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POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR LEICESTERSHIRE JOINT AUDIT, RISK & ASSURANCE PANEL

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Paper

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<tr><td>Report of</td><td colspan="2">**OFFICE OF CHIEF CONSTABLE**</td></tr>
<tr><td>Subject</td><td colspan="2">**FORCE RISK REGISTER**</td></tr>
<tr><td>Date</td><td colspan="2">**WEDNESDAY 17TH APRIL 2024**</td></tr>
<tr><td>Author</td><td colspan="2">**MATTHEW JONES – HEAD OF SAFETY, SUSTAINABILITY AND RISK**</td></tr>
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Purpose of report

1. To provide JARAP with an update on the force strategic risk register, highlighting high priority risks, newly registered risks, changes of risk score and archived risks.

Recommendation

2. The panel is recommended to review the contents of this report and the updates provided within. These updates will be reviewed at the Strategic Organisational Risk Board (SORB), due to meet on 02nd May 2024 (JARAP risk report written on 01st April 2024 and accurate as at this date).

Summary

3. There are currently 22 strategic risks on the risk register.

High Risks
4. 10 risks are currently rated as 'High' priority. All 22 risks are summarised in Appendix A, as well as those that have been archived at SORB.

Archived risks
5. Two risks have been archived since the last JARAP. These are detailed in Appendix B.

Changes in risk score
6. 8 risks have either had a change in risk score at the last SORB meeting in February 2024, or are proposed to have a change in risk score at the next SORB meeting in May 2024. These are detailed in Appendix C.

New risks
7. There is one new risk that was agreed at SORB in February 2024, as per Appendix D.

Risk Grading Criteria
8. The strategic risk register identifies the key strategic risks to the force. These risks typically represent long-term issues and typically remain on the register for long periods.

9. All risks are scored on an ascending scale of 1 – 4 in terms of impact and likelihood. Multiplication of these two figures leads to a Risk Score, which is expressed as a Red/Amber/Green or 'RAG' rating. All strategic risks are reviewed at least quarterly.

Risk Score	'RAG' Rating	Review
9 – 16	High	3 Monthly
5 – 8	Medium	3 Monthly
1 – 4	Low	3 Monthly

Risk Status

10. The 'status' of a risk gives an indication of the extent to which the risk is being managed/controlled. The categories are detailed below:

Controls Tasked – when additional controls have been identified. These additional controls will have an owner tasked to complete them and a target completion date. Within the Keto risk management system, the term 'Pending Control' is used to describe this status.

Overdue Control – when the completion date for additional controls has passed.

Managed – when no further controls have been identified at that time to reduce the risk further, however, the risk is not acceptably 'controlled'.

Controlled – this risk is in the ideal state. Circumstances or time may change this state.

Awaiting Review – a managed risk which requires a review or a new risk to be reviewed for the first time or a risk transferred to a new 'Responsible Officer'.

Risk Matrix Grid Chart:

	Low	Medium	High	Very High
Very High	0	0	0	2
High	0	0	2	6
Medium	0	2	4	4
Low	0	0	1	1

Appendices

Appendix A: Summary of force risk register

Appendix B: Archived risks

Appendix C: Changes in risk score

Appendix D: New risks

Appendix E: High priority risks not included in above appendices.

Appendix F: Risk scoring matrix.

Persons to contact

David Sandall – Deputy Chief Constable – (0116) 222 2222 ext 2847

Email: david.sandall@leics.police.uk

Paul Dawkins – Assistant Chief Officer (Finance and Resources) – (0116) 248 2244

Email: paul.dawkins@leics.police.uk

Matt Jones – Head of Safety, Sustainability and Risk– (0116) 222 2222 ext 6943

Email: matthew.jones@leics.police.uk

Appendix A: Risks Overview

Highlighting Legend:

Risks Archived / proposed archived since last JARAP (Jan 24)
Change to risk score
Proposed new risk since last meeting

Appendix A		Force Risk Register				17th APRIL 2024			
Reference	**Owner**	**Title**	**Impact**	**Likelihood**	**Status**	**First Recorded**	**Last review**	**Current/ proposed Risk Score**	**Previous Score**
STR0278	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	The Financial Challenge – 2022/2023 - 2025/26	Very High	Very High	Controls Tasked	September 2021	March 2024	16	16
STR0081	David Craig Head of I.T	Capacity within I.T.	Very High	Very High	Controls Tasked	May 2019	March 2024	16	16
STR0292	David Sandall DCC	Violence, abuse and intimidation against women and girls	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	October 2021	March 2024	12	12
STR0448	Supt Tompkins Head of PSD	Year-on-year increase in complaints from members of the public	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2023	March 2024	12	8
STR0470	David Craig Head of I.T	Failure of IT Server Affecting Cyclops Database	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	February 2024	March 2024	12	New Risk
STR0339	Steve Morris Head of Info Management	Risk of cyber attack	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	July 2022	March 2024	12	12
STR0411	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	Loss of all IT functionality due to overheating at Euston Street	Very High	High	Controls Tasked	October 2022	March 2024	12	12
STR0350	C/Insp Parkes Head of Transport Unit	Risk associated with a transition to an alternatively fuelled fleet	High	High	Controls Tasked	September 2022	March 2024	9	12

STR0383	Ch/Supt Ward Head of CaID	Lack of PIP 2 detectives	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2020	March 2024	9	9
STR0257	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Risk of not providing appropriate health surveillance	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	June 2021	March 2024	8	8
STR0459	Ch/Supt Maxwell Head of SSD	Capacity within Safety, Sustainability and Risk	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	Sept 2023	March 2024	8	16
STR0421	Steve Morris Head of Info Management	Risk of misconduct and complaints associated with the use of What'sApp	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	March 2023	March 2024	8	8
STR0307	David Craig Head of I.T	Risk to network storage	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	February 2022	March 2024	8	12
STR0450	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Inability to recruit and retain police staff	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2023	March 2024	8	8
STR0453	Leah Johnson Head of Criminal Justice	Nano cell panels sending incorrect information	Very High	Medium	Controls Tasked	July 2023	March 2024	8	8
STR0291	Adam Streets ACC	Impact of ISO standard for forensic science	High	Medium	Controls tasked	October 2021	March 2024	6	6
STR0457	Ch/Insp Gorman SSD	SNAP survey software no longer supported	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	September 2023	March 2024	6	6
STR0228	Paul Dawkins ACO Finance & Resources	Pension remedy for police pension scheme	High	Medium	Controls Tasked	December 2020	March 2024	6	6
STR0418	Supt Tompkins Head of PSD	Predatory individual working for Leicestershire Police	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	February 2023	March 2024	4	4
STR1679	Adam Streets ACC	Complying with Home Office Counting Rules & Ensuring High Levels of Crime Data Integrity	High	High	Controls Tasked	June 2013	March 2024	4	9
STR0449	Adam Streets ACC	CMD demand and performance challenges	Very High	Very High	Controls Tasked	July 2023	March 2024	4	16
STR0419	Ch/Supt Maxwell Head of SSD	Safety and business continuity implications associated with use of lithium ion batteries	Very High	Low	Controls Tasked	February 2023	March 2024	4	4
STR0380	Alastair Kelly ACO HR	Current JES non-equalities compliant and the implementation of new JES scheme carries risk	High	Low	Controls Tasked	January 2010	March 2024	3	6
STR0443	Leah Johnson Head of Prosecutions	Backlog of traffic interviews	High	Low	Controls Tasked	June 2023	March 2024	3	6

Appendix B: Risks archived or proposed to be archived from the strategic risk register

STR0421	Risk of misconduct and complaints associated with the use of What'sApp			
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris		Impact: 4	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	17/03/23		Current Rating	8
Category	Information Systems/Technology		Previous Rating	8
Information	The use of Whatsapp was authorised as a means of external engagement with specific groups and how been used in recent years for this purpose. We believed it is used extensively on force devices. We also believe that it is used directly with victims and for operational communication.			
	There have been a number of issues raised with the use of Whatsapp however:			
	IOPC published a report into the use of WhatsApp which is critical of its use.			
	NPCC Working Group identified 866 cases of misuse nationally involving WhatsApp over a 2 year period, they ultimately recommend moving away from WhatsApp especially for internal use and we should revisit external use.			
	The Information Commissioner has recommended it not be used as the data is stored outside the EU and UK			
	The law of access under Data Protection has expanded and Officers, Staff and MOP can all request access to messages sent about them. We have now had our first case involving a staff member in the VRN wanting access to Supervisors Text Messages			
	Caselaw has expanded the right of access to cover usage of WhatsApp on a personal device where they are talking in a professional capacity.			
	Potential for an increase in complaints or misconduct for inappropriate messages being sent involving either internal or external group chats – even where the officers are not actively engaging.			
	Firearms use What'sApp for every planned operation (on work devices). This increases the risk around data storage.			
Risk rationale	The use of this app and potentially wider social media involves a risk of misconduct and complaints if inappropriate messaging has been used or challenges have not been made to such messaging.			

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Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk could impact on our ability to meet the Layer 5 strategic performance indicators and then impact on the force priorities and pledge
Existing Controls	Supervisors can view an officers' chat history Monitoring by Professional Standards Installation of the app requires authorisation from Sgt or above Social Media Policy Exec group oversight
Additional Control	PSD monitoring software Niche investigate Comms to staff not to use personal devices to talk about work issues
Update	The national guidance for WhatsApp usage has been delayed so there is no change to this update at present. There is an update paper going to Exec at some point although I had hoped to include the national stance. **Agreed to archive at Feb 24 SORB**

STR0418	Risk of a predatory individual working for Leicestershire Police posing a risk to other staff members or members of the public		
Responsible Officer	Supt Tompkins	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 1
Date Recorded	09/02/2023	Current Rating	4
Category	People	Previous Rating	4
Information	The HMICFRS published a review of vetting within the police service in November 2022. This was undertaken following the kidnap, rape and murder of Sarah Everard by Met PC Wayne Couzens in March 2021. There have been a number of other serious cases reported in the press following the Couzens case.		

	The HMICFRS report identified a number of shortcomings within vetting for the police service in general. This concerned new joiners and transferees. Some individuals were allowed to join police forces despite having convictions, having significant debts or having family members that were involved in crime. Some individuals were able to join police forces without having face to face interviews or were able to transfer between forces despite having a significant history of complaints or allegations of misconduct.

There could be a significant risk to staff and the public as well as reputational risk to Leicestershire Police if an individual of this type was able to be employed. There could also be significant ramifications in the public's confidence in our service and willingness to report crime to us. |
| Risk rationale | Police officers are in a position to misuse power and frequently come into contact with vulnerable people. We need to remain vigilant and maintain our control measures to ensure that we do not employ an individual who falls far below the standards of professional behaviour required of and demonstrated by members of Leicestershire Police. |
| Existing Controls | Bad Apple scheme

Briefings on standards of professional behaviour

NPCC data wash to identify any non-disclosed offences

Grievance process

Comms strategy regarding use of social media

Vetting undertaken in compliance with APP

Quarterly reminders to update details for vetting

MV and SC clearance reviewed annually

Comms campaign on 10 standards of professional behaviour

Vetting of transferees

Training on behaviour standards provided to all new officers, specials, PCSOs

Vetting interview candidates if needed |

	Drug testing
	Light touch vetting of cadets
	Bullying and harassment policy
	PSD investigation into allegations and complaints
	CCU APSP risk matrix that assesses intelligence and behaviours of those coming to light that identifies the top 10 possible staff/officers of concern.
	CCU has responsibility for Notifiable Associations and risk management plans in order to manage potential persons of interest associated with Police officers/Staff.
	Internal 'crimestoppers' line to anonymously reports issues of integrity
	Sexual harassment survey undertaken
	Sexual harassment policy
Additional Control	Introduction of annual integrity checks PDR to be updated to prompt staff to notify us of changes
Update	Vetting standards are now good with processes that are robust. This is now managed with usual business procedures. **Agreed to archive at Feb 24 SORB**

Appendix C: Changes in risk score

STR0448	Risk to public confidence due to a year on year increase of complaints from members of the public		
Responsible Officer	D/Supt Tompkins	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	10/07/23	Current Rating	12
Category	People	Previous Rating	8
Information	The level of public complaints continues to rise and as a department, we now predict a likely figure of 1600 complaint this year. Reporting mechanisms have improved means by which the Public can make a complaint which may have some relevance to the increased figures. The trend by complainants at this time appears to be in relation to the quality of investigations and lack of contact. As at December 23: 13 officers/staff suspended – for conduct and complaints 41 officers/staff on restricted duties – for conduct and complaints Impactive on resource deployment capability, particularly within the Custody Suite.		
Risk rationale	There has been no increase in establishment of the PSD Complaints department over the past 4 years, but have secured 1 extra FTE investigator. Using non-PSD restricted staff on short term basis to bolster permanent staff but limited on what they can do. If continued increase in complaints, potential that will need to start sending out on to area for Sergeants to handle complaints – Force will need to consider this risk and contemplate mitigation by providing an increase in permanent resources. Quality and timeliness of investigations will impact on public confidence if we are unable to manage significant increases in workload.		

	Appeals will increase if quality of investigations is not maintained. Staff health and wellbeing will be impacted.
Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk could prevent Layer 5 strategic performance indicators to be achieved which could impact on the force priorities and pledge.
Existing Controls	Internal comms regarding the 10 standards of behaviour Training input from PSD to student officers PST checks on officers before they're confirmed in post Vetting in place for officers and staff Extension of crime stoppers line to members of the public Op Forefront designed to reduce complaints
Additional Control	Training across CMD/Custody Revisit of internal comms Engagement with wider force Additional staff needed
Update	In addition to controls already listed we are also completing training across CMD/Custody and have requested a slot on both Sgt and Insp training for newly promoted Officers. Revisit of internal comms when trends identified to specifically target areas of poor performance and behaviour. Recommencement of engagement with the TLA and other relevant areas of business to address trends coming from complaints (CaiD, Change Team, Local Policing (NPA)). **Current status: Risk score changed in SORB, February 2024.**

STR0350	Risk associated with a transition to an alternatively fuelled fleet		
Responsible Officer	C/Insp Parkes	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	22/09/22	Current Rating	9
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	12
Information	Leicestershire Police is seeking to transition to a fleet which does not use conventionally fuelled vehicles. This is being planned for sustainability reasons (to reduce our carbon footprint and to reduce our contribution to local air pollution) and to ensure business continuity (given the gradual phasing out of conventionally fuelled vehicles). The benefits to sustainability will be maximised if the electricity supplied is from renewable sources. There have been safety concerns raised in relation to electric vehicles both in their usage, especially when specific operational tactics are used and also during charging. There will need to be significant (10s of millions) of infrastructure investment but there are also potential opportunity costs in bringing extensive electrical inputs onto our sites, especially as the force will need to transition to electric sources of heating rather than gas and these heating systems will reduce the amount of electricity that may need to be brought on site. We are aware that new conventionally fuelled vehicles will probably only be produced up until circa 2028. The cost of fuelling EVs is not necessarily that much cheaper than traditional fuels.		
Risk rationale	There are potentially very high impacts to our strategic direction if busines continuity challenges are experienced as our service delivery and ability to respond will be undermined. There is also a high impact on the environment if the transition is not made. There are potentially high impacts to health and safety due to the fire risks associated with operational vehicle use plus the learning provided by the fire service regarding response to fires involving thermal runaway.		
Existing Controls	Liaison with LFRS, Blue Light Commercial, Leicester Climate Change Emergency Partnership, driving school, Emergency Services Environmental and Sustainability Group Oversight of sponsored vehicles Trials of electric cars		

	Vehicle replacement strategy
	Market research on vehicle charging technology
	Ongoing opportunities to increase the amount of renewable electricity for force premises
	Revised Fire Protection Association guidance around charging electric vehicles released
	Officer awareness of safety issues released
	Trial of enquiry vehicles and A1 electric van.
	4 electric cars deployed.
Additional Control	Charging infrastructure to be sited away from buildings
	Pricing for 10% renewable electricity being explored
	Vehicle tracking project to monitor vehicle usage
	Trials of demo vehicles in driving school
	Planning of future charging infrastructure included in future changes to car parks
	Service contracts will be included with installation of charging infrastructure
	Section 106 funding for 5 electric vehicles
	Bid for specific training courses for driving electric vehicles
Update	With ARVs, nothing yet meets 24/7 high performance, rapid change so we are writing a business case to project over the next 5 years and beyond to incrementally replace enquiry car fleet, but these are 2-3 ties more expensive, plus the infrastructure that goes around it.
	Bidding to install chargers across 5 sites for the EV trial. This will give us more data in terms of future vehicle requirements and also a better idea of likely costs depending on our rate of changeover. The biggest headache at the

	moment remains the rapidly dwindling pool of available high-powered vehicles as manufacturers continue their decline in production. **Current status: Risk score changed in SORB, February 2024.**

STR0459	Capacity within the Safety, Sustainability and Risk Unit		
Responsible Officer	Emma Maxwell	Impact: 4	Likelihood:2
Date Recorded	28/09/2023	Current Rating	8
Category	People	Previous Rating	16
Information	The SSR unit provides training, advice and inspections covering sustainability, business continuity, risk management, and health and safety. In 2022 one member of staff was seconded to another department. In April 2023 a member of staff went on long time leave and has since resigned. In September 2023 the head of the unit left the organisation. This left just 2 members of staff, one of which is new to the team and is not yet qualified in the role. In October 2023 a restricted police officer joined the team and in February 2024 a new Sustainability Officer joined. In April 2024 a second Sustainability Office will join. However, there will be some time needed to upskill the staff members in BC, risk and Health and Safety.		
Risk rationale	Risk rationale: Unable to provide any proactive advice and support on BC and Sustainability. Unable to deliver proactive and transformational work. Delays possible in advice, auditing and support.		
Risk consequence	Without sufficient oversight of organisational risk, the force may be less prepared for a crisis even and may be more likely to see litigation and enforcement action. There is also a possibility that sickness and injuries at work will increase. This may impact on Level 5 Strategic Performance Indicators and consequently impact on all other layers leading to a potential inability to deliver the force strategic priorities and the overall force pledge.		
Existing Controls	BC Plan in place		

	Head of SSR undertaking Deputy, Head and x2 assistant roles Restricted officer has joined the team 1 new sustainability officer joined 26th Feb
Additional Control	SSR review as part of wider SSD review Another sustainability officer will join 8th Apr.
Update	Restricted officer continues to help with admin such as chasing departmental risks and BC Plans. Also being trained to help building inspections and assist with operational accident investigation. The Health and Safety Assistant in post needs to complete the NEBOSH Certificate in Health and Safety before being able to take on competent work on their own. Time is being given to train this person in specialist areas, such as lighting assessments, but this does remove the Head of Dept from other work. One sustainability officer has joined and has begun taken on this area of work. A second will join in April 24, but they will need to be inducted and trained in other areas before the risk can reduce further. **Current status: Risk score changed in SORB, February 2024.**

STR0307	Risk to network storage		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	14/01/22	Current Rating	8
Category	Information systems/technology	Previous Rating	12
Information	As part of the Force's Digital Futures Program the infrastructure of our network is changing and will eventually migrate to a predominantly cloud based storage solution. Once delivered this will put Leicestershire Police at the forefront of digital policing and innovation. In the interim, Leicestershire Police are still required to support our current network infrastructure which has been placed under significant pressure from a number of national and local issues.		

	These issues culminated in our Network approaching 98% capacity which triggered a chain reaction of performance related issues, although our operational capabilities were maintained throughout. Currently there is excessive retention of data with infrequent deletion of material. Volume of data stored and acquired from mobile devices constantly increasing, and has become a National Issue. Legacy data is stored in various formats, both hardware storage (significant amount of historical data) and on premises digital storage. This is putting a significant burden on, and exposes the Force to, compliance risks. Current concerns regarding the amount, understanding and requirement of data currently held by the Force. Requirement to triage data stored and remove data that is no longer required, and implement a robust audit regime, with potential to incorporate a level of automation.
Risk rationale	Effective records management is a legal requirement for all public authorities under the terms of the Data Protection Act 2018. Accordingly, we are obliged to have processes and procedures in place that govern our collection, retention and deletion of data that is held within our Force network. Current digital information storage systems are affecting compliance with CPIA and MoPI requirements
Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk will potentially prevent achievement of the Layer 5 Strategic Performance Indicator for the volume of data storage which could then impact on the force strategic priorities and pledge.
Existing Controls	RRD Gold group governance Current network capacity Long term digital growth strategy and road map Financial investment Data deletion and reclaim of storage space DFU deletion of legacy Z-Drive data no longer required, and restructuring data for retention to facilitate effective future review Advice received from records manager

	DPIA
	Force Data Storage Board
	Use of Evidence and Property Archive Centre (EPAC)
	Published 'Management of Physical and Digital Evidence' guidance
	Published 'Retention, Storage and Destruction of Materials and Records relating to Forensic Examinations' document
Additional Control	IT updating unsupported nodes
	Transition to 'on-premise' network storage solution
	Hybrid cloud storage environment
	Discussing new Digital and Data Team
	Plans to set a 1000 day maximum automatic retention period to reduce data consumed by Spectre and Veriato Protective Monitoring Software saving 50TB of storage.
	Digital Forensic Transformation Project
Update	The force suffered some serious issues of late in this respect that resulted in over 100K needing to be spent to stabilise the network. This has been procured and will be installed early April. So, whilst this is not ideal it means the risk of an imminent collapse has reduced and the likelihood has reduced. **Current status: Risk score change proposed for next SORB, May 2024.**

STR449	CMD Demand and performance challenges		
Responsible Officer	T/Supt Bunn	Impact: 2	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	12/07/23	Current Rating	4

Category	Operational	Previous Rating	16
Information	CMD has seen a significant demand rise in relation to 999 call volumes. This has increased by approx. 70K over the past 2 full reporting years 21/22 & 22/23. This year 23/24 has seen continued rises on the 9's with May 23 seeing a record 20k 999 calls in one month and June looking likely to surpass this number. A highlight paper was prepared for the Executive group and presented on 20/6/23. As a result the demand rise into CMD has been declared a critical incident. A large proportionate of the rise is believed to be linked to an Android operating system update issue. The increase in 999 calls is a national issue and not unique to Leicestershire. Performance in Nov 23 – 92% 999 and 62.7% 101 showing significant improvement. FTE has been reached and sits approx. +8 over. The 16 PC's in addition so +24 on numbers. December performance as of 22/12/23 – 93.5% 999 and 71.6% 101.		
Risk rationale	Demand rise into CMD is unsustainable on current staffing levels this has resulted in increased wait times for 999 and 101 calls to be answered. It has also had an impact on 999 calls failing over to Northants as a buddy Force. This leads to increased risk to callers on 999 and confidence and satisfaction reduction on all call types.		
Risk consequence	Failing to manage the risk could result in not meeting the Layer 1 Strategic Performance Indicators which would then prevent the ability to meet the strategic priorities and force pledge.		
Existing Controls	Gold group established in March. Chief officer scrutiny over vacancies. Double staffing intake in CMD January 2023 Audit team carrying out a forensic review of demand. Gold group action generation and monitoring. 59 new starers since June 23 Changes to routing of 101 calls. Suspension of call back offer.		

	PCs seconded to CMD
	Internal and external click before you call campaign
	[New designed calling card](#) along with inputs to relevant staff re use launched
	20 LSTOs trained to handle emails and switchboard calls
	New sickness line process created removing approx. 5,500 contacts a year with a vast majority of those occurring between 0600-0800hrs
	2024/2025 recruitment and planning schedule agreed
Additional Control	Plans to train remaining 9 LSTOs
	Review of 101 answering time commissioned
Update	COT have agreed temp growth for 24/25 financial year £1.2m allocated for +26FTE on current numbers and a rolling recruitment fund.
	Risk is that other demand reduction / efficiency processes via Op Forefront to not delivery saving to fully remove the +26 leading to performance risk.
	Risk that demand may continue to rise again during the 24/25 year and summer months in particular (currently stabilised).
	Risk to retention / recruitment targets not being met and that the new temporary patterns created are not all taken up. Both of which would impact performance.
	Jan 24 performance 999 – 94.2%, 0.2% abandonment, Non-Emergency – 69.2%, 15.1% abandonment.
	Suggest we are currently at an impact of 2 x likelihood of 2.
	The risk may increase later in the year re: summer challenges and/or recruitment and retention issues as mentioned above.
	Current status: Risk score changed in SORB, February 2024.

STR1679	Complying with Home Office Counting Rules		
Responsible Officer	Darren Goddard	Impact: 2	Likelihood: 2
Date Recorded	12/06/13	Current Rating	4
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	9
Information	In 2018 HMICFRS revisited the Force to complete a detailed crime data integrity (CDI) inspection. The subsequent report assessed the overall crime recording processes as 'Inadequate'. There was significant improvement from the previous inspection completed in 2017. As part of HMICFRS PEEL 2021/22 inspection they graded the force as outstanding in respect of crime recording, they estimate our overall crime recording compliance was 95.5% for all crime, 91.3 % for violent crime and 98% for sexual offences. However, the reviews undertaken by the DDMs showed performance on a downward trend in the areas they review.		
Risk rationale	The force is required to comply with Home Office counting rules. PEEL assessment graded the force as outstanding for crime recording within the victim service assessment. However, our local audits and DDM reviews show that performance is on a downward trend.		
Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk could impact on layer 5 and layer 3 strategic performance indicators and could make it difficult to meet the force priorities and pledge.		
Existing Controls	CDI Board, training and delivery plan Audit regime NPCC Lead Increase in DDM staff LPD Bite Size Videos LPD and CMD improvement plans		
Additional Control	Business Insight Model		

	National review of Home Office Counting Rules Recruitment into DMM team
Update	The risk remains as a confidence issue but the trajectory is in the right direction and there are more resources in the DDM team. **Current status: Risk score changed in SORB, February 2024.**

STR0443	Backlog of traffic interviews that may cause reputational harm if cases time out or are lost		
Responsible Officer	Leah Johnson	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 1
Date Recorded	16/06/2023	Current Rating	3
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	6
Information	Due to increased demand and abstraction through injury there is a back log of interviews in our traffic department which currently stands at 245. These will be everything from document offences to Crown court offences. Several approaches have been tried to solve this issue, however they have either not helped or are not sustainable in the long term. The team has an establishment of two police officers but one will retire in October and has substantial leave built up. There is a reputational risk to the force if cases time out, the case is of lower quality as the force has to proceed without interview and therefore, we lose cases and disappoint victims.		
Risk rationale	There is significant scope of a loss in public confidence if we lose these cases and are found to be culpable for this.		
Existing Controls	SERB agreement for 2 extra officers to help for 12 months		
Additional Control	Additional help requested from LPD		
Update	Risk tide is slowing and likelihood of risk being realised is now low. **Current status: Risk score change proposed for next SORB, May 2024.**		

STR380	Implementation of the Job Evaluation Scheme		
Responsible Officer	Becky Milligan	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 1
Date Recorded	06/01/10	Current Rating	3
Category	People	Previous Rating	6
Information	The Equal Pay Audit requires consideration for a different and suitable JES. Following consultation the Force made the decision to implement the Hay Scheme. This has resulted in the development of a new Pay Model which cannot be cost prohibited but was not commissioned for cost saving purposes. If we do implement the HAY scheme some staff will have a reduction in pay, some will have an uplift and others will see no change. Other contractual terms such as A-L entitlement connected to rates of pay may also be affected. Industry consultants have confirmed that to re-design the current scheme would take so much work we would be better to select a scheme off the shelf, which HAY allows. There is a risk regarding the purple book scheme as due to staff departures, there are only 6 purple book evaluators within the force. 3 staff are required to grade each role, one to first grade and two to second grade and a further independent grader is required in the event of an appeal. This creates significant demand on these roles, all of which sit in HR.		
Risk rationale	If we do not implement a new JES we will have an out-of-date scheme that does not meet with Equality criteria, and any claims could be substantial. Not implementing it can also carry an issue of having jobs evaluated against an old and a new scheme, creating excessive resource demand. Increasing delays also risk lower morale and reputation.		
Existing Controls	Project plan and dedicated management Regular consultation Gold group provides governance, with Silver group feeding into it AWE design completed Costings included in the medium-term financial plan		

	Data set for pay modelling completed Pay modelling complete Updated data set prepared Employer Offer People Board
Additional Control	Ongoing employee support and communication
Update	Implementation is planned for September 2024. Next phase of concluding consultation has begun and UNISON are balloting members on the scheme. Several news updates released including FAQs and drop-in events. As there is clear implementation phase planned, suggest risk has reduced to low, noting that once implemented, there will be two risks – demand on HR and the impact on force morale (the latter being picked up as a H&S risk as organisational change is one of the 6 HSE stress factors). **Current status: Risk score change proposed for next SORB, May 2024.**

Appendix D: New Risks

STR0470	Failure of IT Server Affecting Cyclops Database		
Responsible Officer	Jas Minhas	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	02/02/2024	Current Rating	12
Category	Information Systems/Technology	Previous Rating	12

Information	Leicestershire Police currently operate a Server room at our FHQ that enables us to provide a number of critical systems across policing. Due to its importance and the complicated technical environment inherent in operating a server room, there are a number of protocols that are followed to ensure delivery remains stable. Two of these protocols involve maintaining a stable temperature of the physical environment (between 18c to 20c) and ensuring that we have robust disaster recovery processes in place to protect the data. On the 23rd December 2023 the IT Department were alerted to a heating issue in the Server Room that saw the temperature rise to 40c and this significantly impacted the operation of critical systems. This fault could not be remedied directly as the back-up air conditioning also failed, and the on-call IT took the steps they could, to protect the servers. However, on the 25th December 2023 the same situation repeated itself and a number of systems had to be temporarily powered down to stabilise both performance and protect the integrity of the server infrastructure. As soon as our IT Technical experts were in a position to restore the systems they began doing so and it is at this point that a critical failure of the Server that operates the Cyclops System was identified. Despite the best efforts of our IT Department and our Digital Forensics Unit it has not been possible to restore the Cyclops system as it would have been at the time of the failure. At this moment in time, the only possibility is to restore the Cyclops Database from a back-up which dates back to the 1st November 2023. In practical terms this means that the data that was entered between the 1st November and the 23rd December will not be available upon restoring the database. Since the event has occurred, a technical working group has been stood up to explore the various options to us to enable recovery of the system and the missing data.
Risk rationale	This poses a strategic risk to the Force for the following reasons: • Our Force Back-Ups did not work as intended and this meant that we are relying on a relatively old back-up to restore the system. • The Cyclops System stores data linked to HR Personnel Files and OH files for Leicestershire, Notts and Derby Police. The impact of the system being unavailable and having to identify documents that would have been added during this timeframe is significant, as well as having a reputational impact.

	• The risk of legal claims in future that rely on a document considered lost and irretrievable is a potential issue, albeit remote. • We need to evaluate and learn the lessons and ensure that our infrastructure remains robust moving forward.
Risk consequence	The Force has had to spend £13k to secure a copy of the corrupted data. The chance of restoring the lost data is considered low and the system has been returned to a live database from the outdated back-up. This means that moving forward we cannot say with certainty that everything that should be on an OH file, HR file etc is complete. We are reliant on targeted actions based on queries to repopulate the missing data. E.g. someone queries a missing OH report and we use IT solutions to locate it.
Existing Controls	Working group set up and OH, HR and regional forces are all assessing the impact of the event on their working practices. Contract with a disaster recovery supplier for replacement equipment is in place. Communications to the Force users has been published and they have been kept updated on attempts to restore the system.
Additional Control	To be determined.
Update	**Current status: No change to risk**

Appendix E: High Priority Risks (Red)

STR0081	Capacity within IT		
Responsible Officer	David Craig	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	28/06/19	Current Rating	16
Category	Information systems/technology	Previous Rating	16
Information	IT Department may not have capacity to support the delivery of digital transformation for the Force.		
Risk rationale	There are also increasing security incidents that impact on the capacity within IT. This could hinder progressive initiatives, impact strategic objectives and affect the reputation of the Force.		
Risk consequence	Potential failure to meet our pledge by not being able to fully invest in technology Possible impacts on our strategic priorities by affecting our service, delaying efficiency, increasing demand and not being able to maximise technology Increased likelihood of delays to all Level 5a Strategic Performance Indicators		
Existing Controls	IT Department work programme Digital Futures Board Force Programme Management Review of job descriptions Project Management Market Supplements External resource		

	Scheduling and prioritisation process Developing requirements for additional resource Restructuring of Comms and Support Section Creation of Digital Optimisation and Innovation team
Additional Control	Review of IT, Digital and Data Delivery
Update	There is continued IT programme management. The 21H2 upgrade is ongoing to make sure the laptop and desktop estate is supported and secure. The movement of Skype to Teams and the mailbox migration is ongoing. We are continuing to invest in IT despite recent financial pressures. IT review is the key mitigation with a delivery plan in place for this year. We will see incremental improvements as we go through the phases of this plan. This will be tracked through the Digital Futures Board with agreed timescales. We are recruiting solutions architects which provides the highest technical resource to further help mitigate the risk. **Current status: Risk score unchanged**

STR0278	The Financial Challenge – 2022/23 – 2025/26		
Responsible Officer	Paul Dawkins	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 4
Date Recorded	22/06/21	Current Rating	16
Category	Finance	Previous Rating	16
Information	The overall MTFP position has deteriorated further. The police officer and staff pay awards for September 2022 and 2023 have significantly increased pay inflation cost pressures across the MTFP period 2023/27, as the awards are only part funded by the Home Office. The Force is also experiencing higher than forecast non-pay inflation and considerable unbudgeted costs in relation to Op Sycamore. Despite the PCC raising Band D precept by £15 for 2023/24 only, current assumptions indicate the MTFP will not balance through to 2027. The 2023/24 cashable efficiency savings requirement of		

	£3.9m will be achieved. The MTFP will be continually reviewed by the Investments, Demand, Efficiency & Productivity Board (IDEP Board), chaired by the DCC.
Risk rationale	The Force faces a number of challenges relating to its financial position for the MTFP period 2023/27. These originate from unfunded pay and non-pay inflationary cost pressures. In recent months the overall MTFP position has markedly deteriorated. The MTFP will continue to be reviewed each quarter.
Risk consequence	This risk has the potential to impact on the financial resources necessary to meet both the level 5a Finance Strategic Performance Indicators, as well as our strategic priorities; and ultimately to deliver the police pledge.
Existing Controls	Strategy and oversight

Budget review

IDEP Board (chaired by the DCC) |
| Additional Control | Ongoing review

Considering funding implications for pay awards |
| Update | No changes to the risk score at this time.

Current status: Risk score unchanged. |

STR0411	Loss of all IT functionality due to overheating at Euston Street		
Responsible Officer	Andrew Wroe	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	27/10/2022	Current Rating	12
Category	Estates and Assets	Previous Rating	12
Information	The air conditioning system at Euston Street is working at 100% capacity. This system should be n+1 as a minimum meaning it should continue to function fully with the failure of half of the plant. This is how it was designed. So much additional IT equipment has been added, n+1 has been lost. If either half of the plant should fail or is taken down for servicing the temperature in the room rises rapidly. If it is not reinstated quickly this could lead to failure of the IT equipment		

	held in the room. The plant is relatively old at about 8 years. If a major part is required and is not "off the shelf" this could take the system down for days.
Risk rationale	Overheating could lead to complete failure in IT functionality across the force
Risk consequence	Failure to manage the risk could prevent achieving the layer 5 Estates Strategic Performance Indicators and may also impact on delivering performance across other layers. This may lead to being unable to deliver on strategic priorities and the force pledge.
Existing Controls	Regular maintenance. A/C engineers on call. Funding approved within 23/24 Capital Programme Briefing paper created with Contingency Planning detailing the planned work
Additional Control	Proposed more to Cloud system £670K investment proposed to restore n+1 functionality.
Update	We are still awaiting vetting which has been delayed by Warwickshire Police. This will be delayed until at least the end of January. Warwickshire Police do our external vetting but they have significant backlogs. At the last Business Development Board in December 2023 consideration was suggested for someone in our internal vetting team to be trained to do vetting for Estates contractors. This is being reviewed, but will require approx. 3 months training. At other sites the cooling is not a current issue. Keyham, has air conditioning and also has equipment onsite ready to be installed for the summer. At Oakham was completed December 2023. **Current status: Risk score unchanged until work has been completed.**

STR0339	Risk of a successful cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police		
Responsible Officer	Steve Morris	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3

Date Recorded	26/07/22	Current Rating	12
Category	Intelligence, Information Management and Security	Previous Rating	12

Information	A successful cyber-attack on Leicestershire Police may result in the serious compromise of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information systems, services and assets of the force, potentially hindering operational effectiveness. Attacks can vary in nature and extent such as, malicious software or may include phishing, advanced persistent threats, social engineering and hacking. Attacks may or may not be targeted on the force and may be perpetrated by foreign national governments, terrorists, organised crime groups, hackers or employees. Depending upon the sophistication and scale of attack, there will be varying impacts that may include denial of service, loss or disclosure of information/data and the loss of ability to share information and potentially threatening operational effectiveness leading to harm and reputational damage. There can also be system or application downtime and potential legal consequences. The force has recently fallen victim to a number of phishing emails. The Force has also been contacted by partner agencies who have had their systems compromised which have held Police data. Blocking email addresses is one of our main defences, however, these emails will originate from email addresses that we regularly use and would have little reason to regard as suspicious. Many of these partner organisations correspond with senior members of staff.
Risk rationale	Impact scored at a 4 because there would be major impact on ability to fulfil strategic objectives, major stakeholder concerns and major disruption to service delivery. Likelihood scored at a 3 because there is 51-75% chance of a cyber-attack. It is more likely to occur than not.
Risk consequence	Due to the reliance on information systems, failure to manage this risk could result in not being able to meet strategic performance indicators across business layers, preventing force priorities and the pledge to be met.
Existing Controls	Staff guidance, training and awareness Assistance from the NMC with cyber related incidents POLWARP reporting system Annual Accreditation processes for PSN, PSNP and Airwave

	Mail marshall and firewalls for email correspondence and browsing
	Technical internal control procedures such as hardening, patching, control of malicious software and passwords
	Annual IT health checks
	Recruitment procedures including vetting, authorization, access management and leavers
	Management of contractors and volunteers
	Physical security of buildings and assets
	Liaison Between I.T and Information Security
	PSD Protective monitoring including monitoring, auditing and reporting capability
	GDPR compliance
	Security Incident Management Procedure
	Cyber Incident Response Training
	Partnered working with Cyber Crime
	Engagement with the local LRF
	Engagement with National Cyber Working Group
	Technical internal controls
	Oversight from NMC
	Cyber Incident Response Training
	On call rota
	Migration to Sentinel

	Links made to Cyber Crime Unit and they provide advice and assess our capabilities that are put in to our continual improvement process
Additional Control	Planning an audit on how department heads manage cyber security within BC Plans

Detailed list of all valuable assets

Define a strategy for IT infrastructure enhancements

Improved procedures around cyber incidents

Playbooks in development stage

New force policy and procedure – sent through for review

Comms plan to all staff

The Force is in the process of ensuring that all users are onboarded to O365.

Migration to cloud began Nov 2023.

Workstream tracked by Tiger Bridge Working Group |
| Update | We have stood up a new Cyber Resilience Group, which is exploring all elements of our cyber response and BC planning.

This follows the LCC attack, the attack on the NHS in Scotland and a trusted supplier to policing all being attacked within a matter of a week or so.

Current status: No changes to risk score |

STR0292	Violence, Abuse and Intimidation Against Women and Girls		
Responsible Officer	Supt Baker	Impact: 4	Likelihood: 3

Date Recorded	12/09/2021	Current Rating	12
Category	Community Engagement and Partnership	Previous Rating	12
Information	Leicestershire Police is committed to tackling violence against women and girls – and is continuing to engage with partner agencies and the wider public in order to do so. We are also keen to improve women's perceptions of safety across Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland and to ensure that women have the highest level of confidence in our ability and commitment to assist them.		
Risk rationale	In addition to National media attention on the risk to women and girls from violence, Leicestershire Police has seen an increase in the number of reports regarding domestic abuse and controlling and coercive behaviour		
Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk could result in an inability to meet Layer 3 strategic performance indicators and impact on our ability to deliver the force pledge.		
Existing Controls	Robust Force Governance structure NPCC oversight through VAWG Taskforce Partnership structures- DA and Sexual Violence Requirement – SPB, Adult Vulnerability and Offending Boards – LLR Board to be reinstated Force VAWG Action Plan LLR Safeguarding Adults and Safeguarding Children's Boards Boards DHR Review Boards (Leicester City and Leicestershire and Rutland) MARAC Dedicated Decision Makers (ensuring stalking, harassment and CCB are recorded alongside other DA offences) Officer and staff training – rolling for NPOs and additional specialist training given to DAIU, CAIU, Exploitation Team and Signal officers Gender Steering Group and action plan		

National strategy and work with key stakeholders and partners

Safety of Women At Night (SWAN) funding

Safer Streets

Street pastors

Ask for Angela scheme

Partnership bus

Welfare and Vulnerability Engagement (WAVE)

Targeted social media e.g.You're Right / That's Wrong and NTE-specific messaging

New service to make it easier to report sexual offences online

Problem profile created by the analyst team

Outcome 15 and 16 audit is being managed through CDI

VAWG lead now a member of the Adult Vulnerability and Offending Board

The VAWG lead and operational officers linked into a multi-agency partnership project led by University of Leicester and funded by the Economic and Social research Council, EMPOWER, to develop best practice

Lived experience group for sexual violence has been established – VOICES – advising the Response to Sexual Violence (R2SV) Board.

The Domestic Abuse Response Team is now embedded.

Courageous Conversations events to promote a culture in which VAWG internally will not be tolerated – rolling programme with EDI Team

Force review and creation of "layers" – VAWG investigations in Layers 2 and 3. Creation of Layer 3 Crime Board and alignment to the Vulnerability Board chaired by ACC Kerr.

	Enhanced focus upon performance through governance boards and reporting to SPDB. DA Standard Risk performance monitored in STEPS with a DA Performance Pack for LPD Deep drive Rape Audit developed – early 2024 will be carried out by the Aduti Team. Op Soteria self-assessment and .progress monitoring of implementation of the RASSO National Operating Model National VAWG Action Plan – new 4P plans drafted for 2024-2027 Refreshed VAWG, RASSO and DA and Stalking Delivery Plans for 2024 (using 4P approach) Daily DMM focus on unattended DA incidents Lived experience group for sexual violence has been established – VOICES
Additional Control	Outcome 16 scrutiny now applied through new Niche template – newly established, PowerBI tool developed to ensure compliance Monitoring the ability to collect all protected characteristic data on Power BI. Work and engagement with Minerva underway within the NICHE team. Oversight of VAWG related HMIC action plan remains with the Inspectorate Team with appropriate updates provided. Seeking to introduce training provider on Active Bystanders –funding (just under £20k) identified in PSD underspend. Currently awaiting agreement by the People Board to roll out. Development of guidance on the use of language and cultural impact in respect of VAWG is nearing completion. In discussion also with IOPC on their similar work (first draft circulated to partners). VAWG partnerships and commissioning being mapped by the OPCC Violence Reduction Network has secured Home Office Safer Streets funding for preventative interventions with young people to promote healthy relationships, tackle misogyny and develop active bystander programmes for young people in communities across LLR most affected by VAWG.

Update	Work done has highlighted new risks about poor performance / attitude towards VAWG and focus of frontline officers and supervisors on closing crimes quickly rather than achieving positive outcomes for victims. Attendance at DA incidents is a risk and now forms part of daily monitoring through the DMM. Typically between 30 and 50 unattended incidents per day. Work under way to test a video interface with victims. Unattended DA incidents cause a risk to public confidence and victim's confidence – high levels of victim disengagement from investigations impact positive outcome rates. Unattended incidents also leading to increase in the number of uncompleted DASH assessments – therefore crime and incident records with "unknown risk". The 365-day rolling positive outcome rate for Standard risk DA has fallen from 10.0% to 8.5% (December 2022 to December 2023). This is an area of focus for improved performance and has been incorporated into the monthly LPD STEPs performance meeting. Attendance times for DA incidents are significantly longer than for other crime types – concern about perverse behaviours and avoidance by officers impacting upon performance. The DA Language Matters guidance has been completed, now awaiting design by Corporate Comms along with a communications and guidance package to include input / film by survivors of DA to explain their lived experience of encounters with police and good / poor practice. Uplift of 12 x PCs, 2x DSs and 1 x DI – however there remains a risk in that force-wide staffing demands, particularly for Constables who have passed the Sgts' exam, may see Signal DCs removed to fill PS posts elsewhere under Op Forefront changes. Because of the downturn in force performance on DA outcomes and the potential to impact upon force reputation and ability to delivery against the VAWG STRA in volume DA investigations. **Current status: No change to risk**

STR0383	Lack of PIP 2 Detectives due to lack of staff and training affecting capability		
Responsible Officer	DS Amanda Thwaites	Impact: 3	Likelihood: 3
Date Recorded	15/06/2020	Current Rating	9
Category	Operational	Previous Rating	9
Information	The lack of PIP2 qualified detectives has been identified as a national issue, and it is having a significant impact within the CAID departments. In 2019 the number of PIP 2 qualified detectives within CAID sat at only 55% of the allocated establishment.		
Risk rationale	CAID should have 423 detectives in place - but currently only has 264		
Risk consequence	Failure to manage this risk could prevent the achievement of layer 3 and layer 5 strategic performance indicators, impacting on the force priorities and pledge.		
Existing Controls	Process in place for CID Aides (PC to DC Process). DHEP Program. PC to DC recruitment process. CID attachments (PIP 1) part of Resource Cell Plan. SERB - seeking to identify and implement force support around placements of officers in the DCs gaps in the period it takes to train DCs. PIP 1 investigators have been deployed into other CAID depts to assist with vacancies - mitigating the skills drain from CID. Review of work allocation in CAIU has been completed.		
Additional Control	Adopt a more agile approach to backfilling existing staff on area to allow them to attend courses. Identification of the requirement to futureproof the interest shown, and ongoing requirement to promote detective process. An improved approach to seek direct approach to teams and individuals, with personalised inputs and engagements to enhance and motivate interest in individuals becoming, and remaining Detectives.		

	Force looking to recruit temporary capacity for 2 years to support inexperienced staff. This is being managed by the Resource Board
Update	The projection remains be at 423 full establishment as at January 2026. DCS Ward has now increased study days from 3 to 5 to aid getting through the NIE to help get through exam 1st time. In addition there is now a corporate licence to Blackstones to enable all staff to access NIE revision books / Q&A material Including trainee DCs. 241.63/423 = 57.1% of detective/investigator posts filled by PIP level 2 accredited staff. Maternity leave included 241.63 - 19.21 = 4.5% on mat leave with 4.71 pregnant = 1.1%. • 76.18/423= 18% of detective/investigator posts filled by TI's working towards accreditation. 48 Direct Entry DC's = 11.3% • % of detective/investigator posts currently abstracted due to long term investigations. 1 x DC abstracted to Op ZANDER (National) = less than 1% • % of detective/investigator posts currently vacant. Abstractions - 31.67 FTE = 7.5% Vacancies - 34.92 = 8.3% (includes career breaks 12 = 2.3%) 15.8% not in post Actual deployable number 204.29/ 423 of PIP2 Detectives in Detective posts in force is 48.2% Detectives in PIP2 Posts. **Current status: No change in risk**

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Appendix F - Risk Scoring Matrix

	Impact					
Score	**Performance/ Service Delivery**	**Finance /Efficiency £**	**Confidence/Reputation**	**Health and Safety**	**Environment**	**Strategic Direction**
4	Major disruption to service delivery. Major impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force: >1,000,000 Business area: >150,000	Major stakeholder/investigations/longer lasting community concerns. Major reputational damage. Adverse national media coverage > 7 days.	Death or a life changing injury.	Very high negative environmental impact (high amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Major impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
3	Serious disruption to service delivery. Serious impact on performance indicators noticeable by stakeholders.	Force: 251,000-1,000,000 Business area: 41,000-150,000	Serious stakeholder/investigations/ prolonged specific section of community concerns. Serious reputational damage. Adverse national media coverage < 7 days.	An injury requiring over 24-hours hospitalisation and /or more than 3 days off work or a major injury as defined by the RIDDOR regulations.	High negative environmental impact (medium amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Serious impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
2	Significant disruption to service delivery. Noticeable impact on performance indicators.	Force: 51,000-250,000 Business area: 11,000-40,000	Significant investigations/specific section of community concerns. Significant reputational damage adverse local media coverage.	An injury requiring hospital / professional medical attention and/or between one day and three days off work with full recovery.	Medium negative environmental impact (low amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Significant impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.
1	Minor disruption to service delivery. Minor impact on performance indicators.	Force: <50,000 Business area: <10,000	Complaints from individuals. Minor impact on a specific section of the community.	An injury involving no treatment or minor first aid with no time off work.	Low negative environmental impact (limited amount of natural resources used, pollution produced, biodiversity affected).	Minor impact on the ability to fulfil strategic objective.

Likelihood		
	Score	**Chance of Occurrence**
Very High	4	>75% (almost certain to occur)
High	3	51-75% (more likely to occur than not)
Medium	2	25-50% (fairly likely to occur)
Low	1	<25% (unlikely to occur)

Overall Risk Rating
Impact x Likelihood
9 - 16   =   High
5 - 8   =   Medium
1 - 4   =   Low