR0421	Steve Morris Head of Info Management	Risk of misconduct and complaints associated with the use of What'sApp	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	March 2023	June 2023	8	8
STR0291	David Sandall DCC	Impact of ISO standard for forensic science	High	Medium	Controls tasked	October 2021	June 2023	6	6
STR0228	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	Pension remedy for police pension scheme	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2020	June 2023	6	6
STR0443	Leah Johnson Head of Prosecutions	Backlog of traffic interviews	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2023	June 2023	6	New Risk
STR0016	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Maintaining Workforce Wellbeing	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	November 2018	June 2023	6	6
STR184	David Craig Head of IT	Loss of power or cooling affecting ability of IT and CMD to provide service	Very high	Low	Controls tasked	April 2020	June 2023	4	4
STR2017	Supt Bunn Head of CMD	Ineffective Communication of Firearms Markers to Deployed Officers	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	April 2018	June 2023	4	4
STR0280	David Sandall DCC	Appetite for regional collaboration	Medium	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2021	June 2023	4	4
STR0418	Supt Ward Head of PSD	Predatory individual working for Leicestershire Police	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	February 2023	June 2023	4	4

OFFICIAL

STR0419	Ch Supt Slonecki Head of SSD	Safety and business continuity implications associated with use of lithium ion batteries	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	February 2023	June 2023	4	4
STR0422	Andrew Wroe Head of Estates	Contractor management	High	Low	Control Tasked	June 2023	June 2023	3	New Risk
STR0445	D/Supt Hatton CaID	Serious violence duty	High	Low	Controls Tasked	June 2023	June 2023	3	New Risk

**Appendix B: Risks archived from the strategic risk register**

<b>STR0187</b>	<b>Churn of staff and ongoing establishment pressure</b>			
Responsible Officer	Alastair Kelly	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3	
Date Recorded	18/04/20	Current Rating	12	
Category	Leadership and Strategic Planning	Previous Rating	12	
Information	There is pressure on staff movements with a long term 42% churn of staff. There will be 50% of staff with less than 4 years' experience. Induction, training and promotion models will need to change.			
Risk rationale	This attrition in itself had threats to skill capacity but is compounded by large intakes of new recruits and the resources required to train them.			
Existing Controls	Strategic Establishment and Resourcing Board  Governance Boards  Target Operating Model  Volunteer support  Organisational Risk Assessment (ORA)  Development of Police Academy			

OFFICIAL

Mentors and tutors

Recruitment strategy

Change Team Analysis

Workforce Engagement Strategy

PC to Sgt development programme

Police Officer Vacancy Dashboard

Mapping of Police Officer and Staff Vacancies against Establishment

Menopausal Project – support, toolkits, menopause cafes

Focus Group on key issues faced by women in senior police roles

Cost of Living focus in Wellbeing meetings

Managing the national uplift of police officers

Improving technologies

Improving skills

Management and Leadership Apprenticeships

Workplace engagement surveys

Neurodiversity projects

Future leaders programme

Mini Police

New Head of HR/Academy/Occupational Health roles

OFFICIAL

	New joiner experience monitored
Additional Control	None
Update	<p>This risk is now over 3 years into a risk that originally had a 4 year projection. Since then, the risk description no longer reflects the current force position and there are many existing controls in place. The Police Uplift Programme exceeded targets and hit additional recruitment targets.</p> <p>There is now a new People Board that has its own risk register that has been added to KETO. These has more specific risks and these can stay on the relevant departmental risk registers to be raised to strategic as required subject to ORB.</p> <p><b>Current status: ORB to consider archiving this risk</b></p>

STR2017	Ineffective communication of firearms markers to officers		
Responsible Officer	Nigel Rixon	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 1
Date Recorded	25/04/18	Current Rating	4
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	4
Information	Home office has not yet provided an interface to enable NFLMS data to be available via Storm. Locally the Storm and NFLMS gazetteers are incompatible. The GUCCI interface that has not worked for over 5 years and no sign of a fix being implemented.		
Risk rationale	This potentially puts Officers at risk of harm		
Existing Controls	<p>Mitigated by staff using Genie to do checks for NFX data</p> <p>Analytical processes developed in the Firearms Licencing Department</p> <p>Review of current practise</p> <p>Scoped for local interface solution</p>		



OFFICIAL

	<p>CMD reminded to do Genie checks and CMD process in place around Genie</p> <p>Project Team recruited to Home Office</p> <p>Weekly review of all incidents</p> <p>Backlogs in firearms licensing grants and renewals reduced</p>
Additional Control	<p>Future Command and Control System</p> <p>Longer term plan for a new version of NFLMS estimated for delivery in Summer 2023 at the earliest.</p> <p>Transfer of NFLMS data to NICHE</p>
Update	<p>Risk is now superseded by the Niche to NFLMS project and included as part of the Gazateer Management risk on the IT Risk Register.</p> <p>The NFLMS to Niche has commenced and nearly 25% of certificate holders have been added. In the meantime, we are continuing the interrogation of force systems.</p> <p>With regard the backlog, we currently have 169 outstanding grants. The oldest is July 22. There are 12 others outstanding in 2022 which we are targeting to clear. Some of these are awaiting information from the applicant or other government departments, particularly ACRO.</p> <p><b>Current status: Recommend archive to LPD Risk Register whilst Storm 2 is implemented.</b></p>

## Appendix C: Changes in risk score

STR380	Implementation of the Job Evaluation Scheme		
Responsible Officer	Becky Milligan	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	06/01/10	Current Rating	6
Category	People	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p>The Equal Pay Audit requires consideration for a different and suitable JES. Following consultation the Force made the decision to implement the Hay Scheme. This has resulted in the development of a new Pay Model which cannot be cost prohibited but was not commissioned for cost saving purposes.</p> <p>If we do implement the HAY scheme some staff will have a reduction in pay, some will have an uplift and others will see no change. Other contractual terms such as A-L entitlement connected to rates of pay may also be affected.</p> <p>Industry consultants have confirmed that to re-design the current scheme would take so much work we would be better to select a scheme off the shelf, which HAY allows.</p> <p>There is a risk regarding the purple book scheme as due to staff departures, there are only 6 purple book evaluators within the force. 3 staff are required to grade each role, one to first grade and two to second grade and a further independent grader is required in the event of an appeal. This creates significant demand on these roles, all of which sit in HR.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>If we do not implement a new JES we will have an out-of-date scheme that does not meet with Equality criteria, and any claims could be substantial. Not implementing it can also carry an issue of having jobs evaluated against an old and a new scheme, creating excessive resource demand. Increasing delays also risk lower morale and reputation.</p>		
Existing Controls	<p>Project plan and dedicated management</p> <p>Regular consultation</p> <p>Gold group provides governance, with Silver group feeding into it</p>		

OFFICIAL

	<p>AWE design completed</p> <p>Costings included in the medium-term financial plan</p> <p>Data set for pay modelling completed</p> <p>Pay modelling complete</p> <p>Updated data set prepared</p> <p>Employer Offer</p> <p>People Board</p>
Additional Control	Ongoing employee support and communication
Update	<p>Implementation planned for Summer 2023.</p> <p>Employer offer with unions.</p> <p>Assuming proceed to implementation, individuals need to be notified, new grading and pay structure implemented and appeals managed (included as a departmental risk)</p> <p><b>Current status: ORB July 23 to consider reduction in likelihood from '4' to '2'</b></p>

<b>STR0307</b>	<b>Risk to network storage</b>		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	14/01/22	Current Rating	8
Category	Information systems/technology	Previous Rating	12
Information	As part of the Force's Digital Futures Program the infrastructure of our network is changing and will eventually migrate to a predominantly cloud based storage solution. Once delivered this will put Leicestershire Police at the forefront of		

OFFICIAL

	<p>digital policing and innovation. In the interim, Leicestershire Police are still required to support our current network infrastructure which has been placed under significant pressure from a number of national and local issues.</p> <p>These issues culminated in our Network approaching 98% capacity which triggered a chain reaction of performance related issues, although our operational capabilities were maintained throughout.</p> <p>Currently there is excessive retention of data with infrequent deletion of material. Volume of data stored and acquired from mobile devices constantly increasing, and has become a National Issue.</p> <p>Legacy data is stored in various formats, both hardware storage (significant amount of historical data) and on premises digital storage. This is putting a significant burden on, and exposes the Force to, compliance risks. Current concerns regarding the amount, understanding and requirement of data currently held by the Force.</p> <p>Requirement to triage data stored and remove data that is no longer required, and implement a robust audit regime, with potential to incorporate a level of automation.</p>
<p>Risk rationale</p>	<p>Effective records management is a legal requirement for all public authorities under the terms of the Data Protection Act 2018. Accordingly, we are obliged to have processes and procedures in place that govern our collection, retention and deletion of data that is held within our Force network.</p> <p>Current digital information storage systems are affecting compliance with CPIA and MoPI requirements</p>
<p>Existing Controls</p>	<p>RRD Gold group governance</p> <p>Current network capacity</p> <p>Long term digital growth strategy and road map</p> <p>Financial investment</p> <p>Data deletion and reclaim of storage space</p> <p>DFU deletion of legacy Z-Drive data no longer required, and restructuring data for retention to facilitate effective future review</p> <p>Advice received from records manager</p>

OFFICIAL

	<p>DPIA</p> <p>Force Data Storage Board</p> <p>Use of Evidence and Property Archive Centre (EPAC)</p> <p>Published 'Management of Physical and Digital Evidence' guidance</p> <p>Published 'Retention, Storage and Destruction of Materials and Records relating to Forensic Examinations' document</p>
Additional Control	<p>IT updating unsupported nodes</p> <p>Transition to 'on-premise' network storage solution</p> <p>Hybrid cloud storage environment</p> <p>Discussing new Digital and Data Team</p> <p>Plans to set a 1000 day maximum automatic retention period to reduce data consumed by Spectre and Veriato Protective Monitoring Software saving 50TB of storage.</p> <p>Digital Forensic Transformation Project</p>
Update	<p>Due to the work undertaken since January 2023 to cleanse data and provide additional storage, the date at which the force is expected to reach maximum storage capacity has been extended to April 2024.</p> <p><b>Current status: ORB July 23 to consider reduction in likelihood from '3' to '2'</b></p>

<b>STR1679</b>	<b>Complying with Home Office Counting Rules</b>		
Responsible Officer	Darren Goddard	Impact: 3	Likelihood:2
Date Recorded	12/06/13	Current Rating	6

OFFICIAL

Category	Operational	Previous Rating	9
Information	In 2018 HMICFRS revisited the Force to complete a detailed crime data integrity (CDI) inspection. The subsequent report released in Feb 2019 assessed the Force's overall crime recording processes as 'Inadequate'. There was significant improvement from the previous inspection completed in 2017. Due to this assessment CDI and Home Office Counting Rules Compliance remains a key Strategic risk for the Force.		
Risk rationale	The force is required to comply with Home Office counting rules. PEEL assessment graded the force as outstanding for crime recording within the victim service assessment. However, our local audits and DDM reviews show that performance is on a downward trend.		
Existing Controls	<p>CDI Board, training and delivery plan</p> <p>Audit regime</p> <p>NPCC Lead</p> <p>Increase in DDM staff</p> <p>LPD Bite Size Videos</p>		
Additional Control	<p>Business Insight Model</p> <p>National review of Home Office Counting Rules</p>		
Update	<p>As part of HMICFRS PEEL 2021/22 inspection they graded the force as outstanding in respect of crime recording, they estimate our overall crime recording compliance was 95.5% for all crime, 91.3 % for violent crime and 98% for sexual offences. However, the reviews undertaken by the DDMs show performance is on a downward trend in the areas they review.</p> <p><b>Current status: ORB July 23 to consider reducing likelihood from '3' to '2' given the PEEL grading.</b></p>		

OFFICIAL

<b>STR0383</b>	<b>Lack of PIP 2 Detectives due to lack of staff and training affecting capability</b>		
Responsible Officer	DS Amanda Thwaites	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	15/06/2020	Current Rating	6
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	9
Information	The lack of PIP2 qualified detectives has been identified as a national issue, and it is having a significant impact within the CAID departments. In 2019 the number of PIP 2 qualified detectives within CAID sat at only 55% of the allocated establishment.		
Risk rationale	CAID should have 423 detectives in place - but currently only has 264		
Existing Controls	<p>Process in place for CID Aides (PC to DC Process). Process takes 14-18 months. The pool of officers being recruited from are increasingly young in service. Initial findings are positive, very few officers within their initial 6 months that have returned back to area. However CID Aides volunteering have reduced.</p> <p>DHEP Program is underway for direct entry detectives, first cohort started Nov 21, and joining CID and CAID depts in Sept 22. Two further DHEP cohorts have been agreed by SERB and will take start in April/ May 2022 and Nov 2022.</p> <p>PC to DC recruitment process restarted June 2022</p> <p>CID attachments (PIP 1) part of Resource Cell Plan - eliminate 4 week attachments. D/Supt Baker has asked resource planners not to book in individuals with leave/ courses etc. Expected to go to 4 month attachment on 2nd year in CID, 3rd year in Serious Crime. Structured attachments are due for sign off at Force Exec.</p> <p>SERB - seeking to identify and implement force support around placements of officers in the DCs gaps in the period it takes to train DCs. PIP 1 investigators have been deployed into other CAID depts to assist with vacancies - mitigating the skills drain from CID.</p> <p>Review of work allocation in CAIU has been completed - some investigations will be allocated to PC attachments</p> <p>A third cohort of Dc DHEP started in November 2022 – 33 in number.</p> <p>The structured attachments have now been signed off for 2023 assisting with development of staff and showcasing the work of investigators to the wider force to attract new detectives.</p>		

OFFICIAL

Additional Control	<p>Adopt a more agile approach to backfilling existing staff on area to allow them to attend courses.</p> <p>Identification of the requirement to futureproof the interest shown, and ongoing requirement to promote detective process. An improved approach to seek direct approach to teams and individuals, with personalised inputs and engagements to enhance and motivate interest in individuals becoming, and remaining Detectives.</p> <p>Force looking to recruit temporary capacity for 2 years to support inexperienced staff. This is being managed by the Resource Board</p>
Update	<p>We now have 264 qualified DC's with 138 officers working towards PIP2 status (albeit at various stages of the process). The establishment for DC's is 423.</p> <p>Again, experience tends to be a problem across the CAID departments which is more prevalent within the CID's. 2 Cohorts of DC DHEP's have arrived within CID and a further 33 are due to arrive Oct 31<sup>st</sup>.</p> <p>More consistency in exam results has also been established for those completing the NIE.</p> <p><b>Current status: ORB July 23 to consider reduction in likelihood from '3' to '2'</b></p>



OFFICIAL

Appendix D: New Risks

STR0423	Plymouth review - requirement to revisit around 1,000 firearms licence reviews		
Responsible Officer	Nigel Rixon	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	16/05/23	Current Rating	16
Category	Legislative Compliance	Previous Rating	New risk
Information	<p>On the 12th August 2021 a licensed shotgun certificate holder, Jake Davidson, committed a mass shooting in Plymouth (Keyham). Mr Davidson shot and killed five people that day and wounded two others before turning the gun on himself. He died at the scene. It was subsequently established that there were significant issues which were not adequately assessed in respect of Mr Davidson being issued and re-issued with a shotgun licence. These included mental health issues and prior assaults.</p> <p>In September 2022 the Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) began an investigation into Devon and Cornwall Police for potential breaches of health and safety legislation.</p> <p>In March 2023 they released their findings under a report Operation Begna and sent recommendations to the Home Office who are yet to respond.</p> <p>On the 8th March 2023 Ian Arrow, The Senior Coroner for Torbay and Plymouth issued five Prevent Future Deaths Reports (PFD) following the Keyham shooting inquest. Arising from these reports were the following recommendations for police forces:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To consider a further review of all certificates seized, refused, revoked, or surrendered and then subsequently approved over the past five years to be assured of public safety.</li> <li>To ensure that adequate local training, of a satisfactory standard has been universally delivered to all their Firearms staff and supervisors in applying the Home Office Guidance on Firearms Licencing Law (published in November 2022) and the revised Statutory Guidance for Chief officers of Police (published in February 2023) and,</li> <li>Forces to ensure they only delegate decision making to persons who have undergone adequate training in firearms licencing and in applying that recent Guidance.</li> </ul>		
Risk rationale	The IOPCC in September 2022 began an investigation into Devon and Cornwall police for potential breaches to Health and Safety legislation in the running of their Firearms Department prior to the mass shooting. The investigation is examining if the		

OFFICIAL

	Force may have committed offences under the Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974. We need to remain vigilant that we do not place the force in risk of legal action and reputational damage. We also need to ensure that our governance procedures are robust so that we do not issue or return weapons to a person that would place the public in danger.
Existing Controls	<p>No weapons returned without manager authorisation</p> <p>Manager meetings on return of weapons</p> <p>Recirculation on Intranet on police powers</p> <p>South Yorkshire Training Course</p> <p>Managerial oversight of assessments</p> <p>Home Office guidance and APP</p>
Additional Control	<p>Manager dip-sampling</p> <p>Risk assessment for FEO reviewed and updated</p> <p>CoP mandatory training being developed</p>
Update	<b>Current status: ORB July 2023 to consider new risk</b>

<b>STR0447</b>	<b>Witness Care Unit Staffing</b>		
Responsible Officer	Ms Leah Johnson	Impact: 3	Likelihood:3
Date Recorded	16/06/2023	Current Rating	9
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	New risk
Information	The WCU are experiencing massive workload surges due to court back logs with (when fully staffed) each Witness Care Officer (WCO) was carrying in excess of 200+ trials. In addition to this, the unit has now experienced staff leaving and others being on long-term sickness absence. Recent leavers have all cited workload as one of their reasons for leaving. With the leavers and		

OFFICIAL

	<p>the sickness, there are 4 people left from an establishment of 10. Not only does that mean that there are fewer staff to deal with the demand but all of the work needs to be redistributed resulting in each WCO having 333 trials.</p> <p>The unit has been refused backfilling of their vacancies although this has been explained. The manager and team leader have had to work effectively as operational WCOs which means management work cannot be completed. There is an increased risk of sickness as all staff report being overwhelmed. There is also a risk that the force fails to update or warn victims and witnesses and therefore fail to comply with the Victims' Code of Practice. In addition, justice may be delayed or cases are discontinued which could both negatively impact on the force's reputation and public confidence.</p> <p>Any new staff members may have to wait for 6 weeks to be able to access WMS and there will be additional abstractions needed for training.</p>
Risk rationale	The force may encounter significant reputational risk if it fails to update or warn victims and therefore fail to comply with the Victims' Code of Practice. There are significant risks to the staff members' wellbeing as well.
Existing Controls	Request made to ARM for staffing
Additional Control	None
Update	<b>Current status: ORB July 23 to consider new risk.</b>

<b>STR0443</b>	<b>Backlog of traffic interviews that may cause reputational harm if cases time out or are lost</b>		
Responsible Officer	Leah Johnson	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	16/06/2023	Current Rating	6
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	New risk

OFFICIAL

Information	<p>Due to increased demand and abstraction through injury there is a back log of interviews in our traffic department which currently stands at 245. These will be everything from document offences to Crown court offences. Several approaches have been tried to solve this issue, however they have either not helped or are not sustainable in the long term.</p> <p>The team has an establishment of two police officers but one will retire in October and has substantial leave built up. There is a reputational risk to the force if cases time out, the case is of lower quality as the force has to proceed without interview and therefore, we lose cases and disappoint victims.</p>
Risk rationale	There is significant scope of a loss in public confidence if we lose these cases and are found to be culpable for this.
Existing Controls	None
Additional Control	SERB have asked ARM to appoint a PC to assist.
Update	<b>Current status: ORB July 23 to consider new risk</b>

STR0422	Lack of clarity over future legal requirements for contractor management		
Responsible Officer	Andrew Wroe	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 1
Date Recorded	15/05/2023	Current Rating	4
Category	Estates and Assets	Previous Rating	New risk
Information	<p>The EU retained law bill introduced a 'sunsetting clause' to all EU-derived legislation that meant that all of this legislation that was not proactively identified to be retained would be removed from the statute books by the end of December 2023. This has since been changed and the Government now plans to announce a list of 600 laws that it wants to replace by the end of the year. This is far fewer than the 4,800 pieces of EU derived legislation that would initially have been identified.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015 is the main legislation that governs how the force manages contractors. There is a reasonable likelihood that these regulations would be identified as needing replacement or significant review. This leaves the force in an unclear position regarding its control of contractors procedure which currently governs how it manages contractors</p>		

OFFICIAL

Existing Controls	Monitoring of government stance in relation to EU retained law
Additional Control	Review of contractor vetting
Update	<b>Current status: ORB July 23 to consider new risk</b>

STR0445	Risk relating to serious violence duty		
Responsible Officer	Peter Coogan	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 1
Date Recorded	28/06/2023	Current Rating	3
Category	Estates and Assets	Previous Rating	New risk
Information	<p>We need to work together with other local service providers to share information and target our interventions. This is to tackle the increases in violence that have been experienced over the last 10 years. This duty originates in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (the 'PCSC Act').</p> <p>Local partners need to work together to create a strategy to prevent and tackle serious violence within their area. Educational, custody and youth custody authorities will also need to be consulted within this workstream.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>This strategy will need to include a longer term perspective and take into account inequalities.</p> <p>Serious violence will include domestic abuse, sexual offences, violence against property and threats of violence.</p> <p>There may be issues around information sharing agreements.</p>		
Existing Controls	None		
Additional Control	None		
Update	<b>Current status: ORB July 23 to consider new risk</b>		

**Appendix E: High Priority Risks (Red)**

<b>STR0081</b>	<b>Capacity within IT</b>		
Responsible Officer	David Craig	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	28/06/19	Current Rating	16
Category	Information systems/technology	Previous Rating	16
Information	IT Department may not have capacity to support the delivery of digital transformation for the Force.		
Risk rationale	There are also increasing security incidents that impact on the capacity within IT. This could hinder progressive initiatives, impact strategic objectives and affect the reputation of the Force.		
Existing Controls	IT Department work programme Digital Futures Board Design authority Change Team Programme Management Project Management Market Supplements External resource Scheduling and prioritisation process Creation of Digital Optimisation and Innovation team		
Additional Control	Review of IT, Digital and Data Delivery Restructuring of Comms and Support Section		

OFFICIAL

	Review of job descriptions
Update	<p>The risk was discussed at Digital Futures Board on 11/5/23 with the outcome agreed for continued priority and resource focus on keeping core business as usual systems running first, and with mandated digital transformation changes to fit around.</p> <p>This remains an ongoing focus on the DFB in terms of tracking delivery of all key digital works irrespective of whether these are classified as Business as Usual or Transformation Change and discussions regarding resourcing and scheduling will continue to be escalated to DFB where conflicts occur.</p> <p><b>Current status: Risk score unchanged</b></p>

STR0278	The Financial Challenge – 2022/23 – 2025/26		
Responsible Officer	Paul Dawkins	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	22/06/21	Current Rating	16
Category	Finance	Previous Rating	16
Information	<p>The overall MTFP position has deteriorated further. The police officer and staff 2022 pay awards have significantly increased pay inflation cost pressures across the MTFP period 2022/27. The Force is also experiencing higher than forecast non pay inflation and considerable unbudgeted costs in relation to Op Energy (although Home Office funding of up to 85% of these costs should be forthcoming at the year end). Despite the PCC raising Band D precept by £15 for 2023/24 only, current assumptions indicate the MTFP will not balance through to 2027. The use of reserves and identification of £3.9m cashable efficiency savings will be required in 2023/24. This is will be managed through the Investments, Savings &amp; Productivity Board, chaired by the DCC.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>The Force continues to face a number of challenges relating to its financial position for the MTFP period 2022/27. These originate from unavoidable service expenditure, cost pressures, staff related contractual pressures and pay and non pay inflationary concerns.</p> <p>In recent months the overall MTFP position has markedly deteriorated. The MTFP will continue to be reviewed each quarter.</p>		
Existing Controls	Strategy and oversight		

OFFICIAL

	Budget review Investments, Savings & Productivity Board (chaired by the DCC)
Additional Control	Ongoing review Considering funding implications for pay awards
Update	No changes to the risk at this time. <b>Current status: Risk score unchanged. Given the further deterioration of the overall MTFP position, the score has remained high.</b>

<b>STR0386</b>	<b>Risk of Estates Dept failing to support essential building services</b>		
Responsible Officer	Andrew Wroe	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	04/12/2008	Current Rating	12
Category	People	Previous Rating	12
Information	Sudden loss of key staff from the Estates Department from illness, accident or resignation etc. This could cause the Force considerable disruption from a failure of any of our complex building services. SPOF include the electrical engineer and the mechanical engineer.		
Risk rationale	Estates relies on single points of failure due to level of expertise required and knowledge needed of force systems. It is not possible to employ additional staff as failure of our systems is rare or non-existent and there is insufficient work to keep them employed the remainder of their time.		
Existing Controls	Records of drawings and services High levels of planned maintenance Use of contractors BC Plan		



OFFICIAL

Additional Control	None
Update	<p>We still don't have an electrical engineer although we have advertised for a replacement. It will be some time before anyone is in post.</p> <p><b>Current status: Risk remains unchanged.</b></p>

STR0411	Loss of all IT functionality due to overheating at Euston Street		
Responsible Officer	Andrew Wroe	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	27/10/2022	Current Rating	12
Category	Estates and Assets	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p>The air conditioning system at Euston Street is working at 100% capacity. This system should be n+1 as a minimum meaning it should continue to function fully with the failure of half of the plant. This is how it was designed. So much additional IT equipment has been added, n+1 has been lost. If either half of the plant should fail or is taken down for servicing the temperature in the room rises rapidly. If it is not reinstated quickly this could lead to failure of the IT equipment held in the room. The plant is relatively old at about 8 years. If a major part is required and is not "off the shelf" this could take the system down for days.</p>		
Risk rationale	Overheating could lead to complete failure in IT functionality across the force		
Existing Controls	<p>Regular maintenance.</p> <p>A/C engineers on call.</p> <p>Funding approved within 23/24 Capital Programme</p>		
Additional Control	<p>Proposed more to Cloud system</p> <p>£300K investment proposed to restore n+1 functionality.</p>		
Update	Funding approved and put in to the 23/24 Capital Programme.		

OFFICIAL

	<p>The tenders for the Euston Street cooling work came in much higher than expected so the project is awaiting additional funding from Chief Officers.</p> <p><b>Current status: Risk score unchanged until work has been completed.</b></p>
--	--

STR0350	Risk associated with a transition to an alternatively fuelled fleet		
Responsible Officer	C/Insp Parkes	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	22/09/22	Current Rating	12
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p>Leicestershire Police is seeking to transition to a fleet which does not use conventionally fuelled vehicles. This is being planned for sustainability reasons (to reduce our carbon footprint and to reduce our contribution to local air pollution) and to ensure business continuity (given the gradual phasing out of conventionally fuelled vehicles). The benefits to sustainability will be maximised if the electricity supplied is from renewable sources.</p> <p>There have been safety concerns raised in relation to electric vehicles both in their usage, especially when specific operational tactics are used and also during charging.</p> <p>There will need to be significant (10s of millions) of infrastructure investment but there are also potential opportunity costs in bringing extensive electrical inputs onto our sites, especially as the force will need to transition to electric sources of heating rather than gas and these heating systems will reduce the amount of electricity that may need to be brought on site.</p> <p>We are aware that new conventionally fuelled vehicles will probably only be produced up until circa 2028.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>There are potentially very high impacts to our strategic direction if business continuity challenges are experienced as our service delivery and ability to respond will be undermined. There is also a high impact on the environment if the transition is not made.</p> <p>There are potentially high impacts to health and safety due to the fire risks associated with operational vehicle use plus the learning provided by the fire service regarding response to fires involving thermal runaway.</p>		

OFFICIAL

<p>Existing Controls</p>	<p>Liaison with LFRS, Blue Light Commercial, Leicester Climate Change Emergency Partnership, driving school, Emergency Services Environmental and Sustainability Group</p> <p>Oversight of sponsored vehicles</p> <p>Trials of electric cars</p> <p>Vehicle replacement strategy</p> <p>Market research on vehicle charging technology</p> <p>Ongoing opportunities to increase the amount of renewable electricity for force premises</p>
<p>Additional Control</p>	<p>Charging infrastructure to be sited away from buildings</p> <p>Pricing for 10% renewable electricity being explored</p> <p>Vehicle tracking project to monitor vehicle usage</p> <p>Trials of demo vehicles in driving school</p> <p>Planning of future charging infrastructure included in future changes to car parks</p> <p>Service contracts will be included with installation of charging infrastructure</p> <p>Section 106 funding for 5 electric vehicles</p> <p>Bid for specific training courses for driving electric vehicles</p>
<p>Update</p>	<p>Revised Fire Protection Association guidance around charging electric vehicles has been released. The key points are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Charging points will have to be included in the fire risk assessments</li> <li>• It's good practice to design all bays for the use of disabled people to combine inclusive access with the lateral separation of vehicles</li> <li>• Additional oversight must be given when vehicles are going to be charged overnight without many staff being on site</li> <li>• There needs to be suitable fire detection and warning installations in case of a fire, internal charging sites need significant warning systems and fire resisting structures</li> <li>• Provision of portable firefighting equipment</li> </ul>

OFFICIAL

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Staff to be trained in how to react to fires and correct methods of charging</li> <li>• Charging areas should have fire resisting construction or space separation</li> <li>• Charging points should have physical protection from collision</li> <li>• Rapid charging points should be differentiated from other types and standard plugs should never be used</li> <li>• Clearly marked emergency manual isolation should be provided at charging points which is clearly identified for firefighters and others</li> <li>• Clear separation requirements are stated for different applications</li> </ul> <p>Head of TU suggests there should be an increase in the likelihood because the transition will happen. The force is in the process of addressing this in terms of the infrastructure challenges. There will be significant (10s of millions) of infrastructure investment required. It should also be noted that the cost of fuelling EVs is not necessarily that much cheaper than traditional fuels.</p> <p><b>Current status: Risk score unchanged</b></p>
--	---

STR0339	Risk of a successful cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	26/07/22	Current Rating	12
Category	Intelligence, Information Management and Security	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p>A successful cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police may result in the serious compromise of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information systems, services and assets of the force, potentially hindering operational effectiveness. Attacks can vary in nature and extent such as, malicious software or may include phishing, advanced persistent threats, social engineering and hacking. Attacks may or may not be targeted on the force and may be perpetrated by foreign national governments, terrorists, organised crime groups, hackers or employees. Depending upon the sophistication and scale of attack, there will be varying impacts that may include denial of service, loss or disclosure of information/data and the loss of ability to share information and potentially threatening operational effectiveness leading to harm and reputational damage. There can also be system or application downtime and potential legal consequences.</p>		

OFFICIAL

	<p>The force has recently fallen victim to a number of phishing emails. The Force has also been contacted by partner agencies who have had their systems compromised which have held Police data. Blocking email addresses is one of our main defences, however, these emails will originate from email addresses that we regularly use and would have little reason to regard as suspicious. Many of these partner organisations correspond with senior members of staff.</p>
<p>Risk rationale</p>	<p>Impact scored at a 4 because there would be major impact on ability to fulfil strategic objectives, major stakeholder concerns and major disruption to service delivery.</p> <p>Likelihood scored at a 3 because there is 51-75% chance of a cyber-attack. It is more likely to occur than not.</p>
<p>Existing Controls</p>	<p>Staff guidance, training and awareness</p> <p>Assistance from the NMC with cyber related incidents</p> <p>POLWARP reporting system</p> <p>Annual Accreditation processes for PSN, PSNP and Airwave</p> <p>Mail marshall and firewalls for email correspondence and browsing</p> <p>Technical internal control procedures such as hardening, patching, control of malicious software and passwords</p> <p>Annual IT health checks</p> <p>Recruitment procedures including vetting, authorization, access management and leavers</p> <p>Management of contractors and volunteers</p> <p>Physical security of buildings and assets</p> <p>Liaison Between I.T and Information Security</p> <p>PSD Protective monitoring including monitoring, auditing and reporting capability</p> <p>GDPR compliance</p>

OFFICIAL

	<p>Security Incident Management Procedure</p> <p>Cyber Incident Response Training</p> <p>Partnered working with Cyber Crime</p> <p>Engagement with the local LRF</p> <p>Engagement with National Cyber Working Group</p> <p>Technical internal controls</p>
<p>Additional Control</p>	<p>Investigating what further controls can be introduced</p> <p>Cyber Incident Response Training</p> <p>Planning an audit on how department heads manage cyber security within BC Plans</p> <p>Detailed list of all valuable assets</p> <p>Define a strategy for IT infrastructure enhancements</p> <p>Improved procedures around cyber incidents</p> <p>Playbooks in development stage</p> <p>Oversight from NMC</p> <p>On Call support from Information Security being looked at</p>
<p>Update</p>	<p>The Force is in the process of ensuring that all users are onboarded to O365.</p> <p>With regards to Win 10 1809 migration, this will depend on if the update from 1809 to 21H2 can be automated. If it cannot be automated then there is a schedule which replaces or upgrades them all by the end of March 2024. The Force needs to upgrade all devices to ensure that they remain in support and vulnerabilities can be mitigated.</p>

OFFICIAL

	<p>Added an additional control relating to the consideration of an on-call service by Information Management.</p> <p>Added an existing control – technical internal controls.</p> <p><b>Current status: Risk score unchanged at this stage, as work is ongoing. Risk score should fall when all additional controls are in place.</b></p>
--	---

STR0127	Inability to meet regional occupational health demand		
Responsible Officer	Tim Ellis	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	18/01/20	Current Rating	12
Category	People	Previous Rating	12
Information	<p>The unit is currently carrying a number of vacancies. There is a national shortage of occupational health nurses and the force has to compete with the salaries offered in the public sector. The unit reflects the generally aging demographic within occupational health is also affected by an aging workforce in that 12 members of staff that are over 60, this creates an increased risk of staff turnover. Deputy retired and is not being replaced due to disaggregation which will happen 1<sup>st</sup> April 2023. Head of Occupational Health going to Nottinghamshire Police force after 26<sup>th</sup> October and no Head for the collaboration has been recruited. Lincolnshire leave the collaboration 1<sup>st</sup> October 2022. Admin Manager for North decided to transfer to Lincs with a TUPE like agreement.</p>		
Risk rationale	<p>The regional demand for Occupational Health services is outweighing the capacity of the unit. This will have wide-reaching impacts if it continues, from Officer wellbeing through to reputational risk. Police role and salaries are not attractive in the current market.</p>		
Existing Controls	<p>Creation of student placements.</p> <p>Market supplement for OHN roles to maintain salaries after Hay review.</p> <p>Use of agency staff</p> <p>Recruited 1 FTE nurse for Leicester, 1 FTE screening nurse in OH training post for Notts;</p>		

OFFICIAL

	Business manager role continues and will take on line management of administrators in the North.
Additional Control	Identifying how cancellations can be reduced Increased staffing levels suggested for post disaggregation to increase resilience and meet demands Go Live for new case management system delayed Looking at where staffing levels can be increased. Student placements have been created and business manager role will take on the line management of administrators in the North. Video appointments planned.
Update	<b>Current status: No change to risk score.</b>



## Appendix F - Risk Scoring Matrix

Impact							
Score	Performance/ Service Delivery	Finance /Efficiency £	Confidence/Reputation	Health and Safety	Environment	Strategic Direction	
4	Major disruption to service delivery.  Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force: >1,000,000 Business area: >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns.  Major reputational damage. Adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.	
3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force: 251,000-1,000,000 Business area: 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage. Adverse national media coverage  < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24-hours hospitalisation and /or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.	
2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force: 51,000-250,000 Business area: 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns.  Significant reputational damage adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital / professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.	
1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force: <50,000  Business area: <10,000	Complaints from individuals.  Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.	

OFFICIAL

Likelihood		
	Score	Chance of Occurrence
Very High	4	>75% (almost certain to occur)
High	3	51-75% (more likely to occur than not)
Medium	2	25-50% (fairly likely to occur)
Low	1	<25% (unlikely to occur)

Overall Risk Rating
Impact x Likelihood
9 - 16 = High
5 - 8 = Medium
1 - 4 = Low